Information quality in online social media and big data collection: an example of Twitter spam detection by Washha, Mahdi
THE`SE
En vue de l’obtention du
DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITE´ DE TOULOUSE
De´livre´ par : l’Universite´ Toulouse 3 Paul Sabatier (UT3 Paul Sabatier)
Pre´sente´e et soutenue le 17/07/2018 par :
Mahdi Washha
Information Quality in Online Social Media and Big Data Collection: An
Example of Twitter Spam Detection
JURY
Pr. Josiane MOTHE Universite´ Toulouse Jean Jaure`s Pre´sident du Jury
Pr. Anne BOYER Universite´ de Lorraine Rapporteur
Pr. Arnaud MARTIN Universite´ de Rennes 1 Rapporteur
Pr. Morgan MAGNIN Laboratoire des Sciences de Nantes Examinateur
Pr. Florence Se`des Universite´ Paul Sabatier Directeur de The`se
E´cole doctorale et spe´cialite´ :
MITT : Domaine STIC : Intelligence Artificielle
Unite´ de Recherche :
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (UMR 5505)
Directeur de The`se :
Florence Se`des
Rapporteurs :
Anne BOYER et Arnaud MARTIN
Social Networks Research
Twitter Spam Detection in Real-Time Stream
and Big Data Collection
Mahdi Washha
June 2018
ii
Thanking others is part of gratitude to Allah.
— Hadith on GratitudeACKNOWLEDGMENT
First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Florence Sèdes
for the continuous support of my Ph.D study and related research, for her patience, mo-
tivation, and immense knowledge. Her guidance helped me in all the time of research
and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor
for my Ph.D study.
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee for their
insightful comments and encouragement, but also for the hard question which incented
me to widen my research from various perspectives.
My sincere thanks also goes to my best friends and colleagues Aziz Qaroush, Mahmoud
Qudseya, Mahmoud Ammar, Ismail Badache, Abdelhamid Chellal, Manel Mezghani,
Ghada Jaber, Thi Bich Ngoc Hoang, and Mohammed El Malki, who provided me pre-
cious support where without it would not be possible to conduct this Ph.D thesis.
I thank my fellow labmates in for the stimulating discussions, for the sleepless nights
we were working together before deadlines, and for all the fun we have had in the last
four years. Also I thank my friends in the following institution Institut de Recherche en
Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT), and Computer and Electrical Systems Engineering at
Birzeit University (BZU).
Last but not the least, I would like to Thank my family: my parents and my brothers
and sisters for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and my life in
general.
iii
The purpose of abstraction is not to be vague, but to create a new semantic level in which one
can be absolutely precise.
— Edsger DijkstraABSTRACT
The popularity of Online Social Media (OSM) is mainly conditioned by the integrity and
the quality of user-generated content (UGC) as well as the protection of users’ privacy.
Based on the definition of information quality as fitness for use, the high usability
and accessibility of OSM have exposed many information quality (IQ) problems which
consequently decrease the performance of OSM dependent applications. Such problems
are caused by ill-intentioned individuals who misuse OSM services to spread different
kinds of "noisy" information, including fake information, illegal commercial content,
drug sales, malware downloads, and phishing links. The propagation and spreading
of noisy information causes enormous drawbacks related to resources consumptions,
decreasing quality of service of OSM-based applications, and wasting human efforts.
The majority of popular social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc) over the Web 2.0
is daily attacked by an enormous number of ill-intentioned users. However, those pop-
ular social networks are ineffective in handling such a "noisy" information, requiring
several weeks or months to detect them. Moreover, different challenges stand in front
of building a complete OSM-based information filtering methods that can overcome the
shortcomings of OSM information filters. These challenges are summarized in: (i) big
data; (ii) privacy and security; (iii) structure heterogeneity; (iv) UGC format diversity;
(v) subjectivity and objectivity; (vi) and service limitations.
In this thesis, we focus on increasing the quality of social UGC that are published and
publicly accessible in forms of posts and profiles over Online Social Networks (OSNs)
through addressing in-depth the stated above serious challenges. As the social spam
is the most common IQ problem appearing over the OSM, we introduce a design of
two generic approaches for detecting and filtering out the spam content. The first ap-
proach is for detecting the spam posts (e.g., spam tweets) in a real-time stream, while
the other approach is dedicated for handling a big data collection of social profiles (e.g.,
Twitter accounts). For filtering the spam content in real-time, we introduce an unsuper-
vised collective-based framework that automatically adapts a supervised spam tweet
classification function in order to have an updated real-time classifier without requiring
manual annotated data-sets. In the second approach, we treat the big data collections
through minimizing the search space of profiles that needs advanced analysis, instead
of processing every user’s profile existing in the collections. Then, each profile falling
in the reduced search space is further analyzed in an advanced way to produce an
accurate decision using a binary classification model.
The experiments conducted on Twitter online social network have shown that the unsu-
pervised collective-based framework is able to produce updated and effective real- time
binary tweet-based classification function that adapts the high evolution of social spam-
mer’s strategies on Twitter, outperforming the performance of two existing real- time
spam detection methods. On the other hand, the results of the second approach have
demonstrated that performing a preprocessing step for extracting spammy meta-data
values and leveraging them in the retrieval process is a feasible solution for handling a
large collection of Twitter profiles, as an alternative solution for processing all profiles
existing in the input data collection.
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The introduced approaches open different opportunities for information science re-
searcher to leverage our solutions in other information filtering problems and applica-
tions. Our long term perspective consists of (i) developing a generic platform covering
most common OSM for instantly checking the quality of a given piece of information
where the forms of the input information could be profiles, website links, posts, and
plain texts; (ii) and transforming and adapting our methods to handle additional IQ
problems such as rumors and information overloading.
Keywords: Social Spam, Social Spammer, Information Quality, Online Social Media,
Machine Learning, Supervised Learning, Unsupervised Learning, Twitter
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RÉSUMÉ
La popularité des médias sociaux en ligne (Online Social Media - OSM) est fortement
liée à la qualité du contenu généré par l’utilisateur (User Generated Content - UGC)
et la protection de la vie privée des utilisateurs. En se basant sur la définition de la
qualité de l’information, comme son aptitude à être exploitée, la facilité d’utilisation
des OSM soulève de nombreux problèmes en termes de qualité de l’information qui
impacte les performances des applications exploitant ces OSM. Ces problèmes sont
causés par des individus mal intentionnés (nommés "spammeurs") qui utilisent les OSM
pour disséminer de fausses informations et/ou des informations indésirables telles que
les contenus commerciaux illégaux. La propagation et la diffusion de telles informations,
les "spams", entraînent d’énormes problèmes affectant la qualité de services proposés
par les OSM.
La majorité des OSM (comme Facebook, Twitter, etc.) sont quotidiennement attaqués
par quantité d’utilisateurs mal intentionnés. Cependant, les techniques de filtrage adop-
tées par les OSM s’avèrernt inefficaces dans le traitement de ce type d’information ainsi
bruitée, nécessitant plusieurs semaines ou voir plusieurs mois pour filtrer l’information
"spam". Plusieurs défis doivent être surmontés pour réaliser une méthode de filtrage de
cette information bruitée. Les défis majeurs sous-jacents à cette problématique peuvent
être résumés par : (i) données de masse ; (ii) vie privée et sécurité ; (iii) hétérogénéité des
structures dans les réseaux sociaux ; (iv) diversité des formats du UGC; (v) subjectivité
et objectivité.
Notre travail s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’amélioration de la qualité des contenus en
termes de messages partagés (contenu spam) et de profils des utilisateurs (spammeurs)
des OSM en abordant en détail les défis susmentionnés. Comme le spam social est le
problème le plus récurrent qui apparaît sur les OSM, nous proposons deux approches
génériques pour détecter et filtrer le contenu spam: i) la première approche consiste à
détecter le contenu spam (par exemple, les tweets spam) dans un flux en temps réel; ii)
la seconde approche est dédiée au traitement d’un grand volume des données relatives
aux profils utilisateurs des spammeurs (par exemple, les comptes Twitter).
Pour filtrer le contenu spam en temps réel, nous introduisons une approche
d’apprentissage non supervisée qui permet le filtrage en temps réel des tweets spams
dans laquelle la fonction de classification est adaptée automatiquement. La fonction
de classification est entraînée de manière itérative et ne requiert pas de collection de
données annotées manuellement.
Dans la deuxième approche, nous traitons le problème de classification des profils util-
isateurs dans le contexte d’une collection de données à grande échelle. Nous proposons
de faire une recherche dans un espace réduit de profils utilisateurs (une communauté
d’utilisateurs) au lieu de traiter chaque profil d’utilisateur. Chaque profil appartenant à
cet espace réduit est analysé pour prédire sa classe à l’aide d’un modèle de classification
binaire.
Les expériences menées sur Twitter ont montré que le modèle de classification collective
non supervisé proposé est capable de générer une fonction efficace de classification
binaire des tweets en temps réel qui s’adapte à l’évolution des stratégies des spammeurs
vi
sociaux sur Twitter. L’approche proposée surpasse les performances de deux méthodes
de l’état de l’art de détection de spam en temps réel. Les résultats de la deuxième
approche ont démontré que l’extraction des métadonnées des spams et leur exploitation
dans le processus de recherche de profils de spammeurs est réalisable dans le contexte
de grandes collections de profils Twitter. L’approche proposée est une alternative au
traitement de tous les profils existants dans le OSM.
Mots clés : Spam social, Spammeur social, Qualité de l’information, Médias sociaux
en ligne, Apprentissage automatique, Apprentissage supervisé, Apprentissage non
supervisé, Twitter
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INTRODUCT ION
Social media is an amazing tool, but it’s really the face-to-face interaction that makes a
long-term impact.
— Felicia Day
1.1 Evolution of Social Web
The emergence of Social Web has made considerable changes at the functional levels
of the World Wide Web (WWW), evolved from being static, in which users were only
consuming information, to a new version of Web where users can produce information.
The Social Web concept has been firstly introduced by Rheingold in 1996, where the
main purposes of such Web are to make the communication among users more effective
and to make publicly information accessible for users throughout the new generation
of social websites [118]. The primary and main services that have been provided in the
early age of social networks are transforming the structure of the Web from a hypertext
environment to a "Web of people" environment for connecting families, colleagues, and
friends together. These services were mainly provided, in that period, by SixDegrees1
social site which had allowed users to create profiles and then get friends with other
users.
The Social Web evolved in 1998 by launching the first blogging service which has given
Internet users the opportunity to publish their own content on the Web. Such service
allows users to interact with each other and post comments on published contents. Wiki
platforms, namely knownWikipedia2 (2001), have later promoted the interaction service
among users, enabling online communities to efficiently exchange their knowledge and
perform online collaboration. Then, the popularity of these websites has attracted others
to build new social networking services such as Myspace3 (2003), Facebook4 (2004),
LinkedIn5 (2006) and Twitter6 (2006). The rapid appearance and growth of these social
network websites have made a new life style of the Internet generation. The impacts of
the new style of Internet have reached various levels of life services, including education,
communication, commercial, financial, and governmental services.
The dramatic growth of Social Web has changed the role of Internet users from be-
ing just passive information consumers to active producers in generating information.
Thus, Web users have the ability to act as an information producer and consumer at
the same time. The production role of Internet users helps in enriching the Web expe-
rience. Data published by users is defined as User-Generated Content (UGC), which
covers the following formats and materials: (i) original or compiled materials that have
1 https://www.sixdegrees.org/
2 https://www.wikipedia.org/
3 https://myspace.com/
4 http://facebook.com/
5 https://www.linkedin.com/
6 http://twitter.com/
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Figure 1.1: Number of social media users worldwide from 2010 to 2017, projected until 20219.
been published over social media websites (e.g., YouTube7, Flikr8, etc); (ii) feedback and
metadata in form of comments, reviews, rates, and tags; (iii) and social network data
such as public profiles, social network structure and user interactions.
Table 1.1: Statistics showing the type of UGC that US users have created for six years since 2008,
in addition to the percentage of Internet users who have acted as UGC consumers.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
User-generated video 36.0% 39.8% 42.5% 44.8% 47.2% 49.2%
Social Networking 41.2% 44.2% 46.9% 49.1% 50.5% 51.8%
Blogs 54.0% 58.0% 61.0% 64.0% 67.0% 69.0%
Wikis 33.9% 36.6% 39.0% 41.0% 42.6% 43.9%
UGC consumers 60.0% 62.0% 64.0% 66.0% 68.0% 70.0%
Recent statistics about the popular social media websites show the importance of those
sites as well as the incredible volume of UGC published by their users. According
to Statista10, Figure 1.1 illustrates the number of social media users worldwide from
2010 to 2017 with providing predictions until 2021. It is obvious that the number of
social media is getting increasing almost in a linear way with an average rate about
0.3 billion users per year. In 2019, it is estimated that there will be around 2.77 billion
social media users around the globe, up from 2.46 billion in 2017. eMaraketer 11 has
provided useful statistics, reported in Table 1.1, about the type of UGC that had been
created and consumed by United States Internet users. The statistics show that 68% of
internet users in United States were acting as consumers of UGC, while Blog remains
7 https://www.youtube.com/
8 https://www.flickr.com/
9 https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/
10 https://www.statista.com/
11 https://www.emarketer.com/
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the most popular social networking service attracting 67% of Internet users. As less
attractive type of social media for users, social networking and videos sharing websites
have attracted 50.5% and 47.2% of Internet users, respectively.
Table 1.2: Statistics illustrating the number of registered users and monthly active users of Face-
book, Twitter, Google+, and LinkedIn social media users, reported at the fourth quar-
ter (Q4) of the mentioned year.
Social Media Name Registered Users
(million)
Monthly Active
Users (million)
Date
Facebook 1440+ 2000+ Q4 2017
Twitter 255+ 330+ Q4 2017
Google+ 440+ 2200+ Q4 2016
LinkedIn 530+ 106+ Q4 2017
From another perspective, Table 1.2 shows the most popular social networking websites
with the number of registered users and monthly active users. Facebook is the domi-
nant social network site among other popular websites (e.g., Twitter, Google+) with
more than 1.4 billion registered users according to the statistics published in the fourth
quarter of 2017. Twitter, the most popular microblogging service, claims that more than
330 million users were active at the fourth quarter of 2017 with 500 million tweets per
day. Other social networking sites show an increasing number of daily published UGC
including reviews, comments and tagged objects.
1.2 Towards Leveraging Online Social Media Information
The appearance of UGC on Web and, particularly, Social Web has contributed in having
a massive source of information. In 2018, Google processes more than 40,000 search
queries every second, with over 3.5 billion searches per day and 1.2 trillion searches
per year12. Twitter has reported that it has handled over 1.6 billion daily queries by 17
April 2011. On the other side, in 18 September 2012, Facebook has process more than
1 billion daily search queries. These statistics show the impact of changing user’s role
from acting as information consumer to content producer. Furthermore, users have
became interested in seeking for fresh and accurate information than before. Being
aware of the public UGC availability and the original content, users would like to have:
(i) access to this type of data which could be informative for them; (ii) transform and
utilize such data in the end-user applications for increasing their services performance.
Indeed, what would make the UGC valuable is that it represents user interactions,
collective knowledge, and user’s experience. Thus, OSM13 information has been
leveraged in various areas, including researches, social and non-social applications,
recommendation systems, and information retrieval engines. In the following, the
important roles and benefits of UGC are projected on different contexts: (i) Social
Information Retrieval; (ii) Recommendation Systems; (iii) and Marketing and Business.
12 http://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/
13 OSM term is more comprehensive than OSN.
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questioning-answer website would be practical in this case. Furthermore, a
user would be particularly interested in some Smartphone if a similar friend
has already purchased it. UGC and user relationships could be exploited to
enhance information access and provide quality data that satisfies user’s needs
of information and helps him to accomplish his task.
The motivation behind the use of UGC within information access and retrieval
system, typically for Web search, is to take advantage of the “Wisdom of
Crowds” and leverage the search accuracy. The “Wisdom of Crowds” concept,
introduced by Surowiecki (2005), refer to the collective intelligence elaborated
by Internet users who collaborate to tag, rate and review Web resources via
Wikis and blogs. As illustrated in figure 1.1, these interactions are useful for
accessing t web resources. It allows retrieval systems to gather user feedback
and thus present accurate results to his information need.
Social Network Information/RessourceInteractions/UGC
post, photo, video, 
rates, review, wiki, 
comment, bookmark, 
tags, microblog, blog, 
ODP, clickthrough
Information RetrievalQ
Figure 1.1: Using UGC to enhance infromation retrieval
Social networks and UGC could be integrated along retrieval processes as infor-
mation source for relevance feedback and personalized access. For instance, user
queries may be expanded using Wikis (Koolen et al., 2009), ODP collaborative
directory (Bai et al., 2007) and tagging information (Heymann et al., 2008b).
New published Web pages could be instantly detected thanks to blogs and mi-
croblogging stream (Rowlands et al., 2010; Dong et al., 2010). Click through
data such as query logs, clicks, bookmarks may be used for ranking Web re-
sources (Joachims, 2002; Xue et al., 2004). The main di erence between these
approaches and traditional information retrieval models focusing on information
entities (i.e., documents and terms) is to take into account the social context of
Web resources.
Despite the promising role of UGC in information search and access, retrieval
processes should focus on user as a primer unit of information. In fact, Internet
users search for relevant information with regards to their information needs
but, at the same time, wonder which person has published this information? Is
he a reliable source of knowledge? How other people do think about? These
8
Figure 1.2: Role of social network based UGC in enhancing information retrieval engines [17].
Social Information Retrieval (SIR). The current trends in IR field focus on integrating
social networks information and UGC when performing retrieval tasks, as information
source for relevance feedback and personalized access. For example, as simplified in
Figure 1.2, many works have been edicated for xpan ing queries u ing different
sources of UGC such s Wikis [84]. The SIR field has been further evolved t involve
the UGC user as an important unit of information. More precisely, Internet users are
certainly interested in retrieving relevant information, meanwhile, they are concerning
about the users who have published those information at different levels, including
source reliability of knowledge, and user’s reputation among others. With this evolu-
tion of SIR field, the definition of relevance along the Social Web has been extended
to include documents with their related actors at both information producing and
consuming levels.
Recommendation Systems. The utilization of UGC, in form of a side information, to
improve the recommendation accuracy is the current popular trend in recent years,
such as social relationship, implicit feedback. In the context of such systems, the
characteristics of UGC are the main fuel for improving the performance of the online
social media based recommendation systems, summarized in [159]: (i) emphasizing
an item’s outstanding features. For example, the song You belong with me have gained
many following tags in Last.fm, including love, country, and pop, highlighting this
song’s aspects; (ii) reflecting the user’s interested topics. For example, if adventure and
science are frequently used by Bob in his reviews, it can be inferred that Bob may like
the movies Interstellar and Star Trek because such movies have a related theme; (iii)
opening a gate to learn the reason why the user likes or dislikes an item. For example,
after purchasing a laptop, if Baron writes a review "I like its color and its light weight.",
it gives a hint that other electronic devices with the same color and light weight could
be recommended to Baron; (iv) increasing with time, leading to have abundant amount
of information; (v) and providing a direct way to acquire meaningful phrases without
chunking.
Marketing and Business. Although this context is quite far from an obvious research
field, OSM are considered these days as the best and preferable virtual place for do-
ing marketing. Social media marketing process is highly dependent on UGC so that
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different benefits could be gained throughout analyzing UGC posted on OSM. These
benefits include: (i) increasing brand awareness among users; (ii) validating brand; (iii)
improving brand loyalty; (iv) better understanding of target audience; (v) increasing
customer satisfaction; (vi) staying top of mind with customers; (vii) boosting customer
engagement; (viii) and opening direct commutations with customers.
1.3 Information Quality and Online Social Media: The Chal-
lenges
To get insight into the existing challenges in online social media, it is important to re-
call some concepts related to information quality field. The term "Data" is informally
defined as a raw of symbols, while the "Information" term as data with the context
of its interpretation [130]. The context of interpretation can include both the underly-
ing entity (e.g., Hashtag of a tweet) represented by the data and its environment (e.g.,
Twitter social network). Beyond these two basic terms, the IQ has been introduced as
a combined concept between "information" and "quality" terms where the "quality" is
often perceived as subjective and thus the quality of information can vary among users
and among uses of the information [72]. IQ concept is often pragmatically defined as
the fitness of information for use in a particular context [130]. Also, IQ can be viewed
as a measure of the value which the information provides to the user of that infor-
mation. The process of information quality assurance, checking, or filtering is used for
guaranteeing confidence that particular information meets some context specific quality
requirements where the filtering step takes additional action in removing the informa-
tion that does meet the requirements [72]. Consequently, the information that does not
meet defined quality requirements is classified and treated as low quality information;
otherwise it is considered as a high quality one. For instance, a tweet containing a mal-
ware or phishing link is treated as low quality UGC since it does not meet the posting
information requirements provided by Twitter.
Identifying the requirements, that UGCs must meet, requires to determine the potential
problems that could appear on OSM sites. In the literature, five types of information
quality issues might be addressed by users when working with OSM sites, including
Social Spam, Contextual Relevancy, Colloquial Usage and Intentional Misspelling,
Information Overload, and Rumor (misinformation) [2, 116]. Thus, with these signif-
icant IQ problems and the much importance of UGC in a wide range of researches
and applications, exploiting such UGC directly without performing quality filtering
process is risky as well as the performance of the UGC-based applications might be
decreased. A significant effort is spent by information science community to design,
implement, and evaluate new generations of OSM-based methods that leverage UGC
as a primary source of information. However, obtaining and maintaining high levels of
UGC quality are not an obvious task as well as enormous challenges are remaining for
achieving it. In the following, we discuss six different challenges and reasons that must
be addressed when designing and implementing UGC quality filtering techniques:
Data Volume. The evolution of Social Web has produced a huge quantity of UGC. In
most applications and researches, the availability of much data may improve their per-
formance and effectiveness. However, such a conclusion could easily lead to paradoxical
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results. In practical, the assumption of working on noise free data (i.e., high quality
information) is not valid at all and thus increasing the amount of data could result too
noisy data (i.e., low quality information) and consequently decreasing the performance
of data-based applications and systems. Overcoming this problem leads to address a
challenge related to using scalable data quality filtering methods and techniques being
able process big collections of data in an acceptable margin of time. As a practical
example highlighting the problem, it is not acceptable for adopting low quality fil-
tering social profile methods that need months to process few millions of social profiles.
Privacy and Security. Online social media sites do not share same privacy and security
policies, resulting high variations of low quality UGC published on OSM sites where
the restricted sites in their policies tend to have more high quality UGC. For instance,
Facebook, as the most popular social network site, follows restricted rules in creating
profiles/accounts on its site so that establishing more than one account requires phone
verification code which is not easily available, while Twitter, as a top microblogging
social site, allows users to create profiles as much they want without imposing any
effective restrictions. From another perspective, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is a regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy for all individuals
within the European Union only [137]. Indeed, not extending this law over world wide
leads to have violations in using personal data by companies and other unauthorized
parties. Thus, the challenge of having variations at privacy and security levels is in
finding generic quality data filtering methods that can be applied for all OSM sites,
providing a special treatment for every OSM site.
Structure Heterogeneity. Each OSM site has a particular network structure and entity
definitions that differ from other competitor sites. For instance, friendship relation
needs a bidirectional acceptance in Facebook, while Twitter provides one-way relation-
ships known as followership. Google+ social network has another definition of social
connection through classifying the connections into confidence circles (e.g., family, and
friends). In addition, social networks may involve different kinds of entities based on
the networking activities. For instance, in Wiki social networks, two types of entities are
adopted: authors and articles. Beyond the structure of OSM sites, the definitions and
names of entities (e.g., account) and actions (e.g., share) are not common at functional
and semantic levels. This wide heterogeneity in OSM network structures, definitions,
and used entities brings more challenges to identify the quality of data published on
OSM sites. These challenges include searching for similar UGC information on OSM
sites, cross-validating information of published UGC among OSM sites, designing
generic methods for data quality filtering.
UGC Format Heterogeneity. OSM sites provide services for users to publish their
content in different formats such as plain text, video, blogs, discussion form posts,
digital images, and audio files. Adopting such formats open the opportunities for
ill-intentioned users to publish their low quality information in different formats,
increasing the difficulty of detection and filtering. For instance, social spammers could
promote for a particular product through using URLs, plain text, images, or/and
videos. Moreover, these formats do not have an obvious correlation between them so
that each format need special treatment in term of building a dedicated and customized
1.4 research questions 7
quality filtering model. For instance, the quality filtering model of video format cannot
be applied on UGC containing only plain text format.
Subjectivity and Objectivity. Determining the quality of a UGC is not a pure objective
task that has clear rules and standards, meaning that same UGC could be evaluated
as low and high quality by different experts. Thus, for some formats (e.g. plain text)
of UGC, the subjective judgments could be the dominant in which each expert has
its own right opinions and explanations. For instance, posting a tweet containing any
textual information (e.g., "NOOOO WAAAAY") only on Twitter might lead to have two
paradoxical judgments about its quality. On the other-hand, some UGCs are undergone
to objective rules and standards published on OSM sites, facilitating the judgments on
low quality UGCs. For instance, when a tweet contains a phishing (scam) URL, the
quality of this tweet is too low and it must be deleted immediately since such type of
URLs is prohibited on OSM sites. Thus, the challenge here is related to identify clear
rules and standards that can help in easily determining the quality of UGC to make
the problem far from subjectivity.
Service Limitations and Constraints. Usually performing advanced analysis for a
particular UGC to determine its quality requires additional information which must
be retrieved from OSM servers. Crawling additional information could be performed
using official APIs generally provided by OSM sites. However, these APIs have many
constraints such as the time window allowed per APIs, and the number of API calls,
raising the difficulties to apply advanced quality methods on large data-sets of UGC.
For instance, in Twitter, crawling information about profile’s followers may take 15
minutes when the user of the profile is being followed by 10,000 users. Moreover, not all
OSM sites provide same level of API functionally and accessibility. For example, Twitter
provides an API to get all followers IDs, while Facebook does not provide such API
for security reasons. Therefore, the main challenge here is that performing advanced
analysis to provide accurate quality checking must take into the consideration different
aspects related to scalability and how much the targeted applications are sensitive for
the processing time (e.g. real-time tweet summarization).
1.4 Research Questions
This thesis focuses on the problem of information quality in online social media with
special attention dedicated for social spam detection to Twitter microblogging site. Two
main research questions have been addressed:
• What is the applicability of performing real-time UGC quality filtering?
1. To what extent the collective-based analysis conducted on a stream of UGC
(tweets, or accounts) is able to identity low quality UGC ?
2. Is information collaboration among online social media sites effective in im-
proving UGC quality?
3. How do machine learning paradigms and methods contribute in increasing
quality filtering performance?
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• How to handle big data collections of online social media UGCs?
1. To what extent the information retrieval (IR) concept is applicable in infor-
mation quality context?
2. How much is important the study of OSM user’s behavior in having high
quality UGC?
1.5 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis consist of identifying the high quality information
of different forms of UGC published on online social networks. In particular, we exploit
the existing information, represented in terms of meta-data, in UGCs to evaluate
their quality through designing features by which the quality of UGC is quantified
for making a decision about it. Two information quality based problems are being
addressed in this context. In the first scenario, the quality filtering process is conducted
in real-time mode for detecting social spam so that streams of tweets are filtered in a
fast way for feeding the high quality tweets to real-time based applications. The quality
of tweets (UGC) in this case is estimated based on extracting light weight features
combined with a learned quality classification model that is periodically retrained
using machine learning algorithms. The second scenario is about handling a diverse
big data collections of tweets and accounts, crawled from online social networks, to
evaluate their quality. According to these two scenarios, we propose social information
quality evaluation models for detecting social spam in two different contexts: (i) a
real-time social spam tweets detection model for Twitter streams; (ii) a big data based
social spam detection model for Twitter accounts. Besides to these scenarios, we have
crawled and annotated two large data-sets for spam detection tasks. One data-set,
which consists millions of annotated tweets, is dedicated for real-time spam tweets
filtering. The other data-set contains millions of Twitter accounts, devoted for spam
accounts retrieval and detection together. Our contributions in this thesis are integrated
with our team works that are related to social profiling [110, 111, 133], sociosemantic
community detection [1], tweets summarization [28], and location extraction from
Tweets [68] for providing them high quality UGC. We summarize our contributions as
follows:
Real-Time Social Spam Tweets Detection Model for Twitter Streams. We propose
a framework for detecting spam tweets, as a common information quality problem
in OSM, real-time steamed and related to a particular entity (e.g., topic, hashtag, or
URL). The framework periodically trains a binary classification model built using
classical supervised and sequential data based learning algorithms such as Random
Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Then,
the updated and trained classification model is replaced with the previous adopted
model so that the new model has better detection performance. The framework uses
an unsupervised clustering method that collectivity analyzes the behavior of social
spammers and collaborates with other social networks to provide periodic annotated
datasets for retraining the supervised classification models. As no standard data-set
exists for experimenting our framework, we built a data-set consisting of millions of
tweets with providing their ground-truth labels. Compared to previous real-time spam
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filtering approaches, our framework has great benefits in: (i) adapting the dynamic
changes of social spammers’ behaviors and thus providing high quality tweets with
high precision values; (ii) and not requiring for any human intervention to have
annotated datasets for retraining purposes.
Big Data-based Social Spam Detection Model for Twitter Accounts. We propose an
integrated model for spam filtering dedicated to big data collections of Twitter tweets
and accounts. Far away from leveraging time consumption spam filtering methods, the
model performs a fast unsupervised preprocessing step on the input data collection for
extracting a spammy search-able meta-data (e.g., username). Then, such extracted data
are leveraged in a simple and fast information retrieval task to retrieve all suspected
accounts that have high probability for being spam ones. An account-based spam de-
tection model is designed and learned, through extracting a new set of time-based and
account-based behavioral features, to apply it on every suspected account retrieved, in-
stead of advanced processing of all Twitter accounts that exist in the input big collection.
Experiments conducted on millions of Twitter accounts show the effectiveness of our
spam retrieval model as a heuristic function for speeding up the detection process when
handling big data collections.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is structured into 5 chapters. The content of the rest chapters is
summarized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to basic concepts related to information quality,
machine learning, and information retrieval.
Chapter 3 reviews related work of common information quality problems related to
online social media with a particular attention dedicated for Twitter. First, we discuss
the possible forms, types, and definitions of information quality problems that could
appear on sites. Then, we describe in details the main characteristics of Twitter social
network. Afterward, we provide in details a deep review about the related work of
Twitter spam and scam detection methods and techniques.
Chapter 4 introduces a complete design of a real-time spam tweet detection framework.
First, we discuss the difficulties and constraints for applying real-time spam detection.
Second, we formulate the problem besides to some definitions adopted in designing
the framework. Then, details of five stages describing the framework design are
given, followed by the description of a HMM dedicated for producing tweet-based
classification model. After introducing our framework, we describe the data-set that
has been used in experimenting our framework and the state-of-the-art spam tweet
detection methods. Then, the experimental setup is described in details. Thereafter, we
provide the performance results of some and whole parts of our framework in addition
to state-of-the-art methods.
Chapter 5 presents an integrated account-based spam detection method for processing
big data collection of Twitter accounts. First, we discuss account-based spam filtering
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difficulties that are faced when processing big dataset of Twitter accounts. Then, we
formulate the problem that we address with providing some definitions for using them
in modeling our solution. Thereafter, we introduce our entire model that combines
between using information retrieval and machine learning concepts for retrieving
suspected Twitter accounts and then applying a learned spam detection account-based
model. After presenting our integrated models, we introduce the data-set that has
been used in doing our experiments. We then present the experimental setup that
has been followed in retrieval and classification tasks. Thereafter, we provide different
experimental results about our integrated account-based spam detection method with
a deep discussion about the results.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, discusses findings and perspectives.
2
BACKGROUND : INFORMAT ION QUAL ITY, MACHINE
LEARNING , AND INFORMAT ION RETR IEVAL
The best place to hide a dead body is page 2 of Google search results.
— Unknown
We introduce in this chapter basic concepts and definitions that will be used in the
thesis. First, we present definitions related to information quality. Then, we illustrate
some concepts about machine learning paradigms and methods. At last, we briefly
introduce the information retrieval field.
2.1 Information Quality
The word "information" has been exploited in different ways in order to refer to various
things in different circumstances. Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines information
as "an item of information or intelligence" or "action of performing". Different researches
have introduced further definitions of information, however, from a conceptual point
of view. Machlup [94] has provided a definition similar to the OED’s one: "action of
telling or the fact of being told something". In a formal way, Bar-Hillel [11] has given a
definition of semantic information using inductive logic tool. Inspired by the definition
of information theory, Belkin and Robertson [16] have defined the information as "the
structure of any text (data) which is capable of changing the image-structure of a re-
cipient". Higgins [66] has continued in improving the definition of information and has
defined information as data with "recognizable patterns of meaning" where these pat-
terns may reduce uncertainty for decision makers. Taylor [132] has drawn an obvious
distinction among data, information, and knowledge. He has simply defined data as a
sequence of symbols, information as data plus particular relations, and knowledge as
information processed in a way where that information can be used for decision mak-
ing and informing. Data and information terms are often used interchangeable. For our
purposes and based on the definitions given in the literature, we adopt the followings
definition of data, information, and knowledge [130]:
Informally, data is defined as a raw of symbols, information as data with the context of its
interpretation, and knowledge as a stock of information relatively stable and internally
consistent with respect to a given community.
Herein, the context of interpretation can include both the underlying entity (e.g. Hash-
tag of a tweet) represented by the data and its environment (e.g. Twitter Social Net-
work).
The definitions of data and information guide to the definition of IQ. In the literature,
different efforts have been made for introducing an obvious definition of information
quality. Juran [81] has defined IQ as the degree of usefulness or "fitness for use" of
information in a particular task or context. Wand and Wang [139] have introduced a
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Table 2.1: Definitions of wide used concepts in the IQ field [130].
Concept Term Definition
IQ Dimension It is any component of the IQ concept.
Measurability of,IQ dimension The ability to evaluate the variation along a dimension within an acceptable cost.
Measuring IQ dimension It is the process of mapping the attribute-level distributions of real world entities
(e.g. tweets) to symbols or numbers in a systematic and objective way.
IQ problem It is an issue occurring when there is no matching between the IQ of an information
and the IQ requirement of a particular activity along one or more IQ dimensions.
definition of data quality as the quality of mapping between an information system
state and a real world state. Beyond this simple definition, Evans & Lindsay [74] have
turned the attention towards user’s needs with introducing definitions like "meeting or
exceeding customer expectations" or "satisfying the needs and preferences of its users".
A quite recent definition of IQ proposed by Eppler [45], which combines between the
definitions of meeting the customer expectations and meeting the activity requirements.
More precisely, that definition combines the duality of quality: objectivity (meeting the
requirements) versus subjectivity (meeting the exceptions). For our purposes, in this
thesis, we adopt the following definition of IQ by which the both aspects of quality are
encompassed:
IQ is the fitness of information for use in a particular context.
As the IQ definition is conceptually qualitative, further definitions are introduced in
the IQ field, facilitating the transformation of IQ from being qualitative to quantitative,
informally presented in Table 2.1.
2.1.1 IQ Categories
Many attempts have been made to categorize and compile information quality di-
mensions. Felix and Claudia [107] have identified three kinds of orientations followed
in performing categorization for IQ dimensions: (i) semantic-oriented; (ii) processing-
oriented; (iii) goal-oriented. A categorization is called semantic-oriented when cluster-
ing IQ dimensions based on their meaning. Indeed, this way of categorization is the
most intuitive when dimensions are examined in a general way (i.e. independent from
any information framework). Clustering IQ dimensions based on their deployment in
different phases of information processing is the concept of processing-oriented. At last,
a categorization is goal-oriented if it matches predefined goals to be reached with the
help of quality inference. Different projects have been established to analyze informa-
tion quality. The description of those projects is given as follows:
• Total Data Quality Management (TDQM): It aims at providing an empirical foun-
dation for data quality. Wang and Strong [144] have empirically defined fifteen IQ
dimensions that significantly take data consumers’ perspectives. The authors have
semantically (semantic-oriented) categorized their dimensions into four classes:
intrinsic, contextual, representational, and accessibility.
• Mediator-based Information System (MBIS) [108]: The dimensions of MBIS are
based on the TDQM dimension set. However, the dimensions were recategorized
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Information Quality (IQ)
Intrinsic IQ Contextual IQ Representational IQ Accessibility IQ
Accuracy
Believability
Objectivity
Reputation
Value-added
Relevancy
Timelineness
Completeness
Amount of data
Interpretability
Understandability
Consistency
Conciseness
Manipulability
Access
Security
Figure 2.1: Information quality categories and dimensions adopted by TDQM project [2].
to adapt the query planning processing steps. For the source-selection phase,
source-specific dimensions are adopted. For the planning phase where views are
combined, view-specific dimensions are employed as well. When presenting the
information, attribute specific dimensions are used. Indeed, this dimension cate-
gorization is called processing-oriented.
• Weikum [157]: It provides a classification of IQ dimensions in a visionary way. It
distinguishes among system-centric, process-centric, and information-centric di-
mensions. This kind of classification is called processing-oriented, although the
classification has been for biased for a particular application. The three classes of
dimensions can be directly mapped to the query processing steps that are adopted
in MBIS.
• Data Warehouse Quality (DWQ) [75]: It is based on the dimensions introduced
in TDQM project. Operational quality goals are defined for data warehouses with
categorizing the dimensions based on the defined goals. These categories are four:
accessibility, interpretability, usefulness, believability, and validation. This dimen-
sion classification is called goal-oriented.
• SCOUG [13]: This project is dedicated for evaluating the quality and reliability of
databases w.r.t their design, content, and accessibility. However, differently from
other classifications, no special categorization was made for the quality dimen-
sions. But all dimensions are described from an goal-oriented point of view with
an exact description of their assessment.
2.1.2 IQ Dimensions
The Total Quality Management (TQM) [48] approaches have long been leveraged in
the traditional manufacturing industries. Indeed, IQ professionals define information
as a product of information manufacturing system that process a raw data to produce
information product (IP) that has an added value for information consumers [143]. As
TQM provides methodologies, concepts, and tools to promote quality in all operations
of an organization, IQ professionals have developed the IQ theory and extended it to
include information products world. Hence, the term TDQM is extended from TQM to
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Table 2.2: Definition of TDQM dimensions [2].
Measure Description
Intrinsic IQ
Accuracy The extent to which information is valid according to stable references.
Believability The degree to which information is credible.
Objectivity The degree to which information is unprejudiced, unbiased, and impartial.
Reputation The extent to which information is highly standing.
Contextual IQ
Amount of Data The extent to which the amount of information is appropriate for use.
Relevancy The degree to which information is applicable for a given task in hand.
Timeliness The extent to which information is up-to-date for a given task in hand.
Completeness The extent to which information matches the completeness and precision required in a given context.
Representational IQ
Conciseness of Representation The degree to which the structure and presentation of information is compact without being overwhelming.
Representational Consistency The extent to which the definition, format, and value of information is consistent across applications and systems.
Ease of Understanding The extent to which information is comprehensible and clear.
Manipulability The degree to which information can be updated, modified, transferred, reproduced, integrated, and customized.
Accessibility IQ
Access The extent to which information is retrievable and available.
Security The degree to which information is protected from an unauthorized access.
explicitly involve data term so that TDQM is defined as an iterative and continuous data
quality monitoring and improvement process. In this thesis, we propose the adoption
of TDQM methodology because of its wide use in addressing the challenges of social
media [2, 44]. The data quality categories and dimensions of TDQM are listed in Figure
2.1. Table 2.2 contains the corresponding definition of each TDQM dimension adopted,
while the definition of each category is given as follows [2]:
• Intrinsic IQ: reflects the intrinsic nature of data, which means that the quality of
the data is knowable only from its use.
• Contextual IQ: means that the quality of data is best determined in the context
where it is to be used.
• Representational IQ: describes the presentation and usability of data.
• Accessibility IQ: includes the IQ dimensions of access and security. Access and
security reflect the availability of the data as well as its level of protection from an
unauthorized access.
2.1.3 Specifying IQ Model
Solving social media-based IQ problems need to propose one or more hypotheses with
leveraging them to build a measurement model. Having such a model requires to follow
particular guidelines proposed by [52]. These guidelines start by a definition phase fol-
lowed by a research cycle consisting of two main phases: exploratory and confirmatory.
The exploratory phase helps in hypothesising a measurement model, while the confir-
matory phase is responsible about validating the hypothesised measurement model for
newly gathered data. The flow of overall research design is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: IQ research design phases [44].
2.1.3.1 Definition Phase
The definition phase aims to identity the information entity that needs a quality analysis.
For instance, in social media context, information entity could be tweet, account, or
URL objects. Then, according to the chosen information entity, all possible sources of
IQ problems that affect on the selected entity are accurately identified. Afterward, the
IQ problems are mapped to IQ dimensions to drive a conceptual model fusing the right
IQ dimensions and categories.
2.1.3.2 Exploratory Phase
In this phase, an empirical approach will be used to identify IQ attributes for each di-
mension adopted in the derived conceptual model. More precisely, this phase includes
a quantitative exploratory survey so that the conceptual model driver will be opera-
tionalized through using data collection with their ground-truth values. This phase can
be viewed as a selection stage aiming to ensure the appropriate selection of measures,
dimensions and the model completeness. Also, this phase will ensure that the adopted
measures and dimensions derived from the definition phase are not only conceptually,
but empirically relevant to the considered context.
2.1.3.3 Confirmatory Phase
To complete the research cycle, the confirmatory phase aims to further validate the IQ
model derived from the exploratory phase, and to illustrate the additive and mutual ex-
clusivity of the measures and dimensions in the model using confirmatory data analysis
techniques and new data. In this phase, it is expected that the performance testing of
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the IQ model on the new data must be close to the performance resulted in exploratory
phase.
2.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a field in computer science that shows the abilities of machines
in learning to solve problems from given experimental data instead of explicitly pro-
grammed. The behavior of most machine learning algorithms is controlled by a set of
parameters that define a model. The main purpose of machine learning is to estimate the
parameters of the model to learn regular patterns from data observations, with avoid-
ing learning the training samples "by heart". In practice, given a dataset of training
examples, an algorithm is expected to learn a model to solve a specific task. Normally,
machine learning algorithms are classified based on their underlying learning strate-
gies, which are identified by the amount of inference that the computer program can
perform [21]:
• Rote Learning: describes the strategy that all classical computer programs adopt.
Indeed, the programs don’t perform inference and all required knowledge is di-
rectly implemented by the developer since the programs are not able to provide
any conclusions or transformations from the given information.
• Learning from Instruction: includes all computer programs that can transform
information from a given input language to an internal language. Although the
knowledge of performing this transformation is still provided by the developer,
this needs little forms of inference by the computer program. Thus, this defines a
new separate level of learning systems, compared to rote learning.
• Learning by Analogy: tries to provide and develop new skills that are almost
similar to existing skills and easy to adopt. This can be established by performing
transformations on known information. This system must be able to create muta-
tions and combinations of a dynamic knowledge set. It generates and creates new
functionalities that were unknown to the original computer program, and thus a
lot of inference work is required.
• Learning from Examples: is one of the most commonly adopted learning strate-
gies as well as it provides the most flexibility with enabling computer programs
to completely develop unknown skills or find unknown structures and patterns in
a given data [23]. Learning from examples is a technique that is often leveraged in
classification tasks to predict the class label of new, properly unseen, data entries
based on a dynamic set of known examples.
There are so many machine algorithms available that follow the learning from examples
strategy. However, these algorithms can be categorized based on [82]: (i) learning style
(supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised); (ii) and algorithms similarity in terms
of form or function. Both approaches are useful, but in this thesis, we focus on the first
category since we can easily project it on the information quality problem.
There are different ways that an algorithm can model a problem based on its interaction
with the experience or whatever is called the input data. In machine learning and arti-
ficial intelligence textbooks, it is popular to first consider the learning style. Few main
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Figure 2.3: Three common learning styles adopted in machine learning field [14].
learning styles that an algorithm can have and thus we describe them with a few exam-
ples of algorithms. This taxonomy is useful because it let us to think about the roles of
the input data and the model preparation process to select the most appropriate model
for the considered problem to get the best result.
Supervised Learning: includes every task in which the algorithm has access to input
and output values. Herein, input values can be defined as the external information that
the algorithm can use, such as attribute values, while output values, are the specific
target labels of the class attribute. More precisely, it is mean that the structure of the
data is known and the purpose of these programs is to predict the correct class for a
given new data.
Unsupervised Learning: is used for the tasks that have no access to output values and
thus try to find structures within the data through creating classes on their own.
Semi-Supervised Learning: is adopted for solving tasks that have a mixture input data
between labeled and unlabelled examples. Indeed, the problem of those tasks can be
viewed as a prediction problem, but the model has to learn the structures to organize
the data as well as make predictions.
2.2.1 Terminology Overview
The work in this thesis concerns about supervised machine learning algorithms with a
focus on classification-based methods. Here, we provide only a very basic overview of
supervised learning where more details can be found in [106].
More technically, a supervised learning algorithm can be viewed as a tool for producing
a mathematical model or function that, given some input of data, produces some output.
The algorithm infers this model using a training dataset, which is a collection of data
(so-called "instances" or "examples") consisting of example inputs associated with their
corresponding outputs ("labels" or "targets"). The process of learning and producing the
model from the given training set is called training. Once the model is built, the new
output value can be computed for new inputs where those inputs are often not present
in the adopted training set. Figure 2.4 shows the relation between the four elements of
supervised learning approach: data, algorithm, training, and model.
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Figure 2.4: A supervised learning algorithm learns first a model using a given training data
consisting of example inputs paired with corresponding the target outputs. Then,
the trained model is used to compute new output values for new data inputs.
The input to a model is a vector of numbers (so-called features or attributes). In the
classification problems, the output of models is one of a finite set of discrete labels
(classes). For example, a supervised classification-based learning algorithm could be
used to have an American Sign Language fingerspelling classification model that pro-
duces as an output the letter a human is signing, as a work established in [5]. In such a
case, the label (class) set of the classifier is 26 letters of the alphabet. On the other hand,
in regression problems, the output value of the models belongs to real value range. For
example, regression-based learning algorithms are often used for building a continu-
ous gesture-to-speech controller in which continuous hand motions result in changing
articulatory control over a speech synthesis algorithm.
Various supervised learning algorithms have been designed and well-implemented to
build data-driven models using a given training set at hand. In this work, we focus
on commonly adopted classification learning methods in spam detection, including
support vector machine, k-nearest neighbor algorithms, decision tree, random forests,
and AdaBoost.
2.2.2 Classification Learning Algorithms
2.2.2.1 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are a supervised learning method used for classifica-
tion, regression and outlier detection. SVMs are non-probabilistic, linear methods that
work through finding the optimal decision boundary using few training points of each
class. SVMs are guaranteed to reach the global optimum, generalized well with ade-
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3.2.1.2 Logistic Regression 
 
Logistic Regression (LR), though in some ways similar to linear regression, is in fact a binary 
classification method and not a regression model. As a parametric generalized linear model, it 
is simple and has good performance. The binary response variable is related to any number of 
explanatory variables which when combined, form the basis of probability calculations that 
predict the target class, i.e. in this case the categorical response variable. Also, known as 
maximum-entropy classification method or logit regression, named after the decision function 
used in the classifier. The logit function is the natural log of the probabilities that the target 
variable takes one of the two values [21]. Multinomial logistic regression, also called SoftMax 
regression is a form generalization of LR which deals with cases of multiple target classes. A 
well-behaved classification algorithm, LR is generally considered a good baseline choice when 
given features are linear and the problem is potentially linearly separable. 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Support Vector Machines 
 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a set of supervised learning methods used mainly for 
classification, regression and outlier detection. SVM are non-probabilistic, linear methods that 
find the optimal decision boundary using just a few bounding members or training points of 
each class. It is from these few, critical points, called “support vectors”, that the algorithm gets 
its name. SVM is considered to be accurate, guaranteed to reach the global optimum, generalize 
well with adequately chosen parameters. The main advantage of SVMs comes from the fact 
that through using the so-called kernel trick they are perfectly capable of being effective non-
linear classifiers [22]. A kernel is basically a function which quantifies the similarity of two 
observations [23]. The method effectively creates produce nonlinear boundaries by constructing 
a linear boundary in this potentially infinite-sized transformed version of the feature space [24].  
 
 
 
  
Fig. 3-1: Left: Simple diagram showing how transformation of feature space effects in non-linear classifier. Right: 
Representation of the margin boundary.  (image source: https://amitranga.files.wordpress.com) Figure 2.5: A simple diagram showing how transformation of feature space effects in non-linear
classifier, with a representation of the margin boundary.
quately selected parameters value. The main advantage of SVMs relies in using the
kernel trick, making SVMs perfectly capable of being effective non-linear classifiers [8].
A kernel is basically a function that quantifies the similarity of two data observations
[73]. The method effectively creates and produces nonlinear boundaries through build-
ing a linear boundary in the potentially infinite dimension of the transformed version
of the original input feature space [51].
The boundaries that are created in this way are called the hyperplanes (lines, in the
simplest of cases). As shown in Figure 2.5, these boundaries maximize the distance
between the target two classes, also called margins. SVMs can effectively work with
high dimensional spaces and they are memory efficient, because of the availability of
different kernel functions that can be leveraged for the decision function [8]. Among
the disadvantages of SVMs are when having a high number of features more than the
number of training samples might lead to poor results. Moreover, SVM-based classifi-
cation models have shown an underperformance when addressing classification tasks
involving heavily imbalanced data [168].
2.2.2.2 K-Nearest Neighbour
Nearest Neighbour is a flexible, simple, and non-linear classification algorithm. It is
viewed as a common and typical example of an instance-based learning method. Al-
though of its simplicity, K-NN has been successfully and widely applied in a large
number of classification problems, including handwritten digits, EKG patterns, and
satellite imagery [51]. Instance-based learning methods are often called as "lazy" be-
cause the classification process is delayed until new instance arrives. K-NN algorithm
is designed based on an assumption that data instances can be represented as points in
n-dimensional space and the distances between points are measurable [21]. In general,
instance-based learning method does not build explicit mod on the training data, mean-
ing that the process of learning is storing the training instances for processing new data
instances. Handling new data instance is done through searching in the stored instances
for potential matches (nearest neighbours) by utilizing a similarity distance metric such
as Euclidean distance [38]. The k parameter, so-called the radius, represents a distance
threshold associated to the number of nearest neighbours that will be leveraged during
the search process. Providing higher values of k reduces the variance in the ultimate
decision since it takes more information from neighbours in the consideration, mean-
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Figure 2.6: An example of k-NN binary (2 classes) classification task.
while the processing time is proportionally increased. For instance, in Figure 2.6, the
test sample (green circle) should be classified either to the first class of blue squares or
to the second class of red triangles. If k = 3 (solid line circle) it is assigned to the second
class because there are 2 triangles and only 1 square inside the inner circle. If k = 5
(dashed line circle) it is assigned to the first class (3 squares vs. 2 triangles inside the
outer circle).
2.2.2.3 AdaBoost
AdaBoost is one of the first practical boosting ensemble based methods [125]. It works
based on a critical assumption that a set of weak classifiers produces varying above
average predictions in each iteration. These weak classifiers are given weights that are
adaptively updated at the end of each iteration. The update of weights is relative to
the target labels through effectively decreasing the weights for correct training instance
classifications and increasing for incorrect ones. The confidence in the predictions is
called the margin and it is computed based on the majority voting scheme implied by
the weights updating. AdaBoost has an ability to enlarge the margin and enhance its
generalization capability. Several studies have utilized decision trees, neural networks or
support vector machines as components (weak classifiers) since they had reported good
overall generalization performance. Also, the main advantage of AdaBoost method is in
its resistance to the overfitting problem through imposing implicit regularization [125].
2.2.2.4 Decision Trees and Forests
Decision tree learning algorithms are one of the most common methods used for non-
linear classification problems. Their popularity is gained because of their intuitive rep-
resentation in the decision-making process. Decision trees are composed of a set of
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internal nodes where each of which is labeled with an input feature. The output of each
node represents a test resulting of the branch based on a certain threshold value. Both
the actual branch feature as well as the critical splitting value (threshold) are computed
using an optimization procedure. Individual branches represent the outcome and lead
to child nodes with subsequent tests, a target class label in the case of a leaf node.
While single trees are useful for demonstration purposes, an ensemble of trees (i.e. tree
forests) is widely used for classification problems than relying on single decision trees.
Forests of trees [29] have many benefits over only adopting single trees where lower
error margin and better generalization are the most important aspects. Random Forest
is an ensemble of unpruned trees that can be used for both classification and regression
problems. The key point of random forest is to build as a set of decision trees. This
method involves random feature selection for building individual and different trees
and the final classification result is computed using aggregating (voting) scheme in
case of classification and averaging for regression problems over the members. Random
forest has shown a massively improved performance compared to the traditional sin-
gle decision trees [29, 19] such as C4.5 and J48. The generalization of forests decreases
as the number of trees increases, because of the randomness in the sampling process
adopted for building the individual trees.
2.2.3 Feature Engineering
A feature is a property which is sometimes called as an attribute of individual instances
in a given training set. Wikipedia provides a definition of feature as: "A feature is an
individual measurable property of a phenomenon being observed"1. Features can be di-
rectly extracted from the explanatory variables (i.e., attributes of a structured dataset),
while in other cases the data might be a raw sensor data such as temperature sensor
value. In this case, features must be explicitly extracted where the definition of the fea-
ture and extraction way are called feature engineering process. More precisely, feature
engineering is viewed in machine learning as a preprocessing step involving extrac-
tion, creation and selection of features stages [85]. Optimally, a set of features must be
informative, independent, and discriminative as much as possible for improving the
performance of the target classification model.
2.2.3.1 Feature Extraction
Different feature extraction and feature selection methods exist in the literature as well
as it is vast and beyond the scope of our work in this thesis.The types of features can
be categorized as follows:
• Domain-specific Features. They require a relevant knowledge about the target
problem to solve for identifying potential interest points in the given training
data. For instance, for solving a dogs and cats classification problem, relying on
the true fact that cat eye pupils are shrink into a vertical line when exposed to a
strong light is a domain-based feature that can be too helpful in this task. Such a
top discriminative feature would give 100% classification accuracy with a simple
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_engineering
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original features. Polynomial features [45] improve linear methods accuracy on non-linearly 
separable problems (Fig. 3-4). In practice, we derive these additional features indirectly, by 
using the statistical feature values calculated on the time series segments. 
 
 
 
  
Visually derived features are usually based on early exploratory analysis, where some visibly 
“uncommon8” patterns in the data have been spotted. Depending on the problem task such 
observations could be potentially useful for determination of additional features (such as the 
one in section 4.3.3.3) or maybe subject to filtering out. 
 
Feature extraction in practice has some creative aspects to it. It provides freedom to brainstorm 
new ways of obtaining potentially useful features, but in general it might involve a lot of manual 
work, testing and validation as well as use of statistical tools and automating tasks. 
Additionally, combining existing and/or derived features is a viable method to further cover 
aspects that might not be obvious at first inspection. For example, the addition of polynomial 
combinations and/or logical conjunctions of existing features can improve the ability of a linear 
classifier to model nonlinear problems [46].  
 
 
3.2.3.2 Feature Selection 
 
It has been shown that while increasing the number of features in general has a positive effect 
on classification accuracy, a high number of features can also have a detrimental effect on the 
accuracy performance of a classifier. The key idea is feature relevance. Somewhat contrary to 
the idea of creating new features, feature selection is concerned with the aim of reducing the 
number of features made available to the classification algorithm. The motivation behind this 
comes from the fact that increasing the size of feature vectors, proportionally increases the 
amount of processing to be executed by the ML algorithms subsequently applied to the data. 
There are other important considerations to keep in mind as the number of features grows, such 
                                               
8 There might be a certain overlap with the domain feature category here to be able to make the 
objective decision of what in fact is unusual pattern for a given dataset. 
Fig. 3-4: Example showing how adding (polynomial) features may 
make data linearly separable. Source: [45] 
Figure 2.7: Example showing how adding (polynomial) features may make data linearly separa-
ble.
classifier. On the other hand, information like weight, height and life span would
be adequate, but not specific to the domain.
• Statistical Features. This type of features does not require special knowledge
about the target domain. Different characteristics are provided by this type in
form of quantitative dat such as mean, standard deviatio , median, maximum
and minimum [83]. In general, statistical variables are computationally inexpen-
sive, making them popular in feature extraction phase. However, a different and
fully dependent approach is adopted for adding polynomial features to improve
the classification accuracy. Polynomial features represent relations between every
"2" existing features and the square of the original features. Polynomial features
[55] can improve linear methods accuracy when addressing non-linearly separable
problems as shown in Figure 2.7.
• Visual Features. They are usually designed and derived based on early ex-
ploratory analysis, where some clear and visible "uncommon" pattern in the dat
can be spotted. Depending on the problem task such observations could be poten-
tially useful for determining additional features.
In practice, feature extraction engineering needs some creativity as it provides a free-
dom to brainstorm new ways of having useful features. However, it might involve a
lot of manual work, testing, and validation as well as the use of one or many statistical
and automating tools. Additionally, aggregating existing with derived features is a com-
mon and effective method to further cover aspects that might not be clear at the first
inspection. For example, the use of polynomial-based features combined with existing
features might improve the ability of a linear classifier to solve nonlinear problems [64].
2.2.3.2 Feature Selection
In general, increasing the number of features has a positive impact on the classifica-
tion accuracy. On the other side, a high number of features might have a detrimental
effect on the accuracy performance. The key idea revolves around a concept related
to feature relevance. In contrast to the idea of creating new features, feature selection
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process aims at reducing the number of features adopted for solving classification al-
gorithms. The motivation behind this process is related to the true fact that increasing
in the size of feature vectors would proportionally increase the amount of processing
time executed by ML algorithms [121]. Unlike other dimensionality (feature) reduc-
tion methods such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or compression techniques
leveraged in information theory, feature selection process does not change the under-
lying structure of the data. Features are selected out in the final model based on some
importance measurement depending on the used specific feature selection algorithm.
Such algorithms are generally based on correlation and mutual information calcula-
tions. The main advantage of feature selection techniques is low complexity, scalability,
performance speed and the fact that they are independent of the target classification
algorithm. The Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) algorithm is an improved se-
lection technique w.r.t fast processing, besides to the intercorrelation among individual
features [61]. Alternatively, uninformative and useless features can be eliminated by
some iterative evaluation process, such as Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) algo-
rithm. This category, called the "wrapper" methods, uses greedy and heuristic search
methods to produce the final selection relative to the classification model. However, this
kind of methods is computationally expensive [121].
2.2.4 Evaluation and Metrics
Model evaluation is a crucial part when developing data-driven models. The purpose
of any predictive model is to correctly predict the target class value for unseen data
instances with the highest possible accuracy. Thus, it is required to have a way for eval-
uating model performance, typically by quantifying it using some measure of model
error. This same measure must be used to train the model to obtain high accuracy per-
formance. One of great pitfalls when creating predictive model is evaluating the trained
model on same or almost similar data to the training ones [50]. Adopting incorrect
measures and evaluation methods may lead to generate overfitted and overoptimistic
models. In general, there are two main types of error: (i) Bias error related to overly gen-
eralized model, data under-fitting ; (ii) and Variance error related to data over-fitting.
Indeed, there is a trade-off between minimizing one type and both types together [20].
In other words, the main purpose is to have a valid model that can measure what it was
intended and generalize well over unseen data instances.
2.2.4.1 Model Validation
There are two main methods of model evaluation in machine learning: (i) hold-out
validation; (ii) and cross-validation. Both methods use a separated test set of unseen
data in model performance evaluation process. While in model training, the objective is
to minimize the training error based on the chosen metric.
• Hold-Out Validation. It is called a train/test-split method which requires a part
of the original data to be held-out from the training process. The final evaluation
score is only computed through experimenting the test set on the produced model.
This method is simple, relatively fast, and it ensures that the model is tested on
unseen data. The main disadvantage in this method is that a part of the original
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Fig. 3-5 10-fold cross validation. The designated training set is further divided up into K folds (K=10), each of 
these will now function as a hold-out test set in K iterations. Finally, the scores obtained from the model on 
individual iterations are summed and averaged into the final score. (image source: https://sebastianraschka.com) 
 
Cross validation [24][26] is a further extension of the hold-out method. Cross validation is 
widely accepted as the state-of-the art method for ensuring model reliability and improved 
generalisation ability. In k-fold cross validation (Fig. 3-5), k is the number of partitions that the 
training set will be split into. The same k is also the number of iterations that the classifier will 
execute, each resulting in an evaluation score. The k scores are then averaged to obtain the final 
(training) score. For each iteration one of the (k-1)/k of the data is used for training the classifier, 
while the remaining partition of size 1/k is used for validation of the model from that iteration. 
With each iteration, the next, yet unused partition is set aside for validation test, and a new 
model is trained from the remaining partitions as described above.  The final score is then 
averaged over the number of iterations, k. The advantages of k-cross validation are reduced 
variance because of the averaging effect, but the process is slow having high resource 
requirement, as the classifier has to be trained and multiple (k) times over the total size of the 
training data. 
 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Metrics 
 
A good model measures what it was intended to measure and generalizes well to unseen data. 
In this section, we will introduce the set evaluation metrics that will be used in the experiments. 
The main motivation for choosing relatively many different metrics is to encourage comparative 
experiments and provide an extended spectrum of potentially complementary information. 
According to previous analysis by [51] it can be shown that most of the metrics commonly used 
in machine learning for evaluating classifiers, fundamentally measure different things, this 
being especially true for multiclass and imbalanced class problems. 
 
Figure 2.8: 10-fold cross validation. The designated training set is further divided up into K
folds (K=10), each of th se will now fun tion as hold-out test set in K i erations.
Finally, the scores obtained from the model on individual iterations are summed and
averaged into the final score.
data is removed from the training set of the model. Moreover, there is a risk to
have high variance in the predictions.
• Cross-Validation [51, 105]. This method is an extension for the hold-out valida-
tion method. Cross-validation is a widely accepted and used in the state-of-the-
art predictive methods for ensuring model reliability and generalization ability. In
k  f old cross validation 2.8, k represents the number of partitions that the training
set will be divided into. Also, k represents the number of iterations that the trained
model will xecute, resulting an ev luation scor at each ite ation. The evaluatio
scores of k iterations are averaged to obtain the final score. For each iteration, (k-
1)/k ratio of the original data is used for training a model, while the remaining
partition with size of 1/k is used for model validation. With each iteration, the un-
used partition is set aside for the validation test, and a new model is trained from
the remaining pa titions as describ bove. The final score is c mputed hrough
averaging over the number of iterations, k. The benefits of k  cross validation are
in reducing variance due to the averaging effect. However, this process is quite
slow and requires high resource requirement.
2.2.4.2 Metrics
In this part, we present a set of evaluation metrics that are used throughout the thesis.
The main purpose of choosing different metrics is to have comparative experiments
and to provide an extended spectrum of complementary information. According to
analysis introduced in [47], it can be shown that most of the metrics used in machine
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Figure 2.9: An illustrative depiction of the (binary) confusion matrix and a selection of the mea-
sures that may be derived directly from it.
learning for evaluating models, measuring different things, including the multi-class
and imbalanced class problems.
Confusion Matrix. A confusion matrix provides a very intuitive and complete overview
about classification models performance. The matrix has dimension of N ⇤ N, where
N is the number of target class labels of the considered problem. The ground-truth
(true label of instances ) is matched with the predictions resulted by the trained model,
showing information how much the model is accurate in the predictions for each class
with providing the distribution of misclassified instances in each class. The confusion
matrix is the basis for computing most evaluation metrics in machine learning. In a
binary (two class) example 2.9, four basic counts are obtained from the matrix: True
Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True Negatives(TN) and False Negatives (FN). Based
on these terms, we can derive most of the metrics described below.
Accuracy. The most adopted and cited performance metric, defined as the percentage of
correctly classified examples (instances) out of the total number of examples. Accuracy
(ACC) is a good metric when the class distribution is balanced. The problem of imbal-
ance class distribution becomes apparent when one class dominates other class(es). For
example, in a dataset of 900:100 (class 0:class 1) binary class distribution, classifying
blindly all instances as negative will result 90% of accuracy.
Precision and Recall. Precision is defined as the ratio of correctly predicted labels out
of the total predicted positive labels. Recall is defined as the ratio of correctly predicted
positives to the total number of positive labels (ground-truth) in the data.
F-measure. It is known as the balanced F-measure. It is a single scalar value metric
summary that combines both Precision and Recall metrics together. It is used in perfor-
mance evaluation of binary classification problems. F1 is defined as the harmonic mean
of precision and recall, equally weighs precision and recall. As it is based on recall and
precision, the F-score only considers the positive predictions. F1-score is generally con-
sidered in the evaluation when class imbalance is an issue [4]. A high F-measure score
is a good indicator of a good performing classifiers w.r.t. to minority classes.
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). A (ROC) graph is a visualization technique
for evaluating and selecting classifiers according to their measured performance. ROC
curves are insensitive to class balancing issue, forming a very important property. More
precisely, changing in the proportion of negative and positive classes in the underlying
dataset does not change the behavior of ROC curves [126, 46]. As illustrated in Figure
2.10, a ROC graph is a 2D-graph that draws the relation between True Positive Rate
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3.2.4.2.5 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
 
A Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graph is an increasingly popular visualization 
technique for evaluation and selection of classifiers based on their measured performance. 
While not a single valued metric, (a score can be derived from it), the ROC contains useful 
information related to the specific areas of concern. ROC graphs have originally been used in 
signal detection theory, and later adapted for medical decision making in diagnostic testing, 
gaining further popularity. Their increasing use in machine learning is partly due to the growing 
realization by the data science community that traditional accuracy measures are flawed when 
dealing with skewed class distributions, which frequently is the case in real world problems.  
The fact that ROC curves are insensitive to imbalances in class distribution is a very important 
property. If the proportion of negative vs positive class instances changes in the underlying 
dataset, the ROC will not change, due to the way it is calculated [53, 54]. A ROC graph is 
basically a 2D-graph that plots True Positive Rate (TPR, also called Sensitivity or Recall) vs 
the False Positive Rate (FPR, or 1-Specificity). In this manner, the ROC depicts the trade-off 
between benefit and cost, calculated by “sliding” the decision threshold.  
 
 
Fig. 3-7 ROC curve examples: The diagonal represents the random guess. A shows moderate improvement over 
a random model, while B and C are both much better than A. However, B and C, though different, have an equal 
AUC-score. In this case, the decision based on the trade-off between sensitivity (y-axis) and FPR (x-axis), must 
be made. 
 
The diagonal line across the graph (y = x) is the representation of a random classifier, while a 
line through the point at coordinates (0,1) represents a perfect classification performance. ROC 
curve is intrinsically used for depicting binary classifier information. 
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Figure 2.10: ROC curve examples: The diagonal represents the random guess. A shows moder-
ate improvement over a random model, while B and C are both much better than
A. However, B and C, though different, have an equal AUC-score. In this case, the
decision based on the trade-off between sensitivity (y-axis) and FPR (x-axis), must
be made.
(TPR, also called Sensitivity or Recall) vs the False Positive Rate (FPR, or 1-Specificity).
In this manner, the ROC curves show the trade-off between benefit and cost, calculated
by "sliding" the decision threshold. The diagonal line across the graph is the represen-
tation of a random classifier, while a line passing through a point at coordinates (0,1)
reflects a perfect classification performance. ROC curves are used for depicting binary
classifier information.
2.2.5 Class Imbalance
Class imbalance in a classification task appears when one of the considered classes is
being strongly underrepresented or overrepresented w.r.t other class(es). Indeed, it is
one of biggest challenges in data mining and machine learning fields [92]. Real and
practical applications such as credit card fraud detection, and medical diagnostics are
typical imbalanced data problems [4]. Frequently, in imbalanced classification problems,
predictive models tend to be biased towards the majority class where most common
classification algorithms do not work well in such problems [4]. Additionally, some
metrics such as accuracy are often compounding the problem. Hence, several methods
have been proposed for handling imbalanced data, related to both data preprocessing
and classification performance evaluation. In the following, we describe selected re-
sampling methods for modeling strongly skewed data.
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2.2.5.1 Under-Sampling
One solution to encounter the imbalance dataset is by improving the ratio among classes
through reducing the number of majority class instances [91]. The key point of this
method is that in an overwhelming majority of closely related instances, removing a
portion of the least influential instances will not have significant detrimental effect on
classifier effectiveness. Thus, this improves the class balance and reduces the required
storage resources and training time, especially when targeting large applications. Disad-
vantages of under-sampling revolve around removing data from the training set, which
might produce less accurate models.
2.2.5.2 Over-sampling
In over-sampling, the main idea is to influence the class imbalance by increasing the
number of positive instances. The most popular advanced over-sampling method is
SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Oversampling TEchnique) [138]. SMOTE, in its many vari-
ants attempt to create new data instances from an existing set and differ from each
other in the way that this is done. In general, specific similarity measures are used
to define and create instances that would (theoretically) be classified as part of the
positive (minority) class. This is also called the generative oversampling, as it gener-
ates new instances based on the learned distribution of existing data. Contrary to the
under-sampling technique, over-sampling does not remove information from the data,
no instances are ever removed from training the classifier. The drawback is that in the
frequent case where imbalance goes hand in hand with inadequate number of minority
samples, the learned distribution estimate is potentially inaccurate and variance artifi-
cially lowered [43].
2.3 Information Retrieval
The field of Information Retrieval (IR) is one of early research domain in computer
science, which has introduced the first automatic solutions for text storage and search
capabilities [93]. IR systems have different informal definitions, while the most common
one is defined by Salton and McGill [40], quoted as:
Information Retrieval is an information system, that is, a system used to store items of
information that need to be processed, searched, retrieved, and disseminated to various user
populations.
IR systems have a common purpose that can be shorthanded in stratifying user’s in-
formation need where this need is usually formulated using a textual query. Also, in-
formation retrieval has an advanced capabilities to deal with information and ideas
instead of words and phrases. However, the main challenge is understanding the infor-
mation need of the users behind these few words in order to provide "relevant" items
of information that can help the users to accomplish their task(s).
In this section, we describe basic concepts related to information retrieval systems. Then,
we introduce an overview of some information retrieval models and evaluation mea-
sures.
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Figure 2.1: Système de recherche d’information selon Baeza-Yates et Ribeiro-Neto [167]
une meilleure qualité des résultats retournés par le système de RI. Cependant,
l’indexation manuelle présente un effort trop coûteux en temps et en besoin hu-
main. De plus, un degré de subjectivité lié au facteur humain fait que le même
document peut être indexé de différentes façons par des personnes différentes, et
même par la même personne mais à des moments différents [72].
2. Indexation automatique : fait appel aux robots d’indexation, ce qui rend le pro-
cessus d’indexation complètement automatisé. L’indexation automatique, basée
essentiellement sur une approche statistique, est adoptée par la majorité des sys-
tèmes de RI en raison de son coût réduit par rapport à l’indexation manuelle
[129, 140, 176].
3. Indexation semi-automatique : est basée sur un processus automatique. En outre,
elle fait appel à une intervention humaine (par un expert) pour effectuer la sélec-
tion finale des mots clés significatifs et établir les relations sémantiques entre les
mots clés en se basant sur un thésaurus ou une base terminologique qui est une
liste organisée de descripteurs (mots-clés) en suivant des règles bien définies.
Figure 2.11: Information retrieval system [10].
2.3.1 Basic Concepts
Information retrieval systems are usually composed of three main processes: indexing,
retrieval, and ranking. These processes are more or less complex depending on the
retrieval task. Figure 2.11 illustrates a typical architecture of an information retrieval
system.
Indexing Process. It is an offline process performed once at the beginning of an IR cycle.
This processes has main functionalities dedicated for transforming and normalizing the
texts of documents. In general, the flow of this process starts by splitting the text of a
considered document into tokens (words). Then, the useless words, so-called stopwords,
are removed. Tran formati n methods such as lemmatization and stemming [79, 114]
are applied on every useful word to transform it into a common base form.
Retrieval Process. It targets to choose the relevant documents that satisfy us r’s infor-
mation needs. This proce s is depe dent on doc ment representation, user’s needs and
preferences (e.g., date, language, format, et ). In fact, queries are the formal text-based
representations for user’s information needs [15]. Thus, textual transformation meth-
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ods, that are applied on documents in the indexing phase, are performed on the user’s
query as well. However, a kind of expansions on the query might occur to support
user’s preferences and relevance feedback [63]. The last step in this process is returning
a list of documents that contain at least one term of the user’s query, including the origi-
nal and expanded query form. The returned list includes candidate relevant documents
w.r.t. the user’s query.
Ranking Process. It gives a relevance score for each document listed in the retrieved
set as a response to the user’s query. The final results are returned to the user through
sorting the documents in an descending way based on the relevance score of each doc-
ument.
2.3.2 Information Retrieval Models
Since the first appearance of IR field, a large number of search and retrieval algorithms
have been proposed during the last decades. These algorithms can be classified accord-
ing to at least one of the following models: Boolean models [80], vector models [124],
probabilistic models [120], language models [115] and learning to rank [90].
An information retrieval model is a theoretical foundation that represents documents
and queries, and defines a strategy for ranking the returned documents to the query. In
addition, an information retrieval model is modeled as a quadrupled [D,Q, F,R(qi, dj)]
[10] where:
• D is a set of documents;
• Q is a set of queries;
• F is a modeling framework for documents, queries and their relationships;
• R(qi, dj) is a function of relevance ranking with qi 2 Q and dj 2 D, defined
formally as R : Q⇥ D ! [0, 1].
The models proposed for information retrieval in the literature include three main char-
acteristics of documents, including text, links and multimedia. In the following, we
present the main models of information retrieval based on these properties.
• Set Models. They find their theoretical foundations in the set theory. We distin-
guish the pure boolean model, the extended boolean model and the fuzzy set
model [122, 10, 57].
• Vector Models. They are based on algebra through using vector computation.
They include the vector model, the generalized vector model, and Latent Semantic
Indexing (LSI) model [10, 123].
• Probabilistic Models. They are based on the probability theory. They include the
general probabilistic model, the document network or inference model (Document
Network) and the language model [10].
In the Boolean model, documents and queries are represented as a set of terms. Indeed,
it is viewed as a complete model as stated in [57]. In the vector model, documents
and queries are represented as vectors in a N-dimensional space. For the probabilistic
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model, the modeling of documents and queries is based on the probability theory. We
only detail the language model since it is widely adopted in this thesis.
Language models were applied to the search for information by a number of researchers
in the late 1990s [115, 65, 103]. They come from probabilistic language generation mod-
els developed for automatic speech recognition systems in the early 1980s [117]. Au-
tomatic speech recognition systems combine probabilities of two distinct models: the
acoustic model and the language model. The power of the acoustic model is in the pro-
duction of the following candidate texts, given in order of decreasing probability: "food
born thing", "good corn sing", "mood morning", and "good morning". Then, the lan-
guage model aims to determine the most likely expression, namely, in our case "good
morning" is the most appropriate sentence because it appears more frequently in En-
glish than other sentences. Indeed, when the language model is combined with the
acoustic model, the system becomes able to make accurate decisions, thus increasing
the performance of the system.
For information retrieval, the basic idea of language models is to determine the proba-
bility P(Q|D); the probability that the query Q can be generated from the document D.
This formulation is similar to the idea behind probabilistic models that have been for-
mulated for the first time in [97]. However, the way of calculating P(Q|D) in language
models is different from the traditional probabilistic models. Typically, this probability
is calculated using parametric methods: it is assumed that the distribution of words fol-
lows a certain standard (e.g, Poisson distribution) among the relevant (and irrelevant)
documents. Based on the word distributions among two sets (relevant and non-relevant)
of sample documents, the probabilities of words of being relevance can be estimated.
Following this approach, the language model of the book you are reading at this time
would be to assign an unusually high probability for the words "social spammers", in-
dicating that this book would be a good candidate for social cues if the query contains
these words.
The principle of approaches that leverage a language model is different. We do not
attempt to directly model the notion of relevance in the model, but we consider that
the relevance of a document to a query is related to the probability that the query
can be generated by the language model of the document. Thus, we consider that the
document D embodies a sub-language, for which we try to build an MD language
model. The score of the document w.r.t. the Q is determined by the probability that its
model, MD ,generates the requested query Q:
Score(Q,D) = P(Q|MD) (2.1)
We adopt the term P(Q|D) to represent the same probability in the descriptions later.
In general, a query can be seen as a sequence of words: Q = {t1, t2, ..., tn}. Thus, the
new representation of the score function is given as:
Score(Q,D) = P(t1, t2..., tn|MD) = ’
ti2Q
P(ti|D) (2.2)
However, in this formulation, long documents that contain frequent words will be likely
selected and retrieved. In order to overcome this problem, we can use the Bayes rule:
Score(Q,D) = P(D|Q) = P(D)P(Q|D)
P(Q)
(2.3)
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Assuming that the order of the documents is independent of P(Q) and the query terms
are independent of each other, the formula 2.3 can be written as follows:
P(D|Q) rank= P(D)P(Q|D) = P(D)’
ti2Q
P(ti|D) (2.4)
where ti represents the words of the query Q.
P(D) represents the prior probability of the document D where its utility is to model
and integrate other sources of evidence independent of the query (e.g. document length)
into the information retrieval process. The estimation of P(ti|D) can be performed us-
ing different models (e.g, Jelineck Mercer, Dirichlet) [165]. This probability P(ti|D) is
based on estimating the frequency of the terms ti of the query Q in the document D
(maximum likelihood estimation). This may lead to assigning a zero probability for
documents that do not contain at least term of the query. In this particular case, the
similarity score of the document is zero whereas the document could partially answer
the information requirement formulated in the query. To overcome this disadvantage,
language models use smoothing techniques [95, 97]. Smoothing allows non-zero proba-
bilities to be assigned to missing terms. The most used methods in IR are those based on
interpolation. They consist of estimating the probability of a term according to the doc-
ument and a reference collection; often the document collection itself. In the literature,
there is a series of proposed methods.
The interpolation smoothing, for example of Jelinek-Mercer [95], consists of combining
a model with one or more lower order models systematically as follows:
P(t1, t2, ..., tn|D) = ’
ti2Q
(lP(ti|D) + (1  l)P(ti)) (2.5)
The basic probability P(ti) can be estimated by the probability of term occurrence in the
collection using maximum likelihood approach. In the equation, l is an unknown pa-
rameter that must be empirically computed, which is a disadvantage in this technique.
Another smoothing technique often used in information retrieval is called Dirichlet
smoothing, it is defined as follows:
P(t1, t2, ..., tn|D) = ’
ti2Q
⇣ t f (ti,D) + µP(ti|C)
|D|+ µ
⌘
(2.6)
where |D| represents the size of the document (the total number of word occurrences),
and t f (ti,D) is the frequency of the term ti in D.
2.3.3 IR Models Evaluation
Comparing the performances of IR models and studying the impact of involved factors
on the retrieval effectiveness require to have standard quantitative metrics. In the world
of IR systems, two categories of retrieval measures are adopted: (i) recall and preci-
sion based metrics for evaluating the IR model effectiveness; (ii) rank-oriented metrics
for evaluating the ranking accuracy. In the following, we present the main evaluation
metrics adopted in the IR field.
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2.3.3.1 Recall and Precision Metrics
Recall. It is a metric that shows the ability of an information retrieval system to return
relevant documents in the retrieved set. It is defined by the fraction of retrieved relevant
documents over the set of relevant documents in the collection. Let Q be a set of queries,
the recall value of an IR system is averagely computed as follows:
Recall =
1
|Q| Âqj2Q
|Sj \ Rj|
|Rj| (2.7)
where Sj is the set of retrieved documents corresponding to query qj, and Rj is the set
of relevant documents corresponding to query qj in the collection.
Precision. It evaluates the ability of an IR system to return relevant documents in the
answer set. It is defined as the fraction of relevant documents in the retrieved set. Given
a set of queries Q, the precision of an IR system is computed as:
Precision =
1
|Q| Âqj2Q
|Sj \ Rj|
|Sj| (2.8)
Precision at k (P@k). Precision at the kth position (P@k) computes the precision of an IR
system over the top k retrieved document. This metric evaluates the ability of IR systems
to return relevant documents over the top k of results. P@k is mainly used when users
are interested in the top of retrieved documents. For a given a set of queries Q, P@k is
defined by:
P@k =
1
|Q| Âqj2Q
|Sjk \ Rj|
|Sjk| (2.9)
where Sjk refers to the set of top k retrieved documents for query qj, ranked by score.
2.3.3.2 Ranked-oriented Metrics
Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG). The Normalized Discounted Cu-
mulative Gain [76] evaluates the ability of an IR system for retrieving and ranking doc-
uments in a descending order of relevance. In contrast of binary relevance judgment,
NDCG provides gradual relevance scale. First, Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG), is
computed at the kth position for each query qj 2 Q as follows:
DCGkj = rel1 +
k
Â
i=2
reli
log2i
(2.10)
where reli represents the user’s relevance judgment of the ith document. The normalized
version of DCG is computed as follows:
NDCG@k =
Âqj2Q DCG
k
j
Âqj2Q IDCG
k
j
(2.11)
where IDCGkj refers to the perfect ranking of the retrieved set such that reli+1   reli.
2.4 conclusion 33
2.4 Conclusion
We introduced in this chapter basic concepts related to IQ field with defining the IQ
categories and dimensions showing the requirements for designing and specifying IQ
model. Moreover, we provide some concepts about machine learning paradigms and
methods by which IQ models are built to predict the quality of social information. At
last, we introduce brief concepts for IR field which helps in understanding our approach
for retrieving spam data in big collection of social information.
The introduced definitions of IQ are leveraged in studying the potentials IQ problems
and issues that might appear in OSM, ranging from social spam to rumors. Then, the
machine learning concepts are used for engineering features combined with supervised
learning algorithms to build predictive intelligent functions that predict the quality of
social information. The introduced IR evaluation metrics are adopted for evaluating our
spam information retrieval method from different aspects including the recall of social
spam information, and the precision in the top K retrieved social entity (e.g., Twitter
Account).

3
RELATED WORK : ONL INE SOC IAL MEDIA , IQ CHALLENGES ,
AND TWITTER SPAM DETECT ION
The idea of Twitter started with me working in dispatch since I was 15 years old, where taxi
cabs or firetrucks would broadcast where they were and what they were doing.
— Jack Dorsey, Twitter CEO
Millions of users around the world have involved OSM sites into their daily life routines.
OSM have a great ability in linking peoples together, especially who share common in-
terests. In recent years, and particularly since 2005, researchers have realized that the
OSM sites can be a fruitful source for enhancing the performance of different systems,
applications, and tasks such as recommendation systems, information retrieval, busi-
ness, and marketing. However, the quality of information plays crucial roles in the
performance of systems and applications in which the low quality of information can
easily frustrate users since it does not satisfy user’s information needs. Hence, in this
chapter, we present details about online social media, including its categories, charac-
teristics, pros and cons, IQ problems. Then, a detailed description is provided about
the Microblogging sites with a focus on Twitter. Afterward, we discuss the social spam
IQ problem in-depth with providing the related work of Twitter-based spam detection
methods.
3.1 Online Social Media: Site Categories and Forms
OSM are defined as a phenomenon that has recently taken over the web, allowing more
connectivity and interaction between web users and it encourages contributions and
feedback from anyone who is a member of any virtual community [2]. OSM, or com-
monly known as the Social Web, consist of a myriad of services such as blogs, and social
networking websites. The great characteristics of OSM in having reactive interfaces, low
barrier to publication, and zero operational costs, have led a phenomenal growth in user
Table 3.1: Online Social Media Sites grouped based on their functionalities [2].
Category Online Social Media Sites
Blogs Wordpress, Blogger, Blogcatalog, MyBlogLog
Media Sharing Flickr, Photobucket, YouTube, Multiply, Justin.tv, Ustream
Microblogging Twitter, SixApart
Social Bookmarking Delicious, StumbleUpon
Social Friendship
Network
MySpace, Facebook, Friendfeed, Bebo, Orkut, LinkedIn, PatientsLikeMe,
DailyStrength
Social News Digg, Reddit
Wikis Wikipedia, Wikiversity, Scholarpedia, Ganfyd, AskDrWiki
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Figure 3.2: Exemple d’un réseau social
Les motivations des utilisateurs pour utiliser les réseaux sociaux sont diverses
[100, 102, 123, 217]. En effet, ces réseaux sociaux offrent relativement un nouveau
service de communication aux personnes désirant diffuser des informations qu’ils
n’auraient probablement pas partagé autrement en utilisant les services existants (ex.
messagerie instantanée, téléphone, courriel, etc). Les utilisateurs proposent des mises
à jour biographiques et des publications sur des évènements d’actualité [61] ou des
situations de crise et catastrophes [175, 195]. Les réseaux sociaux ont joué un rôle
important durant les révolutions du printemps arabe, ce qui a permis aux gens de
communiquer dans un cercle sociale relativement restreint.
Nous listons ci-dessous quelques exemples de réseaux sociaux :
• Facebook1 : Créé en 2004 par Mark Zuckerberg à l’université Harvard. C’est le
réseau social le plus populaire au monde avec 1.49 milliards d’utilisateurs act-
ifs mensuellement. En moyenne, les utilisateurs comptent 130 amis et passent 6
heures et 45 minutes par mois. Facebook est un réseau social sur Internet perme-
ttant à toute personne possédant un compte de créer son profil et de publier des
informations, dont elle peut contrôler la visibilité. L’usage de ce réseau s’étend du
simple partage d’informations (statuts, photos, liens, vidéos, etc) à la constitution
de pages et de groupes visant à faire connaitre des institutions, des entreprises ou
des causes variées.
• Twitter2 : Créé en mars 2006 par Jack Dorsey à San Francisco, et lancé en juillet de
la même année. Le service est rapidement devenu populaire, jusqu’à réunir plus
de 300 millions d’utilisateurs actifs, qui publient 500 millions de tweets chaque
1 https://www.facebook.com/
2 https://twitter.com/
Figure 3.1: Social Web interactions between consumers and producers
participations which had led to a participatory web. Various OSM sites could be similar
or different at the functionality level. Table 3.1 shows a categorization of different OSM
sites w.r.t. their functionalities. Besides to their specific functionalities, they are common
in allowing individuals to create social connections among them. Blogs, also called web
logs, are a collection of articles or blog posts, written by individuals named as bloggers,
arranged in a reverse chronological order. Blogs allow users to share their views, ex-
press their op nions, intera t and d scuss with ach other through linking to other blogs
or posting comments. Media Sharing sites allow users to upload, annotate, and share
their media content on the web, including videos, images, audio, etc. Microblogging
sites have same characteristics of blog sites, excepting a constraint on the article length.
Twitter, as a famous microblogging site, allows 140 characters for the twe ts. Typically,
these sites are adopted to share what us rs are doing. Social Book arking sites allow
users to share and tag their favorite webpages. Social Friendship Networks let users to
stay in touch with their friends with the ability to create new friends. Individuals reg-
istered on these sites can create profiles with specifying interests, education, location,
work, etc. Usually the connections on social friendship networks are non-directional,
meaning that it i required to reciprocate the friendship relation between two nodes.
Social News sites allow users to comment, share, and tag on news with others. Wikis
are publicly edited encyclopedias where most of Wiki sites have been evolved to be
protected from vandalism.
Typically, OSM sites can be abstracted through modeling them as a social network
which is essen ially a large graph where the nodes represent the users and the edges
represent the relations between the users [42]. It is represented by a graph G = (V, E)
where the set of nodes V represents the users and the set of edges E = VxV represents
the relations between them. In the case of a undirected social network, an edge (vi, vj)
represents a symmetrical relation, associating users vi and vj. Friendship is a typical
example of a undirected relationship in the social network. In the case of an directed
social network, an edge (vi, vj) represents an directed relation from vi to vj. For exam-
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ple, the electronic communication is represented by a direct border (vi, vj) where vi, vj
represents the sender and the recipient, respectively. To indicate the importance of a
user in the network or the strengths of a social relation, the weights of the network are
associated with nodes and edges, respectively. Figure 3.1 illustrates a social network
of 12 persons. A bidirectional edge denotes a reciprocal relationship between the users.
In this example, the 12 users of the social networks are connected to at least one node
in the graph. From a practical point of view, a social network is defined by a set of
actors who share several relationships with others [62]. The actors refer mainly to peo-
ple, but in another context, represent institutions, communities, information elements,
and so on. A social network can involve one or more types of actors, as indicated by
professional social networks where two types of actors present: workers and companies.
Social relations involve two or more actors in a friendship, partnership or even a simple
exchange of social contents. Both actors and social relationships evolve over time. New
actors and relationships may appear in the social network, others may disappear.
3.2 OSM Characteristics
Although of various functionalities that OSM sites provide for the users; however, they
are almost common in their characteristics. Hence, we list in the following many char-
acteristics related to OSM:
• Participation. OSM sites encourage their users to provide their contributions and
feedback.
• Openness. Most OSM sites are open to feedback and participation. They encour-
age commenting, voting, and the sharing of information.
• Conversation. Whereas traditional media is about broadcasting content in one
direction, OSM is better seen as a two-way conversation.
• Community. OSM allows communities to be formed quickly and communicated
effectively. Communities share common interests, such as a love of photography,
a political issue or a favorite TV show.
• Connectedness. Most OSM sites thrive on their connectedness, making use of
links to other sites, resources and people.
• Accessibility. OSM sites are publicly available for free or at no cost. Industrial
OSM are usually privately owned and is not freely available to people.
• Permanence. OSM sites are dynamic in their content and they can be altered
anytime. OSM individuals can edit their profile, blogs, preferences, etc. anytime
they want.
• Recency. The time lag between communications produced by OSM sites can be
almost zero. The communication on OSM sites can be instantaneous, while the
communications on industrial media may take days, weeks or even months.
• Usability. Most OSM sites do not require any special skills to create UGC. OSM
sites offer technologies and services with almost zero operational cost, while in-
dustrial media requires specialized skills and training as well.
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The main advantages of OSM characteristics have attracted companies and individu-
als to leverage OSM sites with their services in different aspects including audience
communication, creating virtual communities, instantaneous connection with users, etc.
Hence, we list many pros related to OSM sites as follow: (i) a good tool to use to pub-
licize your work; (ii) costs very little money to set up online; (iii) easy to create groups
and forming communities of interest; (iv) online participation can be easier than face to
face; (v) cross border collaboration can be facilitated; (vi) connections mean power and
money for many companies; (vii) breaks down barriers for people who want to stay
in touch with other people; (viii) provide added context and value to knowledge; (ix)
companies can obtain information from their demographics; (x) OSM may be used for
educational reasons such as publishing and sharing content, collaborating with others;
(xi) social networking sites facilitate you to procure information on any subjects from
anywhere.
On the other, different disadvantage related to the appearance and use of OSM sites,
listed as: (i) the risk of identify theft and fraud; (ii) user’s messages can be caught up
in "commercial noise"; (iii) difficult to gauge participation and commitment; (iv) a face-
to-face conversation is more effective than OSM-based communications; (v) hits do not
necessarily indicate attitude change.
3.3 User Generated Content
UGC has seen significant growth in recent years. The term UGC is quoted several times
and with different definitions depending on its informational nature (tag, I like, com-
ment, video, etc.). According to Baeza-Yates [9], the UGC is defined as follows:
"User Generated Content is one of the main current trends in the Web. This trend has allowed
all people that can access the Internet to publish content in different media, such as text (e.g.
blogs), photos or video."
In the same context, Volkovich and Kaltenbrunner [135] see that the UGC can be in the
form of user-resource interactions:
"Social news websites have gained significant popularity over the last few years. The
participants of such websites are not only allowed to share news links but also to annotate, to
evaluate and to comment them."
According to all these definitions, the content generated by the user is not only a docu-
ment, a picture or a video shared or created by the user. Other types of content includ-
ing providing additional metadata, for online resources such as descriptions, or terms
created by a set of users to enrich a resource with tags, or a comment , an opinion. To-
day, many social media sites offer to users the opportunity to publicly share their ideas
and opinions with others. Microblogging services, like Twitter, allow users to post short
comments. Also, other sources such as bookmarking services (e.g., Delicious and Digg)
allow users to annotate content published on the Web. The UGC can also be in the form
of a mention or any reaction towards a resource through buttons like, share, comment
(e.g., Facebook).
According to Amer-Yahia [160], the graph of social contents includes 4 types of inter-
actions: content-to-content, content-to-person, person-to-person and person-to-content
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• Content-Content : dans cette catégorie on peut apercevoir, par exemple des liens
hypertextes ou des citations.
Figure 3.5: Graphe du contenu social selon Amer-Yahia [207]
Ces données sociales générées à travers les interactions mutuelles entre les différentes
entités dans le Web (utilisateurs, actions, documents, etc) représentent le fruit d’un
mécanisme d’intelligence collective que les gens ont développé sur le Web, appelé la
"sagesse de la foule" (en anglais wisdom of crowds) [190].
L’UGC traduit une tendance de fond, de plus en plus de sites Internet deviennent des
plateformes mettant à disposition des outils pour que les internautes puissent créer des
contenus. Les réseaux sociaux et les plateformes vidéo/photo ont poussé ce principe
très loin. Souvent l’UGC est remis en cause pour son caractère peu fiable, l’information
délivrée est au contraire bien plus fiable et étendue que celle qu’on peut retrouver dans
les médias traditionnels et permet même d’offrir une source d’information avec une
certaine objectivité. A cela plusieurs raisons :
• La disponibilité immédiate sur Internet de plusieurs sources d’informations per-
met de les comparer, les confronter et en tirer l’information la plus objective pos-
sible.
• La sphère Internet regroupe des millions d’utilisateurs apportant avec eux leurs
bagages de connaissances, leurs qualifications, leurs diplômes et leurs passions.
Ces mêmes personnes sont parfois bien mieux qualifiées que des journalistes par
exemple pour parler d’un domaine particulier.
• Les dispositifs de contrôle, notamment sur Wikipédia par exemple, permettent de
limiter le vandalisme et la propagation d’informations fausses.
3.1.2.2 Signaux sociaux
Aujourd’hui, les signaux sociaux représentent un des types d’UGCs les plus populaires
sur le Web. En effet, les pages Web comprennent différents boutons de réseaux sociaux
Figure 3.2: Graph of social content according to Amer-Yahia [160].
(see figure 3.2). These interactions define the context of social production and the social
consumption of information.
• Person-Content. In this category, we can cite user traces and social actions/signals
on social networks such as commenting, liking and sharing on Facebook. The
UGC can be tweets, tags as well as content such as images, videos and textual
documents.
• Content-Person. This category mainly concerns about, for example, mentions on
Twitter or citations of authors on academic networks such as Researchgate, etc.
• Person-Person. This category concerns social relations such as friendship, Face-
book and Twitter subscription, skills recommendation such as LinkedIn, messages,
etc.
• Content-Content. In this category, we can see, for example, links of hypertexts or
quotes.
These social data generated through the mutual interactions between different entities
in the Web (users, actions, documents, etc.) represent the fruit of a collective intelligence
mechanism that people have developed on the Web, called the "wisdom of the crowd
" [131]. The UGC reflects a funda ental trend, more and more Internet sites become
platforms providing tools for users to create content. Social networks and video / photo
platforms have pushed this principle. The UGC is often called into question for its
unreliable nature, the information provided is on the contrary much more reliable and
extensive than that which can be found in the traditional media and even makes it
possible to offer a source of information with a certain objectivity. There are several
reasons for this:
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Table 3.2: Social Spam statistics in OSM.
Description Stat Data
Spammy Social Media Apps 5%
Brand-owned Spammy Social Media Apps 20%
Average Number of Social Profiles Contacted by a Spam Account 23
Number of New Spam Accounts Created 5 out of every 7 new accounts
Percentage of Spam Posts Contain a URL 15%
Most Popular Social Platforms for Social Spammers Facebook, Twitter, Youtube
• The immediate availability on the Internet of several sources of information makes
it possible to compare and confront them, and to draw as much objective informa-
tion as possible.
• The Internet sphere brings together millions of users bringing with them their
knowledge, qualifications, diplomas and passions. These same people are some-
times much better qualified than journalists, for example, to talk about a particular
field.
3.4 Online Social Media IQ Problems
The characteristics and flexibility of OSM sites lead to appear different IQ challenges
and problems, detailed as follows:
• Social Spam. Open standards and low barriers have made OSM sites vulnerable
to the attacks of social spammers who post non-sensical or gibberish text that not
only degrades the quality of search results, but also consumes valuable network
resources. Although of wide range of social spam definitions, we quote and adopt
the following definition as it fully comprehensive in covering various types of
noisy content:
"Social spam is unwanted spam content appearing on social networking services and
any website with user-generated content (comments, chat, etc.). It can be manifested in
many ways, including bulk messages, profanity, insults, hate speech, malicious links,
fraudulent reviews, fake friends, and personally identifiable information."1
Social spam increases the difficulty to find relevant and accurate information on
OSM. Also, it discourages users from adopting these technologies and using it as
a source of information. The statistics published in 2016 show a dramatic growth
in OSM spam content by a 355% from the previous year. More precisely, in Table2
3.2, we provide useful statistics showing the volume of spam content on OSM sites.
As anybody who frequently visits websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,
the spam on these websites are extremely higher than other OSM websites. Nex-
Gate3 estimates it to be 100 times more than OSM sites. Consequently, the number
of phishing attacks on these preferably and popular sites are also higher than any
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_spam
2 http://techcrunchies.com/growth-of-social-media-spam-statistics/
3 https://www.proofpoint.com/us/solutions/digital-risk
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(a) Twitter Spam Tweets (b) Facebook Spam Posts
(c) Instagram Spam Post
Figure 3.3: Real examples of spam posts published on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram OSM
sites.
other sites by a factor of 4. Given that a huge ratio of social spam are originally
scams targeting at fooling and luring users into divulging their confidential infor-
mation, the financial repercussions of social spam are huge where some estimates
point at a revenue loss of close to $200 million from Facebook. Figure 3.3 shows
real examples of spam posts published on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. At
the account-level, Figure 3.4 illustrates the meta-data of a real spam accounts ded-
icated to post spam tweets in Twitter.
• Contextual Relevance. Information in OSM sites is highly contextual so that a
piece of information could be viewed relevant users while others see it irrelevant.
For instance, some users on Twitter might interest in following others to be in-
formed of their daily activities, while other user(s) may find that being a follower
for those users is annoying. Indeed, social spam has a high correlation with the
contextual relevance IQ problem so that social spam doesn’t relate to the context
that it has been posted in. For example, posting a tweet talking about working
from home in "#breaking_News" trending topic is a spam one since the tweet has
not a near or far relation with the topic.
42 related work : online social media , iq challenges , and twitter spam detection
Figure 3.4: An example of an annotated spam account created on Twitter microblogging site.
• Colloquial Usage and Intentional Misspelling. The nature of OSM sites makes
individuals to use the colloquial forms of language. Such a casual environment
leads to have writings containing sentiments, expressions, and emotions. Indeed,
it is too prevalent to see intentionally modified spellings/words such as “this is
so cooool...”.. These examples with their misspellings clearly emphasize on the
emotions, leading to convey more information than the regular text. It would be
undesirable to ignore them because of their misspellings problem. Apparently, fea-
tures that seem noisy might be extremely informative. However, considering such
a phenomena as an IQ problem is completely dependent on the activities, func-
tionalities, and purposes of the OSM sites. For example, blogging sites related to
academics articles require to publish blogs having high quality in terms of qual-
ity, and thus articles having too many misspellings and colloquial words might
subject the article to be removed.
• Information Overload. With the rapid growth and flowing of information on
OSM sites, it really increases the difficulty to follow what is currently happening
in OSM sites, making the information quickly overwhelms the users. The infor-
mation overload problem makes search engines to choose between the freshness
of information and its accuracy. One suggests to reduce this problem on OSM
sites through identifying influential individuals and follow them to be updated
with the current affairs. Information overload problem has a correlation with the
social spam IQ issue, intersected at repeating and propagating same information
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Table 3.3: A mapping between online social media information quality challenges and the 16
adopted IQ dimensions.
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Social Spam X X X X X X X X
Contextual Relevance X
Colloquial Usage and
Intentional Misspelling
X X
Information Overload X X X X
Rumor X X X
or a piece of it to increase the probability of the desired spam content being seen
by normal users. Thus, having same repeated information on OSM sites is not
necessary to be true and related information.
• Rumor Information. It is defined as an unverified and instrumentally relevant
statement of information spread among people [116]. Indeed, rumor information
can end in three ways [136]: (i) resolved as true (factual); (ii) resolved as false
(nonfactual); or (iii) remain unresolved. To get better understanding about rumor
information and how rumors might have negative impact on people such as panic
and anxiety, in December 21, 2012, a false information had been spread on Twitter
talked about the "Doomsday" event. This event was rumored that the mentioned
day will be the judgment day and it is the end of 5126 year for the mesoameri-
can calendar. Unfortunately, this rumor information had been propagated quickly
over social networks, making the people too frightened about their lives. In the
next morning, people realized that the information had been a rumor without
believing anything said about that [78]. The main difference between social spam
and rumor is at the contextual relevant level where rumor information has a clear
context while social spam does have an obvious one. Thus, identifying the rumor
information requires to get insight into the semantic of the information, which is
not an easy task to do that.
In Table 3.3, the IQ challenges faced in OSM sites are mapped to the IQ dimensions
that are explained in chapter 2. The given mapping is inspired by work of [2] with
modifications made on it. Performing this mapping facilitates the understanding the
properties of IQ problems in addition to know which dimensions that must be taken
into the account when proposing a solution. Social spam problem can be mapped on
eight IQ dimensions. Spam content does not represent a real world data and thus it has
low degree in accuracy and believability dimensions. The reputation of spam is also low
because normal users tend to circulate accurate information in general. The spam con-
tent doesn’t deliver any benefit for the OSNs users, leading to have low degree in terms
of value-added and relevancy dimensions. The accounts that are used for publishing
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spam content are newly created, in general, and thus the timeliness IQ dimension plays
a role in detecting spam accounts. As social spammers tend to achieve ill-legal purposes
in a fast way, they adopt the approach of repeating same spam content to increase the
chance of other users to interact with the spam content. Consequently, the amount of
data IQ dimension is high in case of social spam content. The phishing websites and
malware links are a type of social spam and thus the social spam can be mapped to
security IQ dimension which has low value.
The contextual relevance IQ problem is only mapped to relevancy dimension since
the non-contextual information has low values in terms of relevancy to the considered
context. Intentional misspelling IQ problem has low Accuracy in terms of spelling al-
though of it might help in expressing the emotions of the user in cases such as “this is
cooooool!”. Also, the value added of such information in some contexts and OSM sites
is too low. Information overload problem, which makes decision making more difficult
for users, can be easily mapped to amount of data dimensions. Furthermore, when a
huge amount of data exists, the understandability of information, including the consis-
tency and manipulability of information. Therefore, the information overload problem
can be mapped into the ease of understanding, consistency, and maintainability dimen-
sions. Last but not least, the rumor Information on social media can be projected on
the accuracy, reputation, consistency dimensions. The accuracy of rumor information is
obviously low since it is a false information. Also, the reputation of rumors is in general
low.
3.5 Twitter as Microblogging Service
A microblogging service is defined as a communication medium that allows broadcast-
ing short messages. In contrast to traditional media-sharing, blogs, and social networks,
microblogs are textual-based messages that are submitted in real-time manner to report
about actual interest. It is often limited to few characters (e.g. 140 in Twitter). Also, the
practically of microblogs enables users to create a microblog from their mobile devices.
More precisely, microblogging services provide a light-weight and easy form of com-
munication that allows users to share and broadcast information about their opinions,
activities, and status [77]. Besides the entertaining and personal purposes, microblogs
have recently attracted the attention of online communities, companies, and news edi-
tors because it acts as a promising tool for information broadcasting and team collab-
oration. Thus, based on the different uses of microblogs, they are classified into three
main groups described as follows:
• Information broadcasting. This category mainly concerns about propagating real-
time news where the purpose of these messages is to largely spread an informa-
tion though the social network. Example of these message could be either a per-
sonal information like "The Smith family has a newborn!” or report a large-scale
news such as "Gulf Oil spill continues to grow and spread east".
• Communication. The main idea of this category is to share thoughts, emotional
and factual information such as “No matter what people say”, “I’m so sad!”
and “The moon is the Earth’s satellite”. It also may include information related
to status updates from another social networking sites reporting latest activi-
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ties like auto-generated YouTube activity messages “I liked a @YouTube video
http://youtu.be/...” .
• Collaboration. This category is related to community notifications, group discus-
sions, and questioning-answering posts like "A new release of Twitter API", "Is-
sue allocating memory". Collaborative microblogs may include sharing of helpful
posts containing web resources and knowledge such as technical tips.
Various microblogging sites are available on the Web such as Dailybooth4, FriendFeed5,
and Tumblr6. These sites enable friends to share their interest. However, Twitter is ac-
tually the most popular microblogging service in the Web with over 200 million active
users and 400 million tweets posted per day. Moreover, Twitter is adopted as a source
of information and case study in thousands of academic researches such as text sum-
marization, social information retrieval, and social profiling fields. Thus, we are particu-
larly interested in Twitter microblogging service as it has almost unique characteristics
not available in other OSM sites, making most proposed solutions for it applicable for
other OSM sites.
3.5.1 Twitter on Focus
Twitter is a microblogging service launched in March 2006 where it has become one of
the most popular microblogging sites. The founders of Twitter defined it as a free social
networking microblogging service that offers to everyone the opportunity to instantly
create and share ideas and information, without any barriers. Twitter allows users to
post short messages known as "tweets". A tweet is a plain text in which the user can
post photos, videos and web pages by adding the corresponding URL. Initially, a tweet
was limited to up 140 characters. Since November 2017, this limit has been relaxed to
280 characters. Twitter social network is based on the principle of followership where
users follow others or are followed. Unlike most online social networking sites, such as
Facebook, the relationship of following and being followed requires no reciprocation.
A user can follow any other user, and the user being followed need not to follow back.
Being a follower on Twitter means that the user receives all the tweets from those the
user follows. By default, tweets are publicly visible where users can access to other
user’s tweets unless no restriction is applied the user’s tweets.
A tweet can be addressed to a particular user by mentioning his @username at the be-
ginning of the tweet. A user can interact with a tweet posted by another user using two
types of actions. The first action is about allowing a user to show his/her appreciation
for a Tweet. If a user appreciates a tweet, then he has the possibility to show it by adding
a like. Furthermore, Twitter allows saving tweets as favorite. The second type of actions
consists of disseminating other user’s tweets using one of the following methods:
• Re-Tweeting. A user can post a tweet of another user. This kind of tweet is known
as "retweet". This mechanism of information dissemination is similar to "sharing"
concept in other social networking services.
4 http://www.dailybooth.com/
5 http://blog.friendfeed.com/
6 https://www.tumblr.com/
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Figure 2.5: The most retweeted tweet in Twitter: Tweet posted by Barak Obama.
Figure 2.5 is an example of a tweet posted by Barak Obama and represents, in fact,
the most retweeted tweet in Twitter with over 1,712,001 retweets and more than 4.5
million likes.
In addition, users can annotate their tweets by using hashtags (a non-spacing word
with prefix character “#”). A hashtag is used to draw attention to the main topic in
the tweet. The use of hashtags helps to get found by a target audience because people
research by searching for specific hashtags.
2.2.4.2 Twitter data crawling
Twitter allows access to streaming data that enables dynamically capturing the social
activity of users. Twitter provides two types of APIs with different capabilities and
limitations to access to the social activity of users namely: REST APIs and Streaming
APIs. Below, we describe the difference between these types of APIs.
• REST APIs are based on the REST 14 architecture (REpresentational State Transfer)
which is a web service that allows the requesting systems to access and manipulate
textual representations of web resources. These APIs is used for getting access to
historical data ( old tweets for instances). To retrieve information a user must
explicitly request it. For example, with this API, one can retrieve 3,200 of the most
recent Tweets published by a user including retweets. Anonymous and free access
to this API is limited to 180 requests per 15 minutes.
• Streaming APIs provide a continuous stream of public information from Twitter.
The main advantage of these type of APIs is that once a request for information is
made, the Streaming APIs provide a continuous stream of updates with no further
input from the user. However these APIs only grant access to a 1% sample of the
Twitter data. At the time of writing this thesis, the main access points available
for free are as follows:
14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representational_state_transfer
Figure 3.5: The most retweeted t eet in T itter: Tweet posted by Barak Obama.
• Replying. A reply is a tweet that points to a previous tweet sent as a direct re-
sponse to another tweet. It is used to respond to another user’s tweet by mentio -
ing his @username at the beginning of the tweet before posting it.
Figure 3.5 is an example of a tweet posted by Barak Obama. It represents, in fact, the
most retweeted tweet in Twitter with over 1,712,001 retweets and more than 4.5 million
likes. In addition, users can annotate their tweets by using hashtags (a non-spacing
word with p efix character "#"). A hashtag is used to draw the attention to the main
topic in the tweet.
3.5.2 Twitter Data Crawling Methods
Twitter provides an access for data streaming that dynamically enables capturing the
social activity of users. Twitter provides two types of APIs with different capabilities
and limitations to access to the social activity of users namely: REST APIs and Streaming
APIs.
• REST APIs ar based on the REST7 a chitecture (REpresentational State Transfer)
which is a web service that allows systems to access and manipulate textual rep-
resentations of web resources. These APIs are used for getting access to historical
data ( old tweets for instances). For example, with this API, one can retrieve 3,200
of the most recent Tweets published by a user including retweets. Anonymous
and free access to this API is limited to 180 requests per 15 minutes.
• Streaming APIs provide a continuous stream of public information from Twitter.
The main advantage of these type of APIs is that once a request for information
is made, the Streaming APIs provide a continuous stream of updates with no
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representational_state_transfer
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further input from the user. However, these APIs only give access to 1% sample
of the Twitter data. The main access points available for free are as follows:
– Public Streams. It returns a small random sample of all public tweets. This
API provides approximately a 1% sample of all tweets (sometimes called the
"spritzer");
– User Streams. These are stream of public tweets published by single-user,
with all a user’s tweets.
– Filter Streams. This access point allows to receive a sample of public tweets
streams filtered by users, keywords, and location boxes. The free access to
this endpoint allows to specify a maximum of 400 keywords, 5,000 user ids,
and 25 location boxes8.
Regardless the type of streaming method, in general, the intended object behind data
crawling is collecting tweets. Indeed, Twitter provides too many meta-data in the tweet
object that can be leveraged for different filtering purposes. Figure 3.6 shows an anno-
tated JSON format tweet representing the meta-data of a tweet object. Twitter provides
in the tweet object basic information about the user who posted the tweet such as the
creation date of user’s account, username, and screenname. Also, it contains data re-
lated to the content of tweet like the text of tweet, hashtags (if any), and URLs (if any).
3.6 Twitter Mechanism in Fighting Social Spam
Social Spammers exploit the flexibility of using OSM to misuse all legal and possible ser-
vices supported by OSM to spread their spam content. Regardless the type of OSM site
targeted, social spammers adopt same facts or principles in their goals and behaviors,
summarized as follows: [148]:
• Social spammers are goal-oriented persons targeting to achieve unethical goals
(e.g., promote products), and thus they use their smartness to accomplish their
spammy tasks in an effective and a quick way.
• Social spammers exploit trending topics to lunch their spammy content.
• Social spammers often create and launch a campaign of spam accounts in a short
period (e.g., one day), to maximize their monetary profits and speedup their spam-
ming behavior.
• As a set of APIs is provided by social networks, social spammers leverage them
to automate their spamming tasks in a systematic way (e.g., tweeting every 10
minutes). The random posting behavior is avoided and not preferable solution
for social spammers because it may decrease the target profit and decelerate their
spamming behavior.
Twitter spends a great effort to make its environment spam-free one. The word "spam",
according to Twitter, refers to a variety of prohibited behaviors that violate rules set
and defined by Twitter. Accordingly, the spam can be generally described as unsolicited
8 https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/overview
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Figure 3.6: An example of tweet JSON object describing the accessible meta-data in any tweet
object.
and/or repeated actions that negatively impact other users. It may take different forms
including automated account interactions and behaviors, and the attempts that mislead
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(a) Phishing website (similar to Twitter site) posted using spam tweet.
(b) Suspended spam account due to the aggressive following issue.
(c) Spam tweets abused mention Twitter feature. (d) Spam tweets posted on different trending
topics (or hashtags).
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(e) Spam tweets containing links with unre-
lated text.
(f) Duplicated spam tweets posted by same
spam account.
(g) Multiple spam accounts posted same spam tweets.
Figure 3.7: Different spamming tactics adopted by social spammers.
or deceive users. Provided by true examples of spam tweets and accounts illustrated in
Figure 3.7, Twitter provides some common tactics that spam accounts often use:
• Posting harmful links (including links to phishing or malware sites).
• Aggressive following behavior (mass following and mass unfollowing for atten-
tion).
• Abusing the reply or mention functions to post unwanted messages to accounts.
• Creating multiple accounts (either manually or using automated tools).
• Posting repeatedly to trending topics to try to grab attention.
• Repeatedly posting duplicate updates.
• Posting links with unrelated Tweets.
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(a) Example of reporting a spam account.
(b) Example of reporting a spam tweet.
Figure 3.8: Twitter reporting spam mechanism for accounts and tweets.
As Twitter provides an application programming interface (API) and it does not require
a valid email address when creating an account, the risk of social spam gets further
increased. More precisely, social spammers leverage different set of provided services
to launch their spam attacks through: (i) URL; (ii) Hashtag; and (iii) Mention services.
To give a general idea of how social spammers operate, we describe in the following
different methods used in spreading spam:
• Short URLs. Although businesses promote their products in a smart way ap-
proach, social spammers promote their business opportunities or scams on
through using short URLs. Such URLs are used frequently due to the 140 char-
acter limit on tweets, which is impossible to tell whether the posted URL in the
tweet is a scam or contains a virus, Trojan, or other type of malware. Figure 3.7.a
shows a phishing website posted in a spam tweet where the phishing URL is given
in a shorten format.
• Hijacking. Hackers can hijack Twitter accounts by stealing or breaking the pass-
word of the account and using the account in sending out spam. Hackers usually
target the accounts that have a large set of followers so that they can send to them
spam. This often includes the accounts of famous Twitter users.
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• Hashtags on Trend Topics. Trending topics on Twitter are topics that are currently
circulated among on Twitter’s users. Social spammers exploit the trending topic
in their spam tweets to increase the visibility of their tweets because they show
up more often in popular searches.
• Tweetjacking. Social spammers may reply to tweets by replying to user’s account
@username. When they reply or retweet, the spam messages appear in the user’s
timeline. The spam messages usually contain a short URL that redirect the user
(clicker) to a porn site or, worse yet, a site injected with malware, or phishing site.
• Follower Fraud. The success of any Twitter account is partially dependent on the
number of followers. Creating an account is very easy which encourages social
spammers to automate the process of accounts creation and the collect a massive
amount of fake followers. Social spammer would turn around and try to sell the
account for a good amount of money with repeating the same process to cultivate
their spam group.
Besides the obvious rules followed by Twitter in fighting the spam content and behav-
ior, Twitter gives the opportunity for the users to report spam accounts through clicking
on "Report: they are posting spam" option available in all accounts, illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.8. When an account is being reported, Twitter’s administrators manually review
and deeply analyze that account to make later a suspension decision. However, such
a reporting mechanism is inefficient for fighting and bringing down social spammers
because it needs significant efforts from both users and administrators. Moreover, many
users may provide fake reports and thus not all reports are necessary to be trustworthy.
3.7 Twitter Spam Detection: Cutting Edge Methods
Although Twitter seriously takes fighting spam, its environment is not a spam-free
because of the high evolution in the spam content and tactics. Thus, the shortcomings
in Twitter’s anti-spam mechanism have motivated researchers to introduce more robust
methods to increase the incoming data quality for the applications that use Twitter as a
main source of information.
3.7.1 Methods Taxonomy
After having a deepen insight into a wide range of scientific research works related to
the spam detection methods in Twitter, we build a detailed taxonomy for these methods,
shown in Figure 3.9, based on different criteria, including: (i) type of the detection
approach (Machine Learning or Honeypot); (ii) level of detection (Tweet, Account, and
Campaign); and (iii) type of features (User, Content, Link, Automation, Graph, and
Timing) exploited in the detection methods.
Most of spam detection methods developed have leveraged the machine learning ap-
proach because it has the ability to understand and learn deep spam patterns and
behaviors. Also, the models of machine learning-based are easy to develop since the
steps for doing that are clear and obvious, summarized in: (i) data crawling; (ii) data
annotation based on the targeted task; (iii) feature extraction as data preprocessing; (iv)
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model building using a learning algorithm; (v) and at last, model validation using test-
ing data. The other less common approach is called in the literature as Honeypot which
requires an intervention from systems’ administrators.
The level of detection concerns about the desired task that data-driven machine learning
based model needs to solve. We find three levels of spam detection models proposed in
the literature, listed and defined as follows:
• Tweet-Level Detection. This level is concerned about predicting the class label of
tweet whether it is a spam or non-spam.
• Account-Level Detection. This level of detection focuses on deeply analyzing the
user’s profile or account to predict the user of the account whether spammer or
legitimate user.
• Campaign-Level Detection. This level of detection takes the collective perspective
so that a group of accounts is deeply examined to judge whether it is a spam
campaign or not.
Beyond the detection level, we categorize the features adopted in designing the classifi-
cation models into different types based on the semantic and role of the features. In the
following, we list and define the categorizes as:
• User-based Features. They are extracted from attributes (e.g., username, screen
name) existing in the user object, such as account’s age, and number of tweets
posted by the user.
• Content-based Features. They are extracted from the content of one or more
tweets, such as number of hashtags, and number of URLs.
• Graph-based Features. They require to build first a bi-directional graph contain-
ing user’s neighbors to extract features such as local-clustering, node betweenness.
Social Spam Detection 
Methods
Honeypot Approach Machine Learning Approach
Account Level Tweet Level Account Level Campaign  Level
Content Features
User Features
Link Features
Content Features
User Features
Graph Features
Content Features Graph Features
Timing Features
Automation 
Features
User Features
Figure 3.9: A taxonomy for social spam detection methods in Twitter.
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Figure 3.10: A flowchart describing the classical real-time spam detection method consisting of
two dependent phases: (i) training phase; (ii) and then operational phase.
• Timing-based Features. They are extracted by analyzing the posting time of a
group of tweets posted by a user, such as tweeting frequency.
• Automation-based Features. They relate to the use of external APIs supported by
external websites.
• Link-based Features. They are extracted from analyzing URLs posted in user’s
tweets, such as tweet and URL content similarity.
3.7.2 Machine Learning-based Detection Methods
Most of the spam detection methods have employed supervised machine learning algo-
rithms at three levels of detection, distributed between tweet-level detection, account-
level detection, and campaign-level detection, described as:
• Tweet-Level. Martinez-Romo and Araujo [98] have designed a language model
based method to detect spam tweets existing in Twitter trending topics. In this
method, a uni-gram language model is built for each tweet and another uni-gram
model for the whole tweets posted in the trending topic. Then, the kullback-leibler
divergence is computed between the language model of a given tweet and the lan-
guage model of the topic itself. In addition, if the given tweet contains a URL,
the authors have used the same concept, but with building a uni-gram language
model for the URL and compare it with the language model of the tweet itself us-
ing the same divergence metric. However, this method is not suitable for real-time
filtering because it needs the tweets that have been posted in the same topic from
Twitter’s servers. Moreover, parsing the HTML content of a URL takes a signifi-
cant time, making such a feature unsuitable for real-time filtering. In a more gen-
eral approach, supervised machine learning methods have been used to build a
binary classification models for detecting spam tweets in real-time Twitter streams
as illustrated in Figure 3.10 [18, 31]. Building such models requires a training
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phase which exploits an already annotated data-set consisting of tweets labeled
as spam and non-spam, and a set of features to be extracted from each tweet
to have a labeled feature space. Then, a particular supervised machine learning
method (e.g., Random Forest, J48, Support Vector Machine) is used to produce
a binary classification model. At the operational time, the learned classification
model is exploited to predict the class label of each new incoming tweet into a
spam or non-spam, with using the same features adopted in the training phase.
As the tweet object has a limited amount of information, a few number of features
described in Table 3.4 and categorized into user and content, has been adopted
in spam tweet detection. Most of these features are light and suitable for real-
time filtering, except those features that require an additional information from
either the Web or from Twitter’s servers. However, the major drawback of this
approach is the need for a training set to have an updated classification model
being able to effectively detect spam tweets. A more dynamic method, so-called
asymmetric-self learning[30], has been proposed to overcome and reduce the prob-
lem of needing an up-to-date training set. This method adds incoming classified
tweets, using an initial trained classification model, to the training data-set. Then,
after a defined period (e.g., 1 days or 2 days), the classification model is retrained
using the old training tweets and the recent classified tweets. However, this ap-
proach is completely dependent on the learning algorithm since the algorithms
that don’t consider the distribution of the class labels during the learning phases,
such as neural network, will not produce a classification model differing from the
previous one. Hence, there is no guarantee about its performance in effectively
adapting new social spammers’ patterns.
• Account-Level. The works introduced in [18, 158, 141, 99, 129, 101, 12, 70, 69] have
focused on extracting features (e.g., the number of friends, number of follow-
ers, similarity between tweets, and ratio of URLs in tweets) from users’ accounts.
In more dedicated studies, the works presented in [22, 142] have identified the
spam URLs through analyzing the behavior of shorten URLs such as the number
of clicks and the length of redirection chain. However, the ease of manipulating
in this type of features by social spammers has motivated researchers to leverage
graph theory to extract more complex features. For instance, the studies presented
in [161, 162, 6] have examined the relation among users through using some graph
theories and metrics to measure three features including node betweenness, lo-
cal clustering, and bi-directional relation ratio. Leveraging such complex features
gives high spam accounts detection rate; however, they are not suitable for real-
time Twitter-based applications because of the huge volume of data that must
be retrieved from Twitter’s servers as well as graph operations mainly require
exponential time at the computational level.
• Campaign-Level. Chu et al. [34] have treated the spam problem from a collective
perspective view. They have clustered a set of desired accounts according to the
URLs available in the posted tweets. Then, a defined set of features from the ac-
counts clustered is designed to build a binary classification model using machine
learning algorithms to identify spam campaign. Chu et al. [33] have proposed a
classification model to capture the difference among bot, human, and cyborg with
taking into consideration the content of tweets and the tweeting behavior. Indeed,
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Table 3.4: A description of content and user features exploited in spam tweets detection, with
classifying them based on their suitability for real-time filtering.
Feature Name Description Real-Time Suitability
Content Features
Number of Hashtags The number of words that begin by "#" symbol [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of URLs The number of links, including shorten links [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of Words The number of words written in tweet where white-space is used a separator among words [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of Characters The number of characters used in creating the tweet, including numbers and symbols [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of Mentions The number of accounts mentioned in the tweet through looking for words starting by "@" [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of Retweets The number of retweets that the tweet has gained [18]. 3
Number of Spam Words The number of spam words that exist in the tweet according to a define list of spam words [18, 98]. 3
Number of Trending Topics The number of words that represent trending topics circulated in Twitter [18, 98]. 3
Number of hashtags per words The ratio of the number of hashtags to the number of words in the tweet [18]. 3
Number of URLs per Words The ratio of the number of URLs to the number of words in the tweet [18]. 3
Number of Numeric Characters The number of numeric digits in the tweet [18, 30, 31, 98]. 3
Number of Replies The number of times that the tweet has been replied by other users [18, 98]. 3
Number of Favourites The number of accounts/users that have favorited the tweet [30, 31]. 3
Tweet and URL Page Title Divergence The Kullback–Leibler Divergence value computed between the text of the tweet and the title of the URL website, if any [98]. 7
Tweet and Topic Content Divergence The average value of the Kullback–Leibler Divergence values computed between each tweet of the considered tweet topic
and the text of the considered tweet, if any [98].
7
Tweet and User’s Tweets Divergence The average value of the Kullback–Leibler Divergence values computed between each tweet posted by the tweet user and
the considered tweet content [98].
7
User Features
Number of Followings The number of accounts/users that the user of the tweet follows [30, 31]. 3
Number of Lists The number of accounts/users that has listed the user of the tweet [30, 31]. 3
Number of Followers The number of accounts/users that follow the user of the tweet [30, 31]. 3
Account Age The number of milliseconds spent since the creation date of the account of the tweet [30, 31]. 3
Number of Tweets The number of tweets that the user of the tweet has tweeted [30, 31]. 3
methods belonging to this detection level have a major drawback since these meth-
ods employ a set of features requiring a great number of REST API calls to get
information such as users’ tweets and followers. Consequently, exploiting the cur-
rent version of campaign level detection methods are not appropriate for real-time
filtering due to the high volume of data required from Twitter’s servers.
3.7.3 Honeypot-based Detection Methods
Social honeypot is viewed as an information system resource that can monitor social
spammers’ behavior through logging their information such as the information of ac-
counts and any available content [88]. In fact, there is no significant difference between
Twitter’s anti-spam mechanism and the social honeypot approach. Both of them need
an administrative control to produce a decision about the accounts that have fallen into
the honeypot trap. The necessity of administrative control is to reduce the false positive
rate, as an alternative solution to blindly classify all users who have been dropped in
the trap as spam users.
3.7.4 Feature Analysis: Real-Time, and API Calls
As a part of contributions in this thesis, we study the features that are designed and
proposed for Twitter spam detection methods. As the features have strong variations in
their discriminative power of detecting spam tweets, accounts, and campaigns, also they
have the same variations in their applicability for real-time detection and the amount of
information required for extraction. We study the- state- of- the- art features from two
different aspects, listed and defined as follows:
• Real-time Applicability. This aspect concerns about to what extent the feature can
be applied in real-time spam filtering methods.
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• API Calls. It is about the number of REST API calls that are needed to retrieve
the information (e.g., followers, followees, and tweets) from Twitter servers to
compute its value.
Based on the three aspects, Table A.1, in Appendix A, lists and describes 119 features
adopted at different levels of spam detection in Twitter. Most of the features are not
suitable for real-time spam detection since they are conditioned by retrieving informa-
tion from Twitter’s servers with at least one REST API call. The user-based features
are almost the suitable ones for real-time spam tweet filtering because all information
required for extraction is available in the tweet object itself. The rest type of features
needs at least one API call to retrieve the required information. The most complex
features are the graph-based ones since the number of calls may reach hundreds or
thousands to have the desired information about either tweets or accounts. Although
of some features exactly requires one API call; however, the extraction of such features
is not scalable when having large amount of tweets or either accounts to be filtered in
an offline operation mode. Consequently, such an issue is applied on most graph-based
features.
3.8 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter the different forms and categorizes of OSM with
the possible forms of UGC that can be published by users. Then, we have discussed
the OSM characteristics that lead to have various IQ problems. Afterward, we have
presented all possible IQ problems that could approach on OSM sites through provid-
ing real examples, with a detailed mapping between each IQ problem and each IQ di-
mension. Then, we have introduced Twitter as a microblogging service with providing
details about its crawling data methods. Besides, we have detailed the anti-spam mech-
anism of Twitter, in addition to show different examples of social spammers behaviors
and tactics that they follow in propagating spam content. Finally, we have presented
and then discussed the cutting edge of spam detection methods proposed for Twitter.

4
SOC IAL SPAM DETECT ION IN REAL -T IME STREAM
Everybody thinks they’re famous when they get 100,000 followers on Instagram and 5,000 on
Twitter.
— JMeek Mill
4.1 Introduction
Relying on a single streamed tweet or on a static annotated data-set to build a model to
follow-up social spammers’ patterns and their tricks is not efficient due to the lack of
information in the tweet object itself, and the variation in social spammers’ behaviors.
As Twitter is not immune towards the social spam problem [32], a set of methods has
been introduced in the literature for detecting spam campaigns and individual spam
accounts [18, 148, 158, 141, 99, 129, 101, 12], with little effort spent for individual spam
tweets detection[18, 31, 30]. These efforts mainly exploit supervised machine learning
methods combined with the features extraction concept to produce binary classifiers
using annotated data-sets. However, some of these methods such as campaign and
account based methods are "not" suitable for real-time filtration because their features
require an additional information from Twitter’s servers. The only legal way to retrieve
these additional information is by using REST APIs1 which are provided by Twitter
for developers and researchers. However, Twitter imposes limitations and constraints
(e.g., limiting the number of calls to a time slot) on using REST APIs, decreasing the
applicability of such methods in a real-time way. Moreover, exploiting graph-based
features such as node betweenness, and sender-receiver distance require an exponential
number of REST APIs calls to extract their values.
Most of the features that are used at tweet-level detection such as number of words are
computationally inexpensive and thus they are suitable for real-time spam tweets de-
tection. However, given the fact that social spammers are dynamic in their content and
strategies[148], these light features are not strongly discriminant among spam and non-
spam tweets. Also, the combination of these weak features is not necessary to produce
robust binary classification models, since social spammers can easily manipulate in
these features value. The straightforward and trivial solution to address such a problem
is designing new light features having enough discriminative power among spam and
non-spam tweets. However, this solution is not possible since the tweet content is lim-
ited to 140 (recently updated to 280) characters and the simple available meta-data about
its user (e.g., username attribute) increases the difficulty to design new robust light
features. Beyond the feature design level, the approaches followed in building spam
classification models are time-independent learning algorithms (e.g., Random-Forest,
Support Vector Machine) in which the learning and classification steps are performed
without considering the state of previous classified instances. Also, updating and tun-
ning the classification models (i.e., Model parameters) that use those learning methods
1 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public
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DolceAmore Engagement #KCA Opening the picture of brightness 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
DolceAmore Engagement #KCA How life can really be unfair 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
DolceAmore Engagement #KCA So quietly without a sound, 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
Figure 4.1: An example of three correlated spam tweets posted in a consecutive way by three
different spam accounts.
require a wide range of training and validation to obtain the desired results. Further-
more, performing these steps are time consuming, especially when treating large-scale
collections of tweets, rather than the need for new ground-truth data-sets. When social
spammers launch their spam campaigns through creating thousands of spam accounts,
in an automated way, they might intensively attack a particular trending information
entity (IE) (e.g., trending topic, URL, or account) at that moment. Thus, the probability
of the stream that is related to the targeted trending information entity to receive spam
tweets is higher than those that are not trending ones. For example, Figure 4.1 shows
a series of spam tweets attacked the "KCA" topic by three correlated spam accounts
(social spammers). Besides the prior probability of trending IE being attacked, the state
(spam or non-spam) of last streamed tweets to a particular topic can contribute in de-
tecting spam tweets when treating new incoming tweets. Moreover, from same example,
various patterns might be elicited: (i) same URL used in posting tweets; (ii) same prefix
exploited in filling screen-name attribute "voteddlovatu"; and (iii) high similarity in the
username attribute among the three accounts.
As social spammers might have high correlation among them when they launch their
spam campaigns through thousands of spam accounts, storing streamed tweets and
then analyzing them using unsupervised classification methods based on a small set of
discriminative features can produce annotated data-sets of tweets that can be used for
retraining and updating spam classification models for making them up-to-date with
new social spammers patterns and tactics. Moreover, involving the concept of sequential
data-based learning for real-time spam filtering may increase the detection performance.
In other words, the involvement of the prior probability to receive spam tweets and the
probability of the handled tweets for being a spam can increase the performance of
filtering spam tweets. With these intuitions and more or less hypotheses, we would like
to discuss the following research questions in this chapter:
1. What is the impact of collectively analyzing streamed tweets in revealing the spam
tweets?
2. To what extent is it possible and effective to automatically provide annotated data-
sets for updating the real-time spam classification models?
3. How do sequential data based machine learning methods can contribute in in-
creasing the performance of real-time spam filtering?
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4. How can the collaboration with other OSM sites (e.g., Facebook) improve the
detection of spam tweets ?
5. To what extent the existing real-time based features could help in effectively de-
tecting spam content in real-time stream mode?
Figure 4.2: An abstract view describing the architecture of our method in combining the unsu-
pervised classification component with the supervised one.
As a part of our contributions in this thesis and as a potential to discuss the stated
research questions, in this chapter, we introduce and experiment a framework that
leverages the unsupervised methods in providing periodically and automatically anno-
tated data-sets for updating real-time spam tweet detection models that are built using
sequential data based supervised learning methods. More precisely, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2, our framework is mainly composed of two components: (i) collective-based
unsupervised spam tweet classification model; (ii) and real-time supervised spam tweet
classification model. The first component collects and stores the streamed tweets. Then,
it applies clustering methods on the stored tweets, followed by a hand-designed func-
tion that labels each cluster of tweets to provide annotated tweets. In designing this
function, we propose two types of features: (i) self-cluster features that are extracted us-
ing the available tweets; (ii) and collaborative-based cluster features that are extracted
using external information from other OSM sites. The second component is responsible
about instantly classifying every streamed tweet into spam or non-spam, with period-
ically leveraging the annotated data-sets that are produced by the first component to
retrain and update the current classification model. Beyond applying classical classifica-
tion learning algorithms such as Random Forest, and SVM, we introduce the design of
sequential data based real-time spam tweet classification model using Hidden Markov
Model (HMM). The HMM proposed model allows to perform an inference about the
state of the incoming stream of tweets through: (i) taking and updating the prior prob-
ability to have a spam tweet using previous handled tweets; (ii) and by considering the
transition probability between spam and non-spam states. We demonstrate the effective-
ness of the proposed framework through a series of intensive experiments conducted
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on a data-set streamed from Twitter trending topics consisting of more than 2 million
tweets. Compared to two known methods designed for real-time spam tweets detection,
the experimental evaluation shows the efficiency of the proposed framework in detect-
ing spam tweets in terms of precision, recall, and F-measure performance measures.
Also, it provides the ability to have a control on the target quality of the tweets.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes our framework
in details. Section 4.3 introduces the data-set that has been adopted in performing our
experiments. Section 4.4 presents our approach and state-of-the-art evaluations. At last,
section 4.5 concludes the work introduced in this chapter.
4.2 Real-Time Spam Tweets Filtering Framework Design
4.2.1 Problem Definition and Formalization
Any Twitter stream can be represented as a finite set of chronologically sorted tweets,
defined as Rt = {T1, T2, . . . , Tt 1, Tt}, where t 2 N+ represents the number of seconds
since starting the streaming process, and T1 and Tt are the first and latest tweets that has
been streamed. Tweet object contains different attributes related to the tweet’s content
and its user. Therefore, we represent the tweet element T• by a 6-tuple of attributes,
T• = hUser, #Retweets, #Replies, #Favourites, Text, Timei, where #Retweets represents the
number of retweets that the tweet has gained, #Replies is the number of comments
performed as a reply on the tweet, #Favourites is the number of likes that the tweet has,
Time 2 Z 0 is the posting date of the tweet in seconds time unit computed since January
1, 1970, 00:00:00 GMT, while the Text and User attributes are defined as follows:
• Text. The textual content of the tweet is represented as a finite set of ordered
words, Text = {w1,w2, ...}. This set of words is extracted by segmenting the tweet
content using the whitespace separator. The word element w• might be a hashtag,
URL, user’s account mentioned, or more.
• User. Twitter provides simple meta-data about the user who posted a tweet.
Hence, we further represent the user object by 7-tuple of attributes as, User =
hUN, SN,UA, #Tweets, #Followers, #Followees, #Listsi, where #Tweets is the num-
ber of tweets that the user has posted on his account, #Followers is the number
of accounts that follow the user, #Followees is the number of accounts that the
user follows, #Lists is the number of accounts that list the user. The rest attributes
UN, SN,UA, are further defined as follows:
– Username (UN). Twitter allows users to name their accounts with a max-
imum length of 20 characters. Users can use whitespace, symbols, special
characters, and numeric numbers in filling their username attribute. This
field is not necessary for being unique and thus the users can name their
accounts by already used names. We represent this attribute as a set of or-
dered characters, defined as UN = {d1, ..., di}, where i 2 Z 0 is the character,
d• 2 {Printable Characters}2, position inside the username string.
2 http://web.itu.edu.tr/sgunduz/courses/mikroisl/ascii.html
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– Screen Name (SN). This attribute is a mandatory field and it must be filled at
the creation time of the account. Users must choose a unique name not used
previously by other users, with a maximum length of 16 characters. Twitter
also restricts the space of allowed characters to include only the alphabetical
letters, numbers, and ”_” character. Similar to the username attribute, we rep-
resent this field as an ordered set of characters, defined as SN = {d1, ..., di},
where i 2 Z 0 is the character, d• 2 {Alphanumeric Characters} [ {_}, posi-
tion inside the screen name string.
– User Age (UA). When a user creates an account on Twitter, the creation
date of the account is registered on Twitter’s servers without providing any
permissions to modify it in the future. We exploit the creation date, as an
accessible and available property in user’s object, to compute the age of
the account. Formally, we calculate the age in days time unit through sub-
tracting the current time from the creation date of the account, define as
UA = Timenow Timecreation864⇤105 , where Timenow, Timecreation 2 Z 0 are number of mil-
liseconds computed since January 1, 1970, 00:00:00 GMT.
According to this representation, the problem of real-time spam tweet detection can be
defined as follows. Given a tweet streamed at time t, Tt, and a set of already streamed
tweets, Rt 1, our problem is to predict whether the tweet Tt is a spam or non-spam, with
leveraging only the available information in both Tt and the set of already streamed
tweets Rt 1. More formally, we aim at designing a binary classification model, F : x !
{spam, non   Spam}, that takes a feature vector of the streamed tweet T• as an input
and predicts its class label as an output.
4.2.2 Model Design: An Overview
Motivation. Supervised learning methods are the classical approach adopted in litera-
ture for building spam tweets detection models. As commonly known in the machine
learning field, applying these methods needs an annotated data-set for solving the tar-
geted task. Unfortunately, having such a data is often very expensive in terms of anno-
tation time, and/or human resources. For instance, in information retrieval field, user
studies are performed to annotate documents through determining their relevancy w.r.t
input queries so that the results of these studies are adopted as reference models for
comparing developed retrieval models. Also, the complexity of these studies is propor-
tional with the volume of data required to be annotated so that large data-sets lead to
increase human resources, costs, and management. Indeed, in the context of OSM infor-
mation, the amount of data that are circulated among users and networks are too large,
meaning that making user’s studies for task annotation is too difficult, given the fact
of spam problem content diversity. Further, social spam classification models require
a continues adaption using new training data-sets to follow-up new social spammers’
patterns, and behaviors. Thus, obtaining a static training data-set to train a classification
model is not an efficient solution at all.
Solution Overview. With introduced problems about the annotation task difficulty, we
propose a design of a collective-based spam tweets classification framework that uti-
lizes the great benefits of unsupervised machine learning methods to periodically and
automatically provide an annotated data-set by which updated supervised classification
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Figure 4.3: A digram showing the flow and the steps of two main components in our frame-
work: (i) periodic classification function learning; (ii) and real-time tweet detection
or filtering.
models can be produced. The model employs the correlation among social spammers’
tweets in a short period to predict the spamming behavior. As described in Figure 4.3,
our framework consists of two main components: (i) real-time tweet filtering model;
and (ii) periodic classification model learning. The first component prepares a feature
vector for a streamed tweet through extracting a set of predefined light features and
then passes the vector to an already learned classification model to predict the class
label of the streamed tweet. The second component, which is the core of the frame-
work, incrementally stores the streamed tweets in a storage component (e.g., database)
and then frequently creates a new labeled training data-set using unsupervised meth-
ods once a certain number of new tweets is stored in the storage component, and then
preparing a new feature space of all annotated tweets in the storage component. Finally,
we exploit the characteristics of the sequential data-based learning methods to intro-
duce a design of HMM acting as a binary classification model to detect spam tweets.
The HMM model utilizes the last annotated tweets produced by the second component
to update its parameters, making them up-to-date with social spammers’ patterns and
behaviors.
Model Novelty. To the best of our knowledge, in the context of information quality and
especial social spam, our method idea and concept is novel in this field so that all prior
4.2 real-time spam tweets filtering framework design 65
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_51
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_63
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_58
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_12
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder Dash
SN: balderdashTM06
UA: 10 days
UN: Dash
SN: balderdashTM07
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder
SN: balderdashTM05
UA: 10 days
UN: Elizabeth
SN: ElizTomo
UA: 50 days
UN: Jade Rider
SN: asianmagic
UA: 50 days
UN: Mike
SN: Mikeaprietoo
UA: 50 days
Features Extraction 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 1
Input Users Set
UN: Sarah
SN: Sarah12
UA: 50 days
UN: Ngoc
SN: Ngoc12
UA: 50 days
UN: Pala
SN: Pala12
UA: 50 days
10 days cluster 
Age Clustering
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_51
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_63
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_58
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_12
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder Dash
SN: balderdashTM06
UA: 10 days UN: DashSN: balderdashTM07
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder
SN: balderdashTM05
UA: 10 days
UN: Elizabeth
SN: ElizTomo
UA: 50 days
UN: Jade Rider
SN: asianmagic
UA: 50 days
UN: Mike
SN: Mikeaprietoo
UA: 50 days
UN: Sarah
SN: Sarah12
UA: 50 days
UN: Ngoc
SN: Ngoc12
UA: 50 days
UN: Pala
SN: Pala12
UA: 50 days
50 days cluster 
10 days cluster 
Community Detection
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_51
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_63
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_58
UA: 10 days
UN: Mischief
SN: Mischiefs_12
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder Dash
SN: balderdashTM06
UA: 10 days
UN: Dash
SN: balderdashTM07
UA: 10 days
UN: Balder
SN: balderdashTM05
UA: 10 days
UN: Elizabeth
SN: ElizTomo
UA: 50 days
UN: Jade Rider
SN: asianmagic
UA: 50 days UN: Mike
SN: Mikeaprietoo
UA: 50 days
50 days cluster 
Community 2
Community 1 
UN: Pala
SN: Pala12
UA: 50 days
UN: Sarah
SN: Sarah12
UA: 50 days
UN: Ngoc
SN: Ngoc12
UA: 50 days
Community 3
Community 4
Writing Style Similarity: 0.8
Username Patterns Similarity:0.85
Screen-name Patterns Similarity: 0.7
Posting Behaviour Similarity:0.3 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 2
Writing Style Similarity: 0.7
Username Patterns Similarity: 0.9
Screen-name Patterns Similarity: 0.4
Posting Behaviour Similarity: 0.6 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 3
Writing Style Similarity: 0.4
Usermame Patterns Similarity:0.6
Screen-name Patterns Similarity: 0.8
Posting Behaviour Similarity:0.4 
Writing Style Tweets Similarity: 0.1
Username Patterns Similarity: 0.05
Screen-name Patterns Similarity: 0.1
Posting Behaviour Similarity: 0.1 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 4
Community Classification 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 1 if (Max(0.8,0.1,0.85,0.7,0.3)>= ?)
Spam Users
else       
non-Spam Users
Classification Threshold (?)=0.6
Co
m
m
un
ity
 2
if (Max(0.7,0.5,0.9,0.4,0.6)>= ?)
Spam Users
else
non-Spam Users
Co
m
m
un
ity
 3
if (Max(0.4,0.6,0.6,0.8,0.4)>= ?)
Spam Users
else
non-Spam Users
Co
m
m
un
ity
 4
if (Max(0.1,0.1,0.05,0.1,0.1)>= ?)
Spam Users
else
non-Spam Users
Four Features per Community 
Figure 4.4: An example describing the functionality of the 5-stage unsupervised classification:
(i) user set extraction; (ii) account age clustering; (iii) community detection; (iv)
community-based features extraction; (v) and community-based classification.
information quality methods work on building classification models using manual an-
notated data-sets. More precisely, a data-set of social information is collected and then
one or more user studies are conducted on the data-set to perform the target annota-
tion task with using later the annotated data in training models for solving the original
problem. Our method leverages the benefit of unsupervised learning approaches that
are applied in clustering problems so that classifying a group of elements (e.g, tweets)
is easier than producing a judgment on a single element (e.g, tweet) because more in-
formation can be gained related to group’s structure. The applicability of our method
in other applications is dependent on how much the analysis of group information en-
tities (e.g, tweets, images, etc) could provide details that cannot be captured in analysis
single information entity (e.g., tweet, image, etc). For instance, in tweet location predic-
tion problem, the collective analysis might provide deep details related to locations that
could be captured in a single tweet.
4.2.3 Collective-Based Unsupervised Predictive Model
Leveraging Twitter REST APIs to retrieve more information about users of the streamed
tweets is the most optimal solution to precisely label each tweet as a spam or not. How-
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ever, the impractically of this approach w.r.t. time brings serious challenges to design
an effective method suitable for processing large scale (sometime endless) of streamed
tweets. Beyond inspecting each tweet individually, we overcome these shortcomings
through an automatic approach that inspects the correlation among spam accounts and
their tweets at different levels using unsupervised clustering methods. The design of
the proposed approach comes in five-stage as illustrated through an example in Figure
4.4. For a given set of streamed tweets, the first stage extracts the users who posted
the tweets streamed. The second stage clusters the users set based on the age of each
user’s account. In the next stage, for each cluster resulted, a defined number of com-
munities is detected through an optimization process. In the fourth stage, we extract
hand-designed features for each community induced using only users’ tweets and ac-
counts information. The last stage makes a decision about each community using a sim-
ple discriminative feature-based classification model which labels the tweets of spam
communities as spam tweets.
Stage 1: Users Set Extraction. We design the clustering and the community detection
stages based on leveraging the information available in the users of the streamed tweets.
Formally, for the latest streamed tweets set, Rt, the unique set of users is defined as
Users = {T.User|T 2 Rt} where |Users|  |Rt|.
Stage 2: User Age-based Clustering. Different social spammers have the ability to cre-
ate hundreds and thousands of Twitter accounts in a short period not exceeding few
days, for launching their spam campaigns [18, 148]. Also, the impact of time has shown
its effectiveness in detecting spam accounts so that when a set of accounts have close
and recent creation date the probability of being spam accounts is high. Figure 4.6
three groups of Cumulative Distribution Function CDF of 12 tweet-level based features
drawn for spam and non-spam tweets. The CDFs of each group are computed for 10
days of tweet streaming to study the strength of features at different periods. The CDF
of the features shows that social spammers tend to behave exactly as legitimate users to
avoid the detection. An interesting point worth to mention is that the CDF of account
age feature is the most robust one compared to the rest features since the creation date
of accounts is non-editable by users.
Thus, the creation date of accounts can act as a heuristic for grouping and detecting the
spam accounts that might have correlation among them. According to that, the Users
set is clustered based on the user age (UA) attribute. In a formal way, let CAgea = {u|u 2
Users, u.UA = a} be a day-cluster containing the users who have age equaling a 2 Ages,
where Ages = {u.UA|u 2 Users} is a set of distinct users ages. Obviously, the number
of day clusters is dynamically determined, which exactly equals to the size of the Ages
set (i.e., |Ages|).
Stage 3: Community Detection. Social spammers might create uncorrelated spam cam-
paigns at the same time [142, 129, 155]. In other words, we might have age clusters con-
taining spam accounts belonging to different spam campaigns. Also, many non-spam
users join Twitter daily, increasing the probability of having non-spam users created
in the same day of spam ones. Therefore, to distinguish among different uncorrelated
spam campaigns and non-spam accounts, a community detection stage is performed on
each cluster resulted by age-based clustering stage. We define each spam campaign as
a community having high correlation among its users, where the correlation in a given
community might be measured over naming accounts level, duplicated tweets content,
or similar posting behavior.
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Figure 4.5: CDF of 12 tweet features drawn for the first period of spam and non-spam tweets.
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(a) CDF of 12 tweet features drawn for the second period of spam and non-spam tweets.
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(b) CDF of 12 tweet features drawn for the third period of spam and non-spam tweets.
Figure 4.6: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of non-spam and spam tweets drawn for
different 12 light tweet features at three streaming periods where each period is 10
days, showing the ineffectiveness of these features in discriminating among spam
and non-spam tweets.
We adopt the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) method, as an unsupervised way,
to infer communities’ structure because of its outstanding performance in clustering
problems [163]. NMF has turned into one of the preferable tools for decomposing data
into low-rank factorizing matrices to yield a parts-based representation. It has distinct
features of preserving the structure of the original input data, and keeping the non-
negativity in both weight and basis. The latent semantic space of the NMF method has
a very intuitive explanation in some clustering problems. For instance, in NMF based
document clustering, each axis of the latent semantic space stands for the basis topic of
a particular cluster where each document is represented by the additive combination of
the basis topics.
For the given community detection problem, NMF works through partitioning or factor-
izing one or more information matrices into hidden factor matrices for an age cluster, Ca,
a 2 Ages, of users. Formally, the factorization of information matrices is mathematically
defined as an optimization minimization problem as:
min
H 0 ||X HH
T||2F = minH 0
 vuuut|CAgea |Â
i=1
|CAgea |
Â
j=1
|xij   hihTj |2
!2
= min
H 0
|CAgea |
Â
i=1
|CAgea |
Â
j=1
|xij   hihTj |2
(4.1)
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where || • ||F is the Frobenius norm of the considered matrix, X 2 R|CAgea |⇥|CAgea | is
an information matrix representing the strength of the social connections (i.e., sim-
ilarity among a pair of users) between users, H = [h1 . . .hK] 2 R|CAgea |⇥K is the
community structure hidden factor matrix of K communities, and the jth row vector
hj = [hj1, . . . , hjK] 2 R1⇥K. The entry xij reflects the strength of the social connection
between the ui 2 CAgea user and uj 2 CAgea user. The entry hij in the hidden factor matrix
can be interpreted as the confidence degree of user ui 2 CAgea belonging to the jth com-
munity. It is important to mention that each user belongs to one community only, not
more than one.
Obviously, inferring the hidden matrix H requires a formal definition of the informa-
tion matrix X. For example, X might be an adjacency matrix representing the social
connections or the links among users of a given age cluster CAgea . However, obtaining
the adjacency matrix in our case is not possible since the available information about
users are limited to simple meta-data that describe accounts, which are not an informa-
tion about the followers and followees. Hence, we leverage the available and accessible
information to estimate social connections among users through proposing three defini-
tions of the information matrix X denoted as XSN , XUN , and XWS where each of which
is formally defined as follows:
• Screen Name Similarity (XSN). Since the screen name field must be unique, social
spammers tend to adopt a particular fixed pattern when creating multiple ac-
counts to act as a spam campaign. For example, in Figure 4.1, the spammer has
adopted the name "voteddlovatu" as a fixed pattern and repeating it in filling
the screen name field. Intuitively, the high overlapping or matching in the screen
name among users (or accounts) increases the probability of the users to belong
to the same community. Therefore, we define the information matrix XSN to mea-
sure the degree of matching in the screen name attribute. More precisely, given
two users ui, uj 2 CAgea , a 2 Ages, the degree of matching for a particular entry in
the matrix XSN is defined as:
xSNij =
max{|m|:m2N gram(ui .SN)\N gram(uj.SN),N2{1,...,min(|ui .SN|,|uj.SN|)}}
min(|ui .SN|,|uj.SN|)
(4.2)
where | • | is the cardinality of the considered set, N   gram(•) is a function that
returns a set of contiguous sequence of characters for a given name (set of ordered
characters) based on the value of N. For better understanding, the 3-gram (or tri-
gram[24]) of the screen name "vote" is {”vot”, ”ote”}. The above definition can
detect the matched pattern wherever it appears in the screen name attribute. For
instance, let "vote12" and "tovote" be screen names for two different spam users,
the degree of matching according to equation 4.2 is around ( 46 )66.6%, resulted
from the use of pattern "vote", regardless the position of the pattern.
• User Name Similarity (XUN). Differently from the screen name attribute, spammers
may duplicate username attribute as many as they wish. They exploit structured
and representative (not random) names to attract legitimate users[154]. Therefore,
fully or partially matching among users based on such an attribute increases the
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probability of being in the same community. Thus, we define the information ma-
trix XUN to measure the degree of similarity among users based on user name
attribute. Formally, given two users ui, uj 2 CAgeage , the degree of similarity is de-
fined as:
xUNij =
max{|m|:m2N gram(ui .UN)\N gram(uj.UN),N2{1,...,min(|ui .UN|,|uj.UN|)}}
min(|ui .UN|,|uj.UN|)
(4.3)
• Names Writing Style Similarity (XWS). Based on our observations, social spammers
may follow a particular style in writing the username and screen name attributes.
For instance, in these two real spam accounts (u1 = {SN = ”vote5soss33”,US =
”vote5sos”}, and u2 = {SN = ”saved028”,US = ”saved”}), the social spammer
has used the username attribute in filling the screen-name attribute with putting
the username value in the beginning. Hence, as these two accounts belong to the
same spam campaign, modeling such behavior can contribute in identifying spam
communities. In order to model this similarity feature among a pair of users, we
firstly define a function, Pos(Str1, Str2), that takes two strings as parameters and
then it finds the location (Start, Inside, End ) of the string Str2 in the string Str1,
written as:
Pos(Str1, Str2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
SE |Str1 \ Str2| = |Str2| = |Str1|
S |Str1 \ Str2| = |Str2| and •1 2 Str1 \ Str2
E |Str1 \ Str2| = |Str2| and •|Str1| 2 Str1 \ Str2
I |Str1 \ Str2| = |Str2| and•1 /2 Str1 \ Str2 and•|Str1| /2 Str1 \ Str2
(4.4)
where the two strings are represented as a finite set of ordered characters Str• =
{d1, d2, . . . }, d• 2 {Printable Characters}, the symbol •1 represents any character
written at the beginning of a given string, while •|Str1| corresponds to a character
written at the end of the string Str1.
Therefore, for a pair of users ui, uj 2 CAgea , a 2 Ages, belonging to an age cluster,
we define a writing style similarity matrix XWS based on the equality of the pair
in the Pos function value. For a particular entry in the matrix XWS, the similarity
is defined as:
xWSij =
8<:
1 Pos(ui.SN, ui.UN) = Pos(uj.SN, uj.UN) (4.5)
0 otherwise
where here 1 means that the pair of users has same writing style, while
0 represents dissimilar writing style. For better understanding, when apply-
ing the Pos function on the given example of a pair of spam accounts
(users), (u1 = {SN = ”vote5soss33”,US = ”vote5sos”}, and u2 = {SN =
”saved028”,US = ”saved”}), the "S" location is returned for the both users (i.e.,
Pos(”vote5soss33”, ”vote5sos”) = S, Pos(”saved028”, ”saved”) = S ) since the user-
name "vote5sos" appears in the beginning of screen name "vote5soss33" of the
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user u1, and similar for the "saved" username of the user u2. Thus, the writing
style similarity equals to 1.
Non-negative matrix factorization method allows to integrate these three information
matrices together in the same objective function. According to this, the objective func-
tion is defined as:
min
H 0 ||X
SN  HHT||2F + ||XUN  HHT||2F + ||XWS  HHT||2F (4.6)
Indeed, we assume that screen-name, user-name, and writing style paired user’s meta-
data similarity have same importance in determining the internal community structure
and thus we don’t additionally impose three weighting free parameters on factorizing
the three information matrices. With this important information, the objective function
in equation 4.6 infers the hidden factor matrix H to represent consistent community
structure of related users. Indeed, this objective function is not jointly convex and has
no closed form solution exists. Hence, we propose the use of gradient descent approxi-
mation method as an alternative optimization approach. Since we have one matrix free
variable (H), the gradient descent method updates it iteratively until the variable con-
verge. Formally, let L(H) denotes the objective function given in equation 4.6. So, at
iteration t, updating equation 4.6 is given by:
Ht = Ht 1   h.∂L(H
t 1)
∂(H)
= Ht 1   2h 6Ht 1(Ht 1)THt 1
  (XSN + XUN + XWS)Ht 1   ((XSN)T + (XUN)T + (XWS)T)Ht 1 
where the parameter h denotes the gradient descent step in updating the matrix H. We
assign the value of h to a small constant value (i.e. 0.05). Also, since gradient descent
method is an iterative process, a stop condition is required in such a case. For this,
we exploit two stop conditions: (i) the number of iterations, denoted as M; and (ii)
the absolute change in the H matrix for two consecutive iterations to be less than a
threshold, i.e., |(||Ht||F   ||Ht 1||F)|  e.
One might view that the proposed information matrices and the age-clustering stage
can be easily manipulated by social spammers to evade the detection. Indeed, this view
could be correct when a social spammer create very small spam bot consisting of no
more 5 spam accounts. Also, social spammers could not employ a simple random func-
tion to generate screen names and usernames since the main objective of the social
spammers to lure the legitimate users. Thus, the social spammers have to use names su-
tiable with the target that they want to achieve. For instance, if a social spammer wants
to promote a product "X" through devoting large spam bots, he must name the spam
accounts using keywords related to intended product. Social spammers have the option
to create the accounts before the attack; however, they couldn’t play in the creation date
attribute. Moreover, the purpose of using the age feature is to increase the difficulty
in front of social spammers to create thousands of accounts in short a period so that
social spammers need to spend months to create a thousand of spam accounts. As the
purpose of lunching spam bots is a monetary benefit, social spammers could not wait
for this long time in creating their accounts as well as leaving them inactive may subject
them for suspension from Twitter itself.
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Stage 4: Community-Based Feature Extraction. In order to predict the class (spam
or non-Spam) of each community, one or more features must be extracted from each
community such that these features can effectively discriminate among spam or non-
spam communities. Since social spammers may follow complex and different spamming
strategies, no single feature can effectively discriminate between spam and non-spam
communities. The design of such features must rely only on the available informa-
tion in each community to avoid using REST APIs. Thus, we introduce a design of
five community-based features that take into account the community’s users with their
tweets. The introduced features are distributed between user-based and tweet-based
features. The username patterns similarity (UNPS ), and the screen name patterns sim-
ilarity (SNPS) are two features extracted using the username and screen name of user
attributes. On the other hand, Tweets writing style similarity (TsWSS), Tweets posting
behavior correlation (TsPBC), and Tweet-Post content similarity TPCS) are tweet-based
features which only leverage the available content in the tweets and some external infor-
mation from other OSM sites. It is important to mention that there is a strong intuition
behind the design of each feature, which will be illustrated statistically through differ-
ent graphs of cumulative density function (CDF).
The total number of formed communities is dependent on the number of age clusters
(|Ages|) beside the number of predefined communities K. Therefore, the ultimate num-
ber of communities is |Ages| ⇥ K, since the community detection stage is applied on
each age cluster. We represent the jth inferred community in the hidden matrix, H,
by 8-tuple of attributes Cj = hUsers, Tweets,UNPS, SNPS, TsWSS, TsPBC, TPCS, Labeli
where Users is a finite set of the users belonging to the inferred community, Tweets ✓ Rt
is all tweets that are posted by the users of the community, and Label 2 {spam, non 
spam} is the class label of the community. The remaining attributes are defined and
formulated as following:
• Username Patterns Similarity (UNPS) and Screen Name Patterns Similarity
(SNPS): Social spammers may adopt a particular pattern (e.g., "voteddlovatu") in
creating their spam campaigns and therefore the probability of having spam com-
munities biased toward a particular pattern used in creating accounts is relatively
high. Since there is no obvious correlation among communities at the pattern
level, no prior knowledge about the length and the name of the patterns, we must
have a generic and independent way to determine whether the community has a
spammy pattern. Thus, we rely on an intuitive and generalized fact which states
that the probability distribution of patterns in non-spam communities is close to
the uniform distribution, while the spam communities have the opposite behav-
ior. More precisely, we measure the degree of similarity between string patterns
probability distribution extracted from users of a particular community with the
uniform probability distribution of the patterns. Formally, let PTUN and PTSN be
two finite sets of string patterns extracted from the username and the screen name
attributes for users of the jth community, Cj. Also, let PUND and P
SN
D be the corre-
sponding probability distributions of the username and the screen name patterns,
respectively. For the uniform distribution, let PUNuni , P
SN
uni be the corresponding uni-
form distributions of username and screen name patterns, respectively. For in-
stance, for a particular community, let PTSN = {”mischie f”, ”isch”, ”_12”, ”_14”}
and PSND = {(”mischie f”, 0.7), (”_15”, 0.1), (”_14”, 0.1), (”_12” , 0.1)} be a set of
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screen name patterns along with its probability distribution, and {(”mischie f”,
0.25), (”_15”, 0.25), (”_14”, 0.25), (”_12”, 0.25)} be the uniform probability distri-
bution of these patterns.
To extract and catch all string patterns, N-gram method is applied since social
spammers may define patterns varying in their length and position. To perform
N-gram method, different values of N ranging from three to the length of the
string are used, with ignoring low N values (one and two) because they provide
meaningless patterns. For the jth community’s users, represented as Cj, we extract
the string patterns used in the username and screen attributes as follows:
PTUN =
[
u2Cj·Users
[
N2{3,...,|u.UN|}
N_gram(u.UN) (4.7)
PTSN =
[
u2Cj·Users
[
N2{3,...,|u.SN|}
N_gram(u.SN) (4.8)
The double unification (
SS
) can be viewed as a double "for" loops where the inner
unification is responsible about returning all patterns, as a finite set of strings,
that a single user has, while the outer unification unifies all sets of users’ string
patterns to have only one single set of string patterns representing the community
itself.
Since the pattern is a categorical random variable in which the string has not a
meaningful order of magnitudes, we adopt the Kullback-Leibler divergence [86]
(KL) method as a suitable and a fast way to measure the similarity between any
two probability distributions of categorical random variables. However, the clas-
sical version of KL method cannot be directly exploited in computing similarity
among (PTUND and PT
UN
uni ) or (PT
SN
D and PT
SN
uni ) since the • and 0 values corre-
spond to dissimilar, and similar distributions, respectively. Hence, we perform a
few modification on the current version of KL method to inverse the semantic
meaning of KL values (i.e., 0 =) dissimilar and 1 =) similar) and taking into
account bounding its values. Thus, for the jth community, the value of the UNPS
and SNPS features is computed using the customized KL equation as follows:
Cj.UNPS =
log |PTUN | Âw2PTUN PUND (w) ⇤min(| log P
UN
D (w)
PUNuni (w)
|, log |PTUN |)
log |PTUN | (4.9)
Cj.SNPS =
log |PTSN | Âw2PTSN PSND (w) ⇤min(| log P
SN
D (w)
PSNuni (w)
|, log |PTSN |)
log |PTSN | (4.10)
where | • | is the cardinality (length) of the string patterns set, P•D(w) is the prob-
ability of occurring the pattern w based on the distribution of the considered
patterns set, and P•uni(w) is the probability of occurring the pattern w according to
the uniform distribution of the considered patterns set.
• Tweets Writing Style Similarity (TsWSS): Single social spammer may create thou-
sands of spam accounts for involving them in a spam campaign. Thus, the prob-
ability to have a correlation across the tweets of these accounts is quite high. Ac-
cording to our observations, the way or the style followed in writing tweets is
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Figure 4.7: An example describing the cross-correlation between posting time distribution of
two different spam accounts (users).
mainly similar (e.g., one form) with possible correlations among them. For in-
stance, the spam tweets of a campaign shown in Figure 4.1 have a common style
structure in writing tweets (word, word, hashtag, word, word, word, word, word,
and then URL). It is obvious that the three tweets are too correlated, though their
social spammer has been tricky in writing tweets through avoiding duplication in
the content of the tweets. Computing the writing style among tweets requires: (i)
a new representation of each tweet through identifying the type (Word, Hashtag,
Url, and Mention) of each whitespace separated string; (ii) and a metric that com-
putes the degree of similarity among the new representation of the community’s
tweets. Hence, we define a transformation function, Type(ST) 2 {W,H,U,M}
that takes ST string as a parameter and returns the type of the input string (Word,
Hashtag, Url, and Mention). Consequently, the new representation of a tweet T•
belonging to the jth community, Cj, is Trans(T•) = {(i, Type(wi))|wi 2 T•.Text}
where i 2 Z+ is the position of the string in the tweet text and wi is the string that
requires a transformation. Unifying the new representation of all tweets provides
a single unique set representing the writing style of the community’s users. The
cardinality of the unique set provides a meaningful indication about writing style
variation where the small cardinality means that the users have followed almost
same writing style. However, to precisely quantify how much the writing style is
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close among tweets, a reference value is required to compare the cardinality of
the new set with it. The maximum value of the cardinality of the new set occurs
when there is no intersection among the new representation of all tweets. There-
fore, the cardinality of the new set will equal to the sum of |Trans(T)| over all
community’s tweets. Formally, by the following equation, we measure the writing
style similarity:
Cj.TsWSS = 1 
| ST2Cj.Tweets Trans(T) |
ÂT2Cj.Tweets | Trans(T) |
(4.11)
• Tweets Posting Behavior Similarity (TPBS): Another possible form of correlation
among spam accounts is the rate (e.g., every 5 min) of posting tweets. Intuitively,
when the users (accounts) of a community have same posting behavior, regardless
the posting period, the probability of the community being spam is high. The sim-
plest way to compute the posting rate of a user is by examining the mean and the
variance of the Time difference between each two consecutive tweets. However,
social spammers can manipulate in these two statistics features through leaving
a big gap between every two consecutive sets of tweets, leading to have a large
variance and mean. We overcome this non-ignorable shortcomings through per-
forming a quantitative user pairwise comparison at the posting time distribution
of user’s tweets level. Then, a conclusion is drawn about the class label of the
community based on the result of each pairwise comparison. Formally, for the
jth community, represented as Cj, let PuTS[n] be the probability distribution of the
tweet posting time of the user u, u 2 Cj.Users where n 2 Z+ is a random vari-
able representing the time in seconds. Since PuTS[n] is a function of time and its
random variable is quantitative in which its values with magnitudes have a mean-
ingful order, we adopt the cross-correlation method which widely used in signal
processing field for comparing two signals [113], defined as follows:
PostSim(u1, u2) =
Â•n=0(P
u1
TS ? P
u2
TS)[n]
Min(Â•n=0(P
u1
TS ? P
u1
TS)[n],Â
•
n=0(P
u2
TS ? P
u2
TS)[n])
=
Â•n=0Â
•
m=0 P
u1
TS[m]P
u2
TS[m+ n]
Min(Â•n=0Â
•
m=0 P
u1
TS[m]P
u1
TS[m+ n],Â
•
n=0Â
•
m=0 P
u2
TS[m]P
u2
TS[m+ n])
(4.12)
where u1, u2 are two different users belonging to the Cj community, "?" is a sym-
bol denoted to the correlation operation, and Min is a function that takes the
minimum among two real number values. The correlation between two signals
produces a new signal having different magnitudes where two highly correlated
signals shall have large magnitudes. However, in order to quantify this correlation
in a single real value, we compute the area under the new signal by adding the
outer summation (Â•n=0). As the area under the new signal (output signal) might
be more than 1 and intuitively the maximum area is obtained when the two users’
distributions are identical, we normalize it through computing the correlation be-
tween each user’s distribution with itself, so-called auto-correlation, with taking
into account the minimum among them as a normalization factor. For better un-
derstanding, Figure 4.7 shows the posting time distribution (timely shifted and
not normalized) of two different users having an obvious correlation in posting
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behavior. The cross-correlation between the two distributions has resulted a new
signal with an area of 18 (1+2+3+4+3+2+1). When applying the equation 4.12 on
the given example, the value of the feature will be "1" since the area of the auto-
correlation of each user’s distribution equals to 18, meaning that the two users are
completely correlated.
In computing the ultimate value of the TPBS feature, we compute first the prob-
ability distribution of PostSim over all possible user pairs existing in the Cjth
community. Formally, let PPostSim (e.g., {(0.25, 0.4), (0.1, 0.6)}) be the probability
distribution of the posting similarity and PUni f ormPostSim (e.g., {(0.25, 0.5), (0.1, 0.5)}) be
the corresponding uniform distribution of PostSim. We quantify the difference be-
tween the distributions through performing cross-correlation between them, de-
fined as:
Cj.TPBS = 1  Â
•
n=0(PPostSim?P
Uni f orm
PostSim )[n]
Â•n=0(P
Uni f orm
PostSim ?P
Uni f orm
PostSim )[n]
= 1  Â•n=0 Â•m=0 PPostSim[m]P
Uni f orm
PostSim [m+n]
Â•n=0 Â
•
m=0 P
Uni f orm
PostSim [m]P
Uni f orm
PostSim [m+n]
(4.13)
where high value (close to 1) of TPBS means that all users of the jth community
have almost same posting behavior (i.e., almost same posting frequency) and thus
that community has high probability for being a spam campaign. On the other
side, when the PPostSim be close to the uniform distribution, it means that almost
no users have same posting behavior and thus that community has low probability
for being a spam campaign.
• Tweet-Post Content Similarity (TPCS): This feature focuses on finding a matched
information on other OSNs for a given tweet related to the targeted informa-
tion entity adopted in streaming (e.g., trending topic). The probability of find-
ing same information talking about same information entity, especially when
being a trend, on different OSNs is relativity high. Conversely, the probability
of finding same spam content posted under the same topic is relativity low be-
cause of its dependency on spammers’ goals and the openness of OSNs them-
selves. We rely on using statistical language model concept to detect spam tweets.
Thus, as further notations for modeling purposes, we model the information re-
trieved about the targeted information entity, IE, from defined social networks
(e.g., Facebook, Instagram), SN•, as a finite set SIE = {SNFacbook, SNInstagram, ...}.
Each SN• is modeled as a finite set of posts SN• = {I1, I2, ...} where the ele-
ment I• is defined by 2-tuple I• =< Text, Actions >. As each post may con-
sist of text, we represent the content of post as a finite set of textual words,
Text = {w1,w2, ...}. Users of social networks may perform actions on posts as
a reaction toward the content of posts or tweets. We define actions as a finite set
of 2-tuple, Actions = {< aname1 , aval1 >,< aname2 , aval2 >, ....}, where aname repre-
sents the name of action (e.g. like, share, and comment on Facebook) depending
upon the considered social network, and aval 2 N 0 is the number of times that
the corresponding action performed by social network users on the considered
post or tweet.
We leverage statistical language models [165] to estimate the relevance degree of
other OSNs’ posts with a given tweet to make a decision later about the tweet.
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Language modeling method computes the probability P(D|Q) of a document D
being generated by a query Q to rank a set of documents. We transform the same
concept to get out the most relevant post in other social networks for a given tweet.
Thus, we treat tweets as queries and posts as documents, with computing the post
I probability of being generated by a tweet T 2 C•.Tweets as:
PSNj(I|T) rank= PSNj(I).PSNi(T|I) = PSNj(I). ’
w2T.Text
PSNj(w|I) (4.14)
PSNj(I) is the post prior probability such that I 2 SNj. The post prior can be
viewed as tweet-independent features (i.e. features not extracted from tweet object)
representing the probability of being non-spam content in the social network SNj.
Estimating the other probability component PSNj(T|I) can be performed using
different models (Jelineck Mercer, Dirichlet) to compute PSNj(w|I) or (Kullback-
Leibler divergence) to calculate the degree of dissimilarity between the tweet
and post language models. We use the uni-gram language model for represent-
ing tweets and posts because of its outstanding performance in information re-
trieval field. Also, we adopt Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) method because of
its fast computation time compared to others. However, the classical version of
KL method cannot be exploited directly in computing the PSNj(T|I) probability
since the zero value of KL means that the language models of tweet and post are
completely similar. Moreover, the range of KL method is unbounded, meaning
that the • value appears when two language models are dissimilar. Hence, we
customize the current version of KL method to inverse the semantic of KL values
(i.e. 0 =) dissimilar and 1 =) similar) with bounding its values, where the
probability component PSNi(T|I) is defined as:
PSNj(T|I) =
log |T.Text| Âw2T.Text P(w|MT) ⇤min(| log P(w|MT)P(w|MI) |, log |T.Text|)
log |T.Text|
(4.15)
where P(w|MT) and P(w|MI) are the probability of word w being generated by
tweet and post language models (MT,MI), respectively.
As the retrieved posts of social network, SNj, may consist of spam content, we
estimate the probability of being non-spam through leveraging the actions per-
formed by users on the retrieved posts set (i.e. more actions =) low probability
for being spam post). We assume that actions (e.g. like, comment, and share) are
independent features, and thus the general formula for calculating post prior is
computed as:
PSNi(I) = ’
A2O.Actions
P(A) (4.16)
where P(A) is estimated using the maximum-likelihood of performing the action
A on the post I, computed as P(A) = Count(A,I)Count(A,SNj) . The term Count(A, I) = A.val
means that the number of times that the action A performed on the post I.
Count(A, SNj) represents the summation of action A over available posts in SNj.
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To avoid zero probability, we perform smoothing for the prior probability compo-
nent over the posts of set SNj using Dirichlet. The smoothed version becomes as
follows:
PSNj(I) = ’
A2I.Actions
Count(A, I) + µ.P(A|SNi)
ÂB2I.Actions count(B, I) + µ
(4.17)
where P(A|SNi) is the probability of the action to occur in the retrieved posts
SNi, and µ > 0 is a smoothing variable that is determined through performing
different experiments on our data-set to select the best value that provides high
accuracy results.
When doing inference for a given tweet over a set of posts in SNi, we obtain a
vector of probability values where each represents the degree of matching between
a post and a given tweet. We exploit these values to make a decision about the
class label of a given tweet. To do so, we define a thresholded decision function
that labels tweets as non-spam in case of finding at least one post on any social
network having probability above a fixed threshold. Formally, we define the crisp
decision function as follows:
F(T, SIE) =
(
non  spam max{ PSNi (I|T)Sum(SNi ,T) |SNi 2 SIE, I 2 SNi}   l (4.18)
spam otherwise
where the function Sum(SNi, T) = ÂI2SNi P
SNi(I|T) normalizes the probability
of each post retrieved from a certain social network SNi, making their summa-
tion equals to one. l is a threshold interpreted as the minimum probability (i.e.
matching degree) required to classify the considered tweet T as non-spam.
As the introduced function F classifies a tweet given corresponding retrieved in-
formation from other social networks, we leverage such classification function to
compute the probability of the Cj being spam community through finding the ra-
tio of spam tweets existing in the considered community tweets. More formally,
we compute the value of the community-based feature as follow:
Cj.TPCS =
|{T : F(T, SIE) =0 spam0, T 2 Cj.Tweets}|
|Cj.Tweets| (4.19)
where the high values of this feature means that the community has high proba-
bility to be a spam one and thus all accounts belong to social spammers.
Stage 5: Community Classification Function. After computing the five community-
based features for a community, the next step is determining whether that community
is a spam or non-spam one. The main issue is what the best way to combine or weight
the five features to form a community classification function. Handling robustly this
issue requires to recall two key points: (i) the high values of the four features have a
high degree of correlation with the probability of the considered community being a
spam; (ii) and judging on a community as a spam needs at least one feature having a
high value. The robustness and the strength of the five community-based features are
easily captured through examining their CDF at different streaming periods. Thus, in
Figure 4.8, we show the CDF statistic of four features drawn at three different 10-day
streaming periods using the annotated data-set exploited. For each community feature,
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(a) CDF of 5 community-based features drawn for the first period of spam and non-spam tweets.
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(b) CDF of 5 community-based features drawn for the second period of spam and non-spam
tweets.
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(c) CDF of 5 community-based features drawn for the third period of spam and non-spam
tweets.
Figure 4.8: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of non-spam and spam communities drawn
for our five collective-based features at three streaming periods where each period is
10 days, showing the effectiveness of these features in discriminating among spam
and non-spam communities.
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it is obvious that the area between the spam CDF and non-spam CDF is quite large,
meaning that there is no too much overlapping between the value of the feature of the
spam and non-spam communities. Also, the features of the non-spam communities have
low values because of the early increasing in their CDF curves, while the features of the
spam communities have the opposite behavior. Based on the two key points mentioned
and the provided CDF statistics, we design a simple community classification through
classifying the input community as a spam if one of the features has value more than a
certain threshold D, formally defined for the jth community Cj as follows:
Cj.Label =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
spam Cj.TsWSS   D || Cj.TPBS   D || Cj.SNPS   D
|| Cj.UNPS   D || Cj.TPCS   D
non  spam Cj.TsWSS < D & Cj.TPBS < D & Cj.SNPS < D
& Cj.UNPS < D & Cj.TPCS < D
(4.20)
where ”||” and ”&” are "OR" and "AND" operations, respectively. The high value of D 2
[0, 1] increases the difficulty of the conditions to be satisfied for labeling communities
as a spam. Conversely, the low value of D leads to label too many communities as a
spam. With the simplicity of the community classification function, it is important to
mention that a complex version of the function might be designed through specifying a
threshold value per community feature; however, doing so increases the number of free
parameters, making the study of their impacts more difficult and observable. Thus, we
adopt the simple version of the community classification function.
As the main purpose of the unsupervised classification is to provide an annotated
data-set of spam and non-spam tweets, we leverage the label assigned for each com-
munity inferred through inheriting the label of each community to its users and their
tweets available in the storage component. Formally, the annotated version of all tweets
streamed, Rt, is extracted as follows:
Spam_Tweets =
[
j2{1,...,|Ages|⇥K}
Cj.Label=spam
Cj.Tweets (4.21)
Non  Spam_Tweets = [
j2{1,...,|Ages|⇥K}
j.Label=non spam
Cj.Tweets (4.22)
where Spam_Tweets [ Non  Spam_Tweets= St. As these two annotated sets of tweets
will be exploited in learning a binary classification function, the value of D also plays
an important role in the size of these sets. For instance, setting D to 0.9 will likely
produce a small size of spam tweets set since this condition might be satisfied on few
communities.
4.2.4 Tweet Classification Model and Real-Time Detection
Classical supervised machine learning methods perform training to build a classifier
that can correctly predict the classes of new unseen samples. However, these methods
mainly assume that the training samples are independent. Although of the applicability
4.2 real-time spam tweets filtering framework design 81
of such an assumption in a wide range of applications, this assumption is not strong
in the context of social spam. Intuitively, social spammers might intensively attack one
or more of information entities to propagate their spammy contents as fast as possible.
Thus, a high dependency might exist among successive tweets when they are streamed
into a particular information entity. This means that we can improve the detection of
spam tweets by applying prior and transition state-based prediction models.
Hence, we propose the use of Hidden Markov Model (HMM) as a state prediction
model to detect spam tweets in real-time streaming. HMMs are statistical models used
to represent the probability distributions of discrete hidden states (e.g., spam or non-
spam, and robot coordinates) over sequences (time series) of observations (e.g., number
of words in tweet, and distance from object taken by sensor) [56]. HMMworks based on
two assumptions: (i) the observations at time t had been generated by some hidden state
St where state St is hidden from the observer; (ii) and the hidden state must satisfies the
Markov property in which the current state St is dependent only on the value (output)
of the previous state St 1 . In other words, the Markov conditional property assumes
that the prediction of the next state at some time depends only upon the present state,
not on the sequence of events that preceded it.
In our work, the HMM acts as a binary classification method, representing the function
F(x), and corresponding to the training phase illustrated in Figure 3.10. As a prerequi-
site for performing the training HMM is defining the feature vector that represents the
tweet entity observation, we adopt 17 real-time state of the art features described in Ta-
ble 3.4, which are:Number of Hashtags, Number of URLs, Number of Words,Number
of Characters, Number of Mentions, Number of Retweets, Number of Spam Words,
Number of Trending Topics, Number of hashtags per words, Number of URLs per
Words,Number of Numeric Characters, Number of Replies,Number of Replies, Num-
ber of Followings, Number of Followers, Number of Followers,Number of Tweets,
and Account Age. It is important to mention that the training or learning phase is taken
place in a background process whenever a new number of tweets (e.g., 500 tweets) is
streamed, so-called "Updating Model Frequency". As an initial classification model, we
classify incoming tweets as non-spam, FInitial(x) = ”non   spam”, until the updating
model frequency condition is satisfied to have a binary classification model. At the op-
erational real-time filtering phase, the current adopted classification function is used
to predict the class label of every incoming tweet. Predicting the incoming tweet type
requires first to extract the feature vector of the tweet, using the same 17 features lever-
aged in the training phase. Then, the class label of the considered tweet is predicted
using the current classification function (FInitial(x) or FRt(x)).
Since HMM models are controlled and tunned by different important parameters, first,
we introduce the design and notations used in building HMM model. Then, we mathe-
matically illustrate a supervised learning approach to learn the HMM’s parameters. At
last, we describe how the inference step takes place to handle incoming tweets.
4.2.4.1 HMM Model Design and Notations
In the context of spam tweets detection, the states of the hidden process are "spam"
and "non-spam". Since these states are not directly observable, we adopt M random
independent variables forming a vector of observations Ot extracted from a tweet Tt
streamed at time t. In order to predict the state (St) of the process at time t for a
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Table 4.1: A description of the HMM notations with their potential values in the social spam
detection problem.
Notation Description Values in our model
N Number of possible states in the model. 2
M Number of independent observation variables (e.g., features). 16
Q = {q0, ..., qN 1} Set of distinct N hidden states of the Markov process. Q={Spam, Non-Spam}
St Hidden state value of the process at time t. St 2 Q, t 2 Z+
A Time invariant square matrix of state transition probabilities with size of NxN. A 2 R2⇥2, Âi,j2Q ai,j = N
ai,j Transition probability from j 2 Q state to i 2 Q state. ai,j 2 R
p Initial probability distribution of the possible states Q. p 2 R2
pi Initial probability of the state i 2 Q. pi 2 R, Âi2Q pi = 1
Ot,v Observation value of the vth independent random variable (feature) at time t. Ot,v 2 R, v 2 {1, . . . ,M}
Ot Vector of M observations,[Ot,1, ...,Ot,v, ...,Ot,M]T, observed at time t, Ot 2 RM
bi,v(o) Emission probability distribution of the vth random independent variable of the state i 2 Q. bi,v(o) 2 [0, 1], o 2 R
given sequence of observations {O1, . . . ,Ot}, a prior knowledge is required about (i)
the state transition matrix (A), (ii) initial state probability distribution (p), (iii) and the
emission probability distributions ({bspam,1, . . . bspam,M, bnon spam,1, . . . bnon spam,M}). The
state transition matrix contains probability values reflecting the chance of transitioning
from state Si to state Sj at any time t. For instance, aspam,non spam is the probability
of posting "spam" tweet stream given that the previous tweet streamed is "non-spam"
(i.e., P(St = ”spam”|St 1 = ”non   spam”)). The p probability distribution contains
N probability values reflecting the chance to start the hidden process in a particular
state (e.g., probability of streaming a spam tweet ). The third important parameter is
the emission (observation) probability distribution bi,v of each adopted feature with
respect to each state, requiring N ⇥ M distributions to perform the inference process.
For instance, bspam,1 is a probability distribution of observing the values of feature "1"
(e.g., number of words in the tweet) when the process be in the "spam" state. Table 4.1,
provides a summary of the notations used in formalizing the proposed HMM model
beside their potential values.
4.2.4.2 Learning and Tuning HMM Parameters
Two approaches (supervised and unsupervised) are widely used in learning HMM pa-
rameters, denoted by q = {p, A, bspam,1, . . . bspam,M, bnon spam,1, . . . bnon spam,M}. Expecta-
tion Maximization (EM)[128, 37] is widely used as an unsupervised learning approach
to find the optimal HMM parameters. This approach assumes that the true hidden state
of each tweet (tweet label) is not given in the training data. However, in this work, we
leverage the supervised learning approach since it is possible to have the near-true state
of a tweet using the collective analysis-approach introduced.
Let Traning_Tweets ⇢ Rt be a set of tweets already streamed and their class label
are identified by the previous stage. Computing p probability distribution requires
independent sequences of observations with their true states. Thus, we divide the
Traning_Tweets set into m sequences based on their posting date "day" of the tweets
(e.g., tweets posted in "4/May/2016" forming a single sequence). More formally, let
L = {(z1, x1, y1), ..., (zm, xm, ym)} be a set of m sequences of tweets streamed into
Traning_Tweets, where (z•, x•, y•) = ({Tt1 , . . . , Tt2}, {Ot1 , ...,Ot2}, {St1 , ..., St2}), 1  t1 <
t2, z• is a sequence of tweets having same posting date day, x• is a sequence of observa-
tion (feature) vectors corresponding to the tweets sequence in z•, and y• is a sequence
of true hidden states corresponding to the tweets sequence in z•.
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By leveraging the training set of tweets, we can estimate the HMM parameters, q, using
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method [87] for a given set of observations.
More precisely, the MLE finds the parameter values that maximize the likelihood of
generating the given observations. We formalize the searching for the optimal HMM
parameters as a constraint maximization optimization problem, defined as:
qmle = arg max
q2Q
P(L|q) subject to Â
i2Q
pi = 1,’
j2Q
Â
i2Q
ai,j = 1,’
i2Q
’
v2{1,...,M}
Z
R
bi,v(x)dx = 1 (4.23)
where Q is the search space of HMM parameters. In HMM model, the sum of the dis-
crete p distribution probabilities must equal 1. Also, the sum of each column in the
transition matrix A must equal 1 and thus the multiplication of the column summation
must equal 1. The last constraint is associated to N ⇥M emission probability distribu-
tions where the area under each distribution must equal 1 and thus the multiplication
of the N ⇥M distributions area must equal 1.
The probability of generating any sequence of observation can be written using the
HMM parameters q as follows:
P((z•, x•, y•)|q) =’
i2Q
p
f (i,y•)
i .’
i2Q
’
j2Q
a f (i,j,y•)i,j .’
i2Q
’
Ot2x•
’
ot,v2Ot
bi,v(ot,v) f (i,v,ot,v,x•,y•) (4.24)
where:
• f (i, y•) is a binary (0 or 1) value representing the occurrence of the state i in the
start of the given sequence y•. For instance, for three consecutive true tweet hidden
states sequence y0 = {spam, non  spam, non  spam}, the value of f (spam, y0) is
"1" since y0 starts by "spam" state, while f (non  spam, y0) is "0" since y0 starts by
"non-spam" state.
• f (i, j, y•) represents the number of occurrences of having a transition from the
state j to the state i in the given true states sequence y•. For instance, for three
consecutive true tweet hidden states sequence y0 = {spam, non   spam, non  
spam}, the value of f (spam, spam, y0) is "0" since no two consecutive "spam, spam"
true states exist in y0, while the value of f (spam, non  spam, y0) is "1" since the
transition from spam to non-spam exists in the given sequence. The values of the
rest two combinations f (non  spam, spam, y0) and f (non  spam, non  spam, y0)
are "0" and "1", respectively.
• f (i, v, ot,v, x•, y•) is a binary value (0 or 1) representing the occurrence ot the v0s
feature value ot,v in the given both sequences of observations x• and y• when
the process be in the state i. For instance, given a sequence of three consecutive
tweets observations related to "number of hashtags" feature, x• = {2, 5, 4}, and
the corresponding tweets true hidden states y• = {spam, non  spam, spam}, for
first tweet streamed (t=1), the value of f (spam, #hashtag, 2, x•, y•) is "1" while for
f (spam, #hashtag, 10, x•, y•) for same tweet is "0" at t=1.
A closed form solution to find the optimal HMM parameters q can be obtained by em-
ploying the assumption regarding each sequence of the training m sequences, which
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states that the probability of generating the L set equals to the probability multiplica-
tion of generating each sequence individually. This assumption formally defined using
HMM parameters as:
P(L|q) =
m
’
l=1
P((xl , yl)|q) =
m
’
l=1
 
’
i2Q
p
f (i,y•)
i .’
i2Q
’
j2Q
a f (i,j,y•)i,j .’
i2Q
’
Ot2x•
’
ot,v2Ot
bi,v(ot,v) f (i,v,ot,v,x•,y•)
!
(4.25)
Since the P(L|q) which can be viewed as a function of q, P(L|q) is a concave function
having only one global maximum value. Hence, we compute the partial derivatives of
P(L|q) with respect to each free parameter in, q, (aspam,spam,pspam, bspam,1, . . . ). The task
now is turned to solve and find the value of each free parameter that makes each partial
derivatives equal to zero ( ∂P(L|q)∂aspam,spam = 0,
∂P(L|q)
∂pspam
= 0, ∂P(L|q)∂bspam,1 = 0, . . . ). Thus, the optimal
value of the HMM parameters can be computed using in a closed form way using the
following three equations:
pi =
Âml=1 f (i, yl)
Âk2Q Âml=1 f (k, yl)
ai,j =
Âml=1 f (i, j, yl)
Âk2Q Âml=1 f (i, k, yl)
bi,v(o) =
Âml=1 f (i, v, o, xl , yl)
Âml=1
R
R
f (i, v, o0, xl , yl)do0
(4.26)
These optimal values implicitly satisfy the added constraints in equation 4.23 since the
denominator of each value is a normalization factor for the numerator.
4.2.4.3 Inference
After computing the optimal HMM model parameters values q, the next step is to use
the tuned model as a time-dependent tweet spam prediction model to handle new
incoming tweets related to a given topic. Let Tt be the first tweet streamed into the
considered topic and Ot be the corresponding feature vector (observation) of the tweet.
The likelihood process state when observing tweet Tt is computed as:
S⇤t = arg max
i2Q
P(St = i|Ot) = arg max
i2Q
Â
j2Q
P(St 1 = j) ai,j ’
ov2Ot
bi,v(ov) (4.27)
where P(S0 = j) = pj. The class label of the streamed tweet is the likelihood inferred
state St.
4.3 Data-set Description and Ground Truth
4.3.1 Twitter
The data-sets used at tweet-level detection [31, 18, 98] are not publicly available for
the research use. Moreover, for privacy reasons, when social network based researchers
publish a data-set, they only provide the target object IDs (e.g., tweets and accounts) to
retrieve them then from servers of the desired social network. However, inspired by the
nature of the spam problem, providing the IDs of the spam tweets or accounts is not
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enough because Twitter might already have suspended the corresponding accounts and
thus nothing to retrieve from the servers. Hence, we have developed a crawler that uses
the Streaming APIs of Twitter. As Twitter offers different basic streaming endpoints,
we have adopted the public streaming option which streams the public data flowing
through Twitter network. We have launched our crawler for four months, started since
1/Jan/2015, where millions of tweets have been collected and stored.
Typically, the real-time spam detection methods are applied on a stream of tweets re-
lated to one or more entities (hashtag, username, and URL). However, the public stream-
ing method may stream tweets not related to that entity at all. Thus, Twitter allows
developers or researchers to setup a filter that passes only the tweets that contain the
defined list of entities. In order to simulate and experiment on such cases, we have
chosen the hashtag as a target entity since most of the researches and applications
[67, 27, 167] stream tweets related to a particular hashtag or topic. Using the collected
tweets for four months, we have sampled 50 hashtags which had been trending during
the crawling period. As each hashtag may have tweets talking about it, we have sorted
first the relevant tweets based on the posting time with selecting then the oldest 50,000
tweets. However, some hashtags have less than 50,000 tweets and therefore the total
number of tweets of the 50 hashtags is about 2.1 million tweets.
The most challenging task is creating an annotated data-set for training and testing
purposes. Performing a manual annotation for 2.1 million tweets is time consuming
and not practical at all. Hence, we have leveraged a widely followed annotation process
in the social spam detection researches [69, 153, 70]. The process checks whether the
user of each tweet was suspended by Twitter. In case of suspension, both the user and
his tweets are labeled as a spam; otherwise, we assign non-spam. We have performed
this process one year after the crawling of the tweets in order to have a large number of
spam users and tweets. It is important to mention that being a spam account is not only
the reason that Twitter suspends an account. Knowing automatically the suspension
reason is not possible since Twitter does not provide such information for the public.
Also, it is too costly and expensive to annotate every tweet existing in our big data-set.
Therefore, although our data-set is not noise-free, we assume that all the tweets that the
corresponding accounts were suspended by Twitter are truly spam ones, including the
reasons of hate speech, porn materials, copyright issues, and scams.
Table 4.2: Distribution of different statistics for social spammers (spam accounts) and legitimate
users (non-spam accounts) existing in our data-set.
Social Spammers Legitimate Users
Statistic Name Value Rate (per 100 users) Value Ratio (per 100 users)
Number of users 78,074 (8.1%) — 881,207 (91.9%) —
Number of geo-enabled users 5,986 (1.8%) 8 (18.2%) 316,617 (98.2%) 36 (81.8%)
Number of verified users 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2,978 (100%) 1 (100%)
Number of users’ followers 78,143,567 (2.9%) 100,089 (25.8%) 2,526,736,521 (97.1%) 286,735 (74.2%)
Number of users’ followees 50,839,084 (3.6%) 651,165 (81.5%) 1,302,269,081 (96.4%) 147,782 (18.5%)
Number of tweets posted 944,566,070 (5.4%) 1,209,834 (39.1%) 16,604,525,699 (94.6%) 1,884,293 (60.9%)
Number of tweets retrieved 208,546 (10.1%) 267 (55.8%) 1,857,479 (89.9%) 211 (44.1%)
Number of retweeted tweets 80,773 (9.1%) 104 (53.3%) 808,263 (90.9%) 92 (46.6%)
Number of replied tweets 855 (2.4%) 1 (33.3%) 24,895 (97.6%) 3 (66.6%)
Number of URLs 127,655 (1.9%) 163 (55.1%) 1,166,666 (98.1%) 133 (44.9%)
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Table 4.3: Distribution of 50,000 spam and non-spam tweets streamed into the top 20 hashtags
existing in our data-set, showing an obvious variation in the number of spam tweets
of 20 hashtags.
Topic Name #Non-Spam Tweets #Spam Tweets Topic Name #Non-Spam Tweets #Spam Tweets
#iHeartAwards 39,478 (78.9%) 10,522 (21.1%) #Harmonizers 38,844 (77.7%) 11,156 (22.3%)
#KCA 38,992 (77.9%) 11,008 (22.1%) #quote 46,076 (92.2%) 3,924 (7.8%)
#BestFanArmy 40,982 (81.2%) 9,018 (18.8%) #NowPlaying 47,841 (95.7%) 2,159 (4.3%)
#TreCru 49,541 (99.1%) 459 (0.9%) #BTS 48,798 (97.6%) 1,202 (2.4%)
#Periscope 48,831 (97.7%) 1,169 (2.3%) #VoteMaineFPP 47,756 (95.5%) 2,244 (4.5%)
#SoundCloud 46,709 (93.4%) 3,291 (6.6%) #gameinsight 45,492 (90.9%) 4,508 (9.1%)
#np 47,150 (94.3%) 2,850 (6.7%) #VoteKathrynFPP 47,427 (94.8%) 2,573 (5.2%)
#RT 36,922 (73.8%) 13,078 (26.2%) #android 46,162 (92.3%) 3,838 (7.7%)
#5SOSFam 41,476 (82.9) 8,524 (17.2%) #love 46,802 (93.6%) 3,198 (6.4%)
#Directioners 44,704 (89.4%) 5,296 (10.6%) #giveaway 47,602 (95.2%) 2,398 (4.8%)
In total, as reported in Table 4.2, we have found about 78,000 users (accounts) labeled as
social spammer, and 881,000 legitimate users. Also, the number of spam tweets existing
in our data-set is more than 208,000 tweets, forming about 10% of 2.1million tweets. The
number of tweets posted is obviously greater than the number of tweets retrieved since
the former number represents the tweets that have been streamed into the hashtags
selected, while the latter number corresponds to the ultimate tweets that have been
posted since the creation date of the accounts. As the data-set is not balanced at the
class level, we compute the normalized version of the statistics per 100 users to have
more fair comparison between social spammers and legitimate users. The normalized
version of the number of URLs shows an obvious misusing of URLs in spreading social
spammers’ content, compared to the legitimate users. It is expected that the number
of verified users is zero since having a verified account requires to contact Twitter’s
administrators and thus the spam accounts are too difficult to be verified.
Another interesting possible conclusion is that the distribution of spam tweets is not
necessary to be uniform, meaning that social spammers may have some hidden pref-
erences for selecting hashtags. More precisely, Table 4.3 reports the distribution of the
spam and non-spam tweets streamed into top 20 hashtags, showing a clear variation
in the number of spam tweets. The stream of some hashtags such as #RT has been in-
tensively polluted with an estimated ratio of 1 spam tweet to 3 non-spam tweets, while
there are hashtags have not been polluted too much like #TreCru. Indeed, there is no
clear interpretation behind this high variation in distribution of spam tweets; however,
the importance of the hashtag, and how long time the hashtag has been trending are the
most possible reasons. Thus, in Figure 4.9, we draw the day distribution of streaming
spam and non-spam tweets for 20 hashtags. These distributions show that a direct cor-
relation could exist between the volume of tweets streamed in a one day into a hashtag
and the probability to stream a spam tweet into the same hashtag. For instance, the
number of streamed tweets related to #KCS is 50,000 during two days only with 22.1%
of these tweets is spam ones. Conversely, the number of tweets streamed into #TreCru
is also 50,000, but over 30 days of public streaming. Therefore, the importance of the
hashtag and how much it is circulated among users are the major factors to stream a
spam tweet.
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Figure 4.9: Day distribution of streaming non-spam and spam tweets, drawn for 20 hashtags.
As the major drawback of real-time spam detection methods is the fragility of the fea-
tures in discriminating among spam and non-spam tweets, we leverage our annotated
data-set to show that statistically. Figure 4.6 presents three groups of cumulative distri-
bution function of 12 tweet-level based features drawn for spam and non-spam tweets.
The CDFs of each group are computed for 10 days of tweet streaming to study the
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strength of features at different periods. Indeed, the statistics show that the majority of
the features is non-discriminative at all since the spam tweets CDF and the non-spam
tweets CDF of each feature are almost identical and thus the difference of the area be-
tween them is too small. Also, the temporal dimension (different periods) of the CDFs
does not show any significant changes in the strength of the features. The CDF statis-
tic of the features ensures that social spammers tend to behave exactly as legitimate
users to avoid the detection. An interesting point worth to mention is that the CDF of
account age feature is the most robust one compared to the rest features because the
creation date of accounts is non-editable by users. Thus, consistently with the previ-
ous study [34], the old age accounts have low probability for being spam ones. Indeed,
this study has conducted experiments for detecting spam accounts; instead of detecting
spam tweets in real-time manner. Hence, it is not fair to compare our approach with
them as their approach is not applicable for real-time detection at all.
4.3.2 Facebook
For the selected 50 trending topics, we collected the corresponding Facebook posts that
contain those topics and posted during the period 1/Jan/2016 to 31/May/2016. It is im-
portant to mention that Facebook community has stopped recently post searching APIs
in the latest version, v2.8, of Graph API3 released on August 2016. Thus, we overcome
this obstacle through developing a Facebook crawler that searches for a particular topic
using a normal Facebook account and then parses the HTML tags of the retrieved posts.
We automate this process through using open source Selenium web browser automa-
tion tool4. In total, we collected more than 6,880 Facebook posts generated by about
3,122 different users in less than one hour.
4.4 Experimental Setup and Results
In this section, we present the results of three different parts. The first part is about
the performance of spam tweet detection using external information from Facebook.
More precisely, we experiment the community-based features, named as Tweet-Post
Content Similarity (TPCS), in detecting spam tweets at different values of classification
threshold (l) adopted in equation 4.18. The second part is dedicated for experimenting
only the performance of HMM designed in spam tweets detection through learning
once the HMM parameters. At last, the third part reports the results of the introduced
framework that periodically learns classification model using annotated data-set.
4.4.1 Collaboration with Social Networks Results
4.4.1.1 Experimental Setup
Performance Metrics. As the ground truth class label about each tweet is available,
we exploit accuracy, precision, recall, F-measure, average precision, average recall, and
average F-measure, computed according to the confusion matrix of Weka tool [60], as
3 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/using-graph-api
4 http://docs.seleniumhq.org/
4.4 experimental setup and results 89
commonly used metrics in classification problems. As our problem is two-class (binary)
classification, we compute the precision, recall, and F-measure for the "spam" class,
while the average metrics combines both classes based on the fraction of each class (e.g.
11.8% * "spam precision" + 88.2% * "non-spam precision" ).
Baselines.We define two baselines to compare our method with: (i) baseline "A" which
represents the results when classifying all tweets as non-spam directly without doing
any kind of classification; (ii) baseline "B" which reflects the results obtained when
applying supervised machine learning algorithms on state of the art "tweet" features
described in Table 3.4. As many learning algorithms provided by Weka tool, we exploit
Naive Bayes, Random Forest, J48, and support vector machine (SVM) as well-known
supervised learning methods to evaluate the performance of the mentioned state-of-
the-art features.
Parameter Setting. In computing the post prior probability, PSNj(I), we adopt "Likes",
"Shares", "Comments", "Wow", "Love", "Sad","Haha", and "Angry" as actions. In our
method, l is the main variable in classifying tweets and thus we study the impact of
changing its value through performing experiments at different values of l 2 [0.1, 1.0]
with 0.1 increment step. For the Naive Bayes method, we set the "useKernelEstimator"
and "useSupervisedDiscretization" options to false value as default values set by Weka.
For Random Forest, we set the option max depth to 0 (unlimited), with studying the
effect of changing number of trees 2 {100, 500}. For J48 method, we set the minimum
number of instances per leaf to 2, number of folds to 3, and confidence factor to 0.2.
For the SVM method, we use the LibSVM. implementation integrated with Weka tool
with setting the kernel function to Radial Basis and examining the impact of gamma
2 {0.5, 1}, where the rest parameters are set to the default ones.
Experiment Procedure. For the baseline "B" experiments, we use the concept of cross
validation along the 50 trending topics in our data-set, summarized in the following
steps: (i) for each topic, we build a feature vector space using the state of the art features
described in Table 3.4; (ii) then, a feature vector space of a selected topic (training set)
only is used to build a predictive model using a chosen learning algorithm; (iii) the
feature vector spaces of rest topics (i.e. 49 topics for testing) are validated on the built
classification model in the previous step; (iv) the validation results in terms of true
positive, true negative, false positive, false negative are extracted and stored; (v) the
steps from ii to iv are repeated on each topic in the collection; (vi) at last, using the
validation results obtained for each single topic, we calculate the performance metrics
mentioned above. It is important to mention that the experiment procedure for the
baseline "B" simulates exactly the real scenarios in detecting spam tweets.
In experimenting our method, for each topic we perform the following steps: (i) for a
certain value of classification threshold l, the designed classification model is applied
on the considered topic tweets using the corresponding topic Facebook posts to predict
the class label of tweets ; (ii) then, the results in terms of true positive, true negative,
false positive, false negative are extracted and stored for final results computations; (iii)
the previous two steps are performed on each topic in the data-set; (iv) in the last step,
the results of whole topics are summed together to compute the performance results
using the mentioned metrics.
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Table 4.4: Performance results of baseline A and baseline B in terms of different metrics.
Learning Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Avg. Precision Avg.Recall Avg. F-Measure
Baseline (A): All Tweets Labeled as Non-Spam
————— 88.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0.% 88.2% 88.2% 88.2%
Baseline (B): Supervised Machine Learning Approach
Naive Bayes 81.2% 13.7% 10.5% 11.9% 79.0% 81.2% 80.1%
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 86.4% 13.2% 2.8% 4.6% 79.0% 86.4% 80.1%
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 86.5% 12.6% 2.6% 4.7% 79.4% 86.5% 82.8%
J48 (Confidence Factor=0.2 ) 86.4% 13.8% 2.9% 4.9% 79.6% 86.4% 82.5%
SVM (Gamma=0.5) 87.2% 15.7% 0.2% 0.4% 78.3% 87.2% 82.5%
SVM (Gamma=1.0) 87.0% 15.9% 0.1% 0.3% 77.9% 87.0% 82.2%
Table 4.5: Our collaborative method performance results in terms of different metrics, showing
the impact of post prior probability component when performing collaboration with
Facebook social network.
Model(l) Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Avg. Precision Avg.Recall Avg. F-Measure
Uniform Post Prior Probability
l = 0.1 49.8% 10.8% 48.3% 17.7% 79.7% 49.8% 61.3%
l = 0.2 32.3% 10.8% 69.4% 18.7% 79.1% 32.3% 45.9%
l = 0.3 26.2% 10.8% 77.0% 18.9% 78.6% 26.2% 39.3%
l = 0.4 22.8% 10.9% 82.3% 19.2% 78.5% 22.8% 35.3%
l = 0.5 21.0% 11.0% 85.3% 19.4% 78.7% 21.0% 33.2%
l = 0.6 19.4% 11.0% 87.9% 19.6% 78.8% 19.4% 31.2%
l = 0.7 18.7% 11.1% 89.3% 19.7% 79.1% 18.7% 30.3%
l = 0.8 17.5% 11.1% 90.9% 19.8% 79.3% 17.5% 28.7%
l = 0.9 17.2% 11.1% 91.5% 19.8% 79.2% 17.2% 28.3%
l = 1.0 17.2% 11.1% 91.6% 19.8% 79.4% 17.2% 28.3%
Non-Uniform Post Prior Probability
l = 0.1 80.7% 17.0% 18.8% 17.8% 81.4% 80.7% 81.0%
l = 0.2 80.6% 17.2% 19.3% 18.2% 81.5% 80.6% 81.0%
l = 0.3 79.3% 15.8% 19.6% 17.5% 81.2% 79.3% 80.2%
l = 0.4 77.8% 15.0% 21.1% 17.5% 81.1% 77.8% 79.4%
l = 0.5 73.4% 13.5% 24.9% 17.4% 80.8% 73.4% 77.1%
l = 0.6 64.0% 12.3% 36.4% 18.5% 80.7% 64.0% 71.4%
l = 0.7 57.7% 11.9% 43.4% 18.7% 80.6% 57.7% 67.2%
l = 0.8 51.9% 11.5% 49.0% 18.6% 80.3% 51.9% 63.0%
l = 0.9 42.2% 11.0% 59.0% 18.6% 79.8% 42.2% 55.2%
l = 1.0 34.79% 10.7% 66.0% 18.5% 79.1% 34.79% 48.3%
4.4.1.2 Experimental Results
According to the results of the baselines reported in Table 4.4, the supervised classi-
fication models have strong failure in filtering out the spam tweets existing in the 50
trending topics. This failure can be easily captured from the low spam recall values
(4th column) where the highest value is obtained by NaiveBayes learning algorithm.
The 10.5% of spam recall obtained by NaiveBayes means that less than 80,000 of spam
tweets can be detected from around 736,500 spam tweets. The low spam precision val-
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ues also give an indication that a significant number of "non-spam" tweets has been
classified into "spam" ones. Subsequently, as spam F-measure is dependent on recall
and precision metrics, the values of spam F-measure are definitely low. The accuracy
values of baseline "B" are close to the accuracy value of baseline "A". However, given
the low values of spam precision and spam recall, the accuracy metric in this case is not
an indicative and useful metric to judge on the supervised learning as winner approach.
More precisely, the supervised learning approach does not add significant contribution
in increasing the quality of the 50 trending topics tweets. The key idea of using different
machine learning algorithms with playing in their parameters is to highlight the bad-
ness of the state of the art tweet features. Overall, the results obtained by the learning
models draw various conclusions: (i) the state of the art features are not discrimina-
tive among non-spam and spam tweets, ensuring the dynamicity of spam content; (ii)
spammers tend to publish tweets almost similar to non-spam ones; (iii) adopting a su-
pervised approach to perform training on an annotated data-set of trending topics and
applying the classification model on future or not annotated trending topics is not the
solution at all.
Taking a look at our method performance results in Table 4.5, the behavior is com-
pletely different in recalling (classifying) "spam" tweets, especially when the value of
l gets higher. The recall results are completely consistent with the equation 4.18 de-
signed for classifying tweets. For high values of l, the major difficulty is in finding at
one high matched Facebook post to classify the considered tweet as "non-spam". Thus,
this explains the dramatic degradation in the accuracy when increasing the value of
l. Although of high recall values, the spam precision values of our method are almost
similar to the supervised learning approach ones. For selecting the best l value with
adopting non-uniform or uniform post prior probability, an objective study is made
through drawing in Figure 2.10 the ROC curves at different values of l when including
and excluding the post priori probability component. Indeed, ROC curves are widely
adopted in parameter selections so that the best value of the considered parameter has
the smallest Euclidean distance to the 2-D point (100%,0%) which corresponds to true
positive rate and false positive rates, respectively. Thus, based on this fact, the best value
of l is at 0.4 when adopting uniform probability component since it has the lowest dis-
tance to the reference optimal point.
Uniform v.s non-Uniform Post Prior. The role of post prior probability component is
obvious in detecting spam tweets. Working on the assumption that each Facebook post
has same probability (uniform) for being non-spam increases the spam recall values
when the value of l gets higher, leading to detect most spam tweets. On contrary, a sig-
nificant number of "non-spam" tweets has been predicted as "spam" ones. We interpret
this behavior because of the small value of post prior probability when working on the
uniform probability assumption. Indeed, this problem is reduced when considering the
actions performed on Facebook post to compute the post prior probability component.
Thus, the spam recall has increased without high degradation in the accuracy values.
Although of low values of spam precision, the high values of average precision mean
that little tweets have been classified as "non-spam" where they are truly "spam".
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Figure 4.10: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves drawn at different values of lwhen
treating the post prior probability as uniform and non-uniform.
4.4.2 HMM Results
4.4.2.1 Experimental Setup
Performance Metrics. Since the ground truth class-label of each user is available, we ex-
ploit commonly used metrics in classification problems to asses the proposed approach.
These metrics includes: precision, recall, F-measure, computed according to the confu-
sion matrix of the Weka tool[60]. We don’t exploit the accuracy metric since our data-set
is imbalanced (e.g. 11.8% spam tweets and 88,2% non-spam tweets) and thus it is not
a useful metric in such a case. Also, since the problem is two-class binary classification,
we compute the precision, recall, and F-measure for the "spam" class.
Baseline Method. The performance of the proposed time-dependent method using
HMM is compared with the performance results of time-independent supervised learn-
ing methods. Hence, we adopt the Random Forest (RF) with #Trees 2 {100, 1000}, and
the J48 decision tree with two different confidence factors CF 2 {0.5, 1.0}, as a well-
known time-independent supervised learning methods used in spam tweet detection
problem [18, 30, 31, 98]. We use the implementation of the Weka tool [60] for these
two learning methods. For the features set, we exploit 16 features which are commonly
used in the literature [18, 30, 31, 98] and suitable for the real-time spam filtering. These
features are the number of hashtags, number of URLs, number of words, number of
characters, number of mentions, number of retweets, number of spam words, number
of hashtags per words, number of URLs per words, number of numeric characters, num-
ber of replies, number of favorites, number of followings, number of followers, tweet’s
user age, number of tweets posted by the tweet’s user, and number of lists. All of these
features are extractable from the tweet object directly without needing any further in-
formation from Twitter’s servers.
HMMModel Setting. In this work, we adopt the tweet features introduced in the base-
line methods, to represent the observations vector, O• 2 RM, where M represents the
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Figure 4.11: Performance results for different classical supervised learning methods (Random
Forest and J48 decision tree) and the HMM in terms of spam recall, spam precision,
and spam F-measure. The left column represents the results when performing the
training stage on the first 5-day of the streamed tweets of 50 topics, while using
the tweets of the rest 95 days for testing stage. In the other-hand, the right column
represents the results when performing training on the first 10-day of streamed
tweets while doing the testing on the rest 80 days tweets.
length of the observations vector and equals to the number of features (M = 16). Since
each feature is a continues independent random variable, we model each correspond-
ing emission probability distribution, bi,v, v 2 {1 . . .M} of state i 2 Q as a Gaussian
probability distribution, N (µi,v, s2i,v), with mean and variance of µi,v, s2i,v, respectively.
For each Gaussian probability distribution, we compute the optimal parameters value
using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method (MLE).
4.4.2.2 Experimental Results
The main purpose of our experiments on the annotated data-set is to study three aspects,
summarized in (i) getting insight into the effect of time-dependent learning models in
detecting effectively and efficiently spam tweets of trending topics, compared to the
classical learning methods; (ii) studying the impact of the training data size (number
of tweets) on the performance of spam detection; (iii) and to which extent the learned
detection models can have a stable performance without dramatic degradations. Hence,
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we study the impact of training of 5-day tweets and 20-day tweets streamed into 50
trending topics.
The graphs drawn in Figure 4.11 show the averaged performance results over 50 trend-
ing topics when applying two time-independent supervised learning methods (Ran-
dom Forest and J48), and the proposed time-dependent HMM method. The left column
shows the results when considering the 5-day tweets of each trending topic as a training
set, while the second column shows the results when using the 20-day tweets as a train-
ing set. The streaming period of each topic is 100 days. Thus, in the first experiment,
we have tested the models on the rest 95-day tweets, while in the second experiment,
we have leveraged the 80-day tweets in experimenting the classification models. Each
graph consists of five curves (HMM, 2 Random Forest, 2 J48) which represent the re-
sults in terms of the proposed performance metrics (e.g., spam recall), and the number
of days used in the training stage.
The spam recall curves in Figure 4.11 show the strength of the proposed time-dependent
HMM model in detecting spam tweets effectively, compared to the Random Forest and
J48 as time-independent classification models. The exploitation of the 5-day tweets as a
training set has contributed in having a good model, since the average spam recall over
the 95-day is about 70% for HMM, compared to 20% as an average spam recall obtained
by Random Forest and J48. As an interpretation, the degradation in the spam recall of
HMM after the 40-day is because the emission probability distributions of the spam
class have given low probability values in that period. These low values of emission
probabilities are due to the new spam campaigns that have been launched by spammers
in that period which had not been modeled well during the training phase. On the other
side, performing training on 20-day tweets has increased the spam recall values when
using Random Forest and J48 method for the first 20-day. Afterward, the spam recall
values have decreased to about 25%. This ensures the true fact about the dynamicity of
social spammers in their spam content. Conversely, the HMM has performed badly in
the first 30-day and that because of having low transition probabilities (aspam,spam and
aspam,non spam ). For the rest of 60-day, the performance of HMM has been increased since
more tuning and adaptation has been performed regarding the prior state probability
HMM model.
In terms of the spam precision metric, Random Forest and J48 methods have better
performance than the spam recall values in all testing days. On the other hand, the
performance of HMM is almost stable at the spam precision level where increasing
the amount of training days has a direct impact on the spam precision. Indeed, the
increasing in the precision values is expected when increasing the number of training
tweets because this leads to have more information to learn and know about. However,
the behavior of time-independent classification models has stayed valid for the first 10
streaming days only with a dramatic degradation in the precision values. This degra-
dation is because of the over-fitting problem that occurs when building a model too
biased towards the training data-sets and not generalized enough. The stable behav-
ior of HMM in the precision metric shows the trained model is generalized enough,
although of low precision values in the beginning of the streaming.
Based on the results, we draw the following conclusions: (i) relying on the time-
independent classification models with the state-of-the-art features are not useful to
detect spam tweets effectively; (ii) the low spam recall values obtained by the time-
independent classification models ensure the dynamicity of spam contents in Twitter
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and thus adopting a static classification model is not a solution at all; (iii) as a dynamic
model, the HMM is suitable to have high quality tweets since it has quite stable perfor-
mance in recalling spam tweets over time.
4.4.3 Collective-based Framework Results
4.4.3.1 Experimental Setup
Performance Metrics. As the ground-truth class label of 2.1 million tweets belonging
to 50 different hashtags is available, we adopt three commonly used metrics in the clas-
sification problems to evaluate two state-of-the-art detection methods besides to our
proposed framework. These metrics include precision, recall, and f-measure, computed
according to the confusion matrix of the Weka tool [60]. As our classification problem
is a pure binary, we only compute the precision, recall, and f-measure metrics for the
spam class since our main task is to detect spam tweets, not the non-spam tweets.
Methods and Parameters. We compare our framework with two real-time spam de-
tection methods presented in the literature, denoted as "Classical" and "Asymmetric"
methods. The classical one simply works through performing training on an annotated
data-set of tweets for a once to build a classification model. Then, the model resulted
is used all the time at the operational real-time detection phase, without retraining the
model again as long as no new annotated data-sets available at hand. The asymmetric
method has the same core of the classical method so that a training phase is performed
to build a binary classifier. However, the resulted model is used to enrich the training
data-set through adding each tweet streamed to the original set with using the output of
the classifier as a ground-truth label for the tweet. After streaming a certain number of
tweets, the classification model is updated using the already streamed tweets. Therefore,
for experimenting both methods, we adopt different machine learning methods, includ-
ing our designed HMM, Random Forest, Decision Tree (J48), and K-Nearest Neighbor
(K-NN) where WEKA tool is used as an implementation for these algorithms. For the
number of the training tweets, we study its impact through testing three different sizes
of training tweets: 500,1000, and 5000. In the asymmetric method, the updating model
frequency (i.e., number of tweets to update the model) must be set before running the
method. Thus, we examine the performance of the method at 500, and 1,000 tweets since
this parameter has an important impact on the detection performance. For the features,
we adopt the 17 real-time features described in Table 3.4, which are listed as: Number
of Hashtags, Number of URLs, Number of Words,Number of Characters, Number of
Mentions, Number of Retweets, Number of Spam Words, Number of Trending Top-
ics, Number of hashtags per words, Number of URLs per Words,Number of Numeric
Characters, Number of Replies,Number of Replies, Number of Followings, Number
of Followers, Number of Followers,Number of Tweets, and Account Age.
As the major difference between these two methods and our collective-based method
is the unsupervised classification stage, this stage is controlled by various parameters,
including the number of communities (K), the classification threshold (D), the number
of iterations (M), stop condition (e), and learning rate (h). The number of communities
and the classification threshold are the most important parameters in this stage. Thus,
we analyze their impact through setting K 2 {5, 10}, and D 2 {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}, while
the number of iterations, stop condition, and learning rate are fixed to 5,000, 0.00001,
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Table 4.6: Parameters and learning algorithms setting for the classical, asymmetric, and our
collective-based methods.
Learning Algorithms Updating Model Frequency (Tweets) Training Tweets Unsupervised Classification Parameters
Classical Method Random Forest (RF)
-Number of Trees:10, 100, 500
Decision Tree (J48)
-Confidence Factor (CF):0.5, 1.0, 3.0
K-nearest neighbour (K-NN)
-K:2, 5, 10
Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
—- 500,1000,5000 —–
Asymmetric Method 500,1000 500,1000,5000 —-
Collective-based Method 500,1000 —-
-Number of Communities (K): 5,10
-Classification Threshold(D): 0.2,0.5,0.8
-Number of Iterations (M): 5,000
-Stop Condition (e): 0.00001
-Learning Rate (h): 0.001
-TPCS classification threshold (l): 0.9
-TPCS smoothing parameter (µ): 10
and 0.001, respectively. Table 4.6 summarizes the setup of the parameters of the three
methods.
Training and Testing Tweets. The classical and the asymmetric spam tweet detection
methods require pre-training before putting them in the detection or operation mode.
As we have performed our experiments using tweets of 50 different hashtags, for each
hashtag, we devote an independent classification model, resulting 50 classification mod-
els. When using the classical method, each classifier is trained for the first streamed
tweets (e.g., 500, 1000, or 5000) into the intended hashtag, while the rest streamed tweets
are used for the testing. The asymmetric method is pre-trained as the classical method
needs, but a periodic retraining is performed when a defined number of new streamed
tweets (e.g., 500, or 1000) is satisfied. Thus, in some points, the testing tweets are lever-
aged later for training tweets when the periodic retraining condition is satisfied.
Our collective-based method differs from the classical and asymmetric methods in not
needing a pre-training phase since we assume that the user of the system doesn’t have
time to build an annotated data-set. Hence, with excluding the initial training phase, our
method has been experimented using the same circumstances of asymmetric method.
4.4.4 Experimental Results and Discussion
The main purposes of our experiments are to study three aspects, summarized in: (i)
getting insight into the performance of our unsupervised collective-based method in au-
tomatically providing automatic training data-sets for producing updated classification
models, (ii) analyzing the effect of changing the number of training tweets, updating
model frequency, number of communities, and the classification threshold on having
a stable and high detection performance; (iii) examining how much the use of differ-
ent learning algorithms with manipulating in their main parameters could improve the
performance metrics. The experiments have been conducted on 50 different hashtags
illustrated in section 5.4. It is important to mention that our model is not dependent
or biased towards hashtags, URLs, or keywords. However, we have performed the ex-
periments on hashtag as a proof of concept because such information entity is widely
adopted in real-time streaming applications such as tweet summarization. Thus, out
method is unbiased towards any information entity.
As each hashtag is a stream of tweets, we compute the performance results for the three
real-time spam detection method at different values of streamed tweets (e.g., every 500
tweets). The ultimate value of the performance metrics is computed over the 50 hash-
tags. More precisely, the confusion matrix at a particular number of streamed tweets is
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Figure 4.12: Spam recall results of two baseline spam detection methods (Classical and Asym-
metric), and our collective-based method, drawn for different method configuration
parameter values and the best learning algorithm that performs well at those con-
figurations.
summed over the 50 hashtags, leading to have a single confusion matrix by which the
metrics are computed.
At the evaluation level, we report the experimental results of the classical, asymmetric,
and our collective-based methods in three main Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14, correspond-
ing to the spam recall, spam precision, and spam f-measure metrics, respectively. We
don’t report the results of accuracy performance since our data-set is not balanced and
thus it results are not informative. To facilitate the comparison between the two base-
line methods and our method at different configuration values, the three main figures
are a summarization of the advanced study for the methods and the machine learning
algorithms reported in the appendix B. The reported results in the appendix are for the
classical time-independent machine learning algorithms only. Each figure of the summa-
rized version of the results reports the empirical results of the best supervised (includ-
ing HMM) machine learning algorithm drawn over all possible spam detection method
configuration. For example, the asymmetric spam detection method has nine possi-
ble configurations (3 updating frequency configurations ⇥ 3 different training tweet
size configurations) where for each parameter configuration we draw the result of best
learning method performance. For better results reading and understanding, the curve
of "Asymmetric_J48(CF=5)_Freq=300_Training=500" (solid blue line) reported in Figure
4.12 corresponds to the spam recall performance results when using the asymmetric
spam detection method, J48 learning method, 300 updating tweets frequency, and 500
tweets for training an initial version of the classification model. Through deeply analyz-
ing the three main figures, some interesting conclusions and remarks can be inferred:
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Figure 4.13: Spam precision results of two baseline spam detection methods (Classical and
Asymmetric), and our collective-based method, drawn for different method con-
figuration parameter values and the best learning algorithm that performs well at
those configurations.
• Classical Method Results. The accuracy results, not reported in this paper, have
almost a fixed performance along the number of streamed tweets with more than
90% when running the classical real-time spam detection method at different
learning algorithms and parameters. The three learning algorithms (Random For-
est, J48, K-NN) have almost the same accuracy performance, without noticing any
important role of their parameters (#Trees,CF,K) on improving the results. Accord-
ing to distribution of the class labels in our data-set, it is important to mention
that the accuracy metric is not too indicative one since there the class label distri-
bution is imbalanced. In other words, having a high accuracy near 90% doesn’t
mean that all spam tweets have been detected because in our data-set the distri-
bution of spam class is about 11% to 89% for non-spam class. At the first glance,
we can conclude that the classical method is effective for detecting spam tweets
in real-time; however, the spam class recall values illustrated in Figure 4.12 are
too low with an average value of 35%. Indeed, this means that the classical-based
classification models almost predict incoming tweets as a non-spam. The recall
values of the classical method show the impact of the size of the training tweets
and the effect of using different learning methods. The increasing in the train-
ing tweets size improves the spam recall. This behavior is expected since large
enough training tweets may contain a diverse of social spammers’ patterns, help-
ing classification models to detect them. Also, at the spam recall metric, there is a
clear diverse among the learning algorithms so that the decision tree (J48) learn-
ing method has a dominant performance, compared to K-NN and Random Forest
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Figure 4.14: Spam f-measure results of two baseline spam detection methods (Classical and
Asymmetric), and our collective-based method, drawn for different method con-
figuration parameter values and the best learning algorithm that performs well at
those configurations.
learning methods. On the other side, as reported in Figure 4.13, the spam class
precision results of the classical method are better than spam recall ones, with
showing a direct correlation between the size of the training set and the spam
precision performance metric. The high spam class precision values ensure that
the classical-based classification models classify the incoming tweets as a spam
when they have a high confidence in that tweet being a truly spam. The decision
tree (J48) has the lowest spam precision values, compared to the other learning
algorithms. On the other hand, Random Forest has the best performance in terms
of spam precision. The low spam precisions and high recall values obtained by
J48 mean that the classification models (a sequence of if-else conditions) resulted
by J48 have been designed through setting up the conditions that require any
small clue to classify incoming tweet as a spam, while the Random Forest has
established a group of decision trees made the conditions for classifying tweet
as a spam too difficult. As the spam class F-measure metric is a combination of
spam class precision and spam class recall metrics, as reported in Figure 4.14, the
value of the F-measure metric gets increased when increasing the number of the
training tweets since the size of the training has a direct correlation with both the
spam class recall and precision metrics.
• Asymmetric Method Results. The impact of tweets frequency and the training
size set parameters are obvious on increasing the spam class recall values. Up-
dating every streaming 300 tweets achieves better spam recall values than doing
that every 500 and 1,000. This behavior is reasonable and consistence since up-
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dating classification models as soon as possible makes them up-to-date to recent
social spammers’ patterns. Interestingly, although 300 tweets frequency is small
enough to have effective models, the increasing rate of spam class recall values is
too small and near to zero. More precisely, the best and maximum spam class re-
call value has not exceeded 40%. This behavior can be explained through recalling
the design of the method. The asymmetric method enriches the initial training set
through adding incrementally every incoming tweet with labeling it based on the
output of the current classification model. Therefore, the new added tweets don’t
provide too much information about the patterns or behaviors related to social
spammers since the built classification model predicts it as a spam tweet when the
model has already learned over similar patterns or feature values. Consequently,
with the small improvement rates, the asymmetric method may need millions of
tweets to obtain high spam recall values. On the other hand, the spam class pre-
cision results presented in Figure 4.13 have completely opposite behavior to the
spam class recall values, with maintaining stable performance along the number
of streamed tweets. Compared to the precision of classical method, there are sig-
nificant improvements occurred when a retraining is carried out every either 500
or 1,000 tweets. Thus, this proves the necessity of updating classification models
to adapt social spammers’ patterns and tricks. Consistently with the results of the
classical method, the Random Forest learning algorithm is the dominant in the
spam class precision, while the decision tree (J48) is the best in producing spam
class recall values. For the spam class F-measure results reported in Figure 4.14,
they reflect the ineffective of such a method for detecting tweets in real-time since
the best maximum value that can be obtained is not exceeding 40%, while the
classical method reaches around 50% at some configurations.
• Collective-basedMethod Results.As reported in Figure 4.12, our collective-based
method has high and superior spam class recall values with an average exceed-
ing 80%, compared to classical and asymmetric methods. With doing a pair-wise
comparison along possible values of D, we find that the classification threshold D
has a high direct correlation with the spam recall performance metrics. In other
words, using small D values lead to have many spam tweets in the new train-
ing sets and thus learning over a diverse of social spammers’ patterns. The large
number of communities such as (K=10) does not provide too much contribution
in detecting spam tweets. This behavior is because the number of uncorrelated
spam campaigns that have attacked every hashtag is not more than 5. However, it
is recommended to use large number because the uncorrelated spam campaigns
in the streamed tweets might increase with time. The tweets frequency has no sig-
nificant impact on improving the spam recall values because, at each retraining
phase, the training tweets have enough spam examples that make the classifica-
tion models robust till the next retraining phase. It is important to mention that
our collective-based method is not pre-trained such that before the first training
phase, all streamed tweets are classified as non-spam ones. Indeed, this explains
the behavior of having zero spam recall values at the beginning. The spam class
precision values are almost at level of classical and asymmetric methods with an
average performance of 75%. The main reason for having such spam class pre-
cision values is because of classifying non-spam communities as spam ones and
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thus the training sets will contain spam tweets which are truly non-spam ones.
The results of the F-measure metric reported in Figure 4.14 are quite stable along
the number of streamed tweets and have almost similar behavior to the spam re-
call values. Furthermore, the impact of number of communities and number of
tweets frequency is not clear in both the spam class precision and F-measure, leav-
ing the full control to the classification threshold (D). It is important to mention
that the combination of collective-based analysis and HMM have resulted a strong
tweet classification model better than using HMM as it without periodic retrain-
ing, showing the strength of collective-analysis in providing annotated data-sets
covering recent social spammer’s patterns.
With the introduced results and discussion, several conclusion can be inferred: (i) the
features adopted in the literature are not powerful to build a single classification model
staying robust for a long time; (ii) retraining periodically new classification models
using new training data-set reduces the problem of features robustness; (iii) the low
results of the spam recall metric of the classical and asymmetric method ensures our
hypothesis about the dynamicity of social spammers in Twitter; (iv) the high recall
values of our proposed framework show the effectiveness of the unsupervised collective-
based analysis in producing automatically training sets, especially for high D values; (v)
the closeness of different learning algorithms results again ensures that the major issue
in the spam detection problem is directly related with the features; (vi) there is no
obvious and clear correlation between the learning algorithms with their parameters
and the four performance metrics, making them not preferable solution to increase
the quality of tweets in a stream; (vii) the classification threshold D is almost the only
parameter that has a direct correlation with the spam recall performance metric and
thus decreasing it leads to have high quality of tweets; (viii) and the combination of
collective-based analysis with the sequential data-based learning methods can boost-
up the detection performance at recall and precision levels with maintaining stable
detection rate along streaming time.
The precision values obtained by our proposed system are almost to the classical and
asymmetric methods, unlike the importance of having high recall values, leading to
discuss this issue from false positive problem side. Indeed, spam filtering in online so-
cial networks is conceptually different from the email spam filtering field. Classifying a
truly non-spam email as spam one is a serious problem in email spam filtering, known
as false positive problem, since that email might be too important for the receiver. This
situation is quite different in online social networks since in such a context the informa-
tion circulated inside the networks are publicly accessible for all registered users. There-
fore, the users are obviously interested in seeing high quality and relevant information
(non-spam tweets) more than low quality ones (spam tweets). Furthermore, classifying
mistakenly a tweet as spam while it is truly non-spam is not a serious problem since
another tweet can compensate the misclassified ones. Hence, maintaining high spam
class recall values during the streaming is more important than having high precision
values with low recalls.
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4.4.5 Time Performance Analysis
As the main purpose of our proposed system is to detect spam tweets in real-time, it
is important to discuss in-depth the system performance in the detection time required,
the CPU cost, and the needed resources. The recent statistics about the number of tweets
show that every second, on average, around 6,000 tweets are tweeted on Twitter, which
corresponds to over 350,000 tweets sent per minute, 500 million tweets per day and
around 200 billion tweets per year 5. In the streaming tweet mode, Twitter performs
sampling and then pushes to the endpoint users only 1% of the instant tweets, having
a maximum frequency of 60 tweets per second. This frequency imposes a constraint
on our system to make a decision about every streamed tweet in margin no more than
( 160 ⇡ 16.7 ms). Recalling that the component responsible about learning and updat-
ing new classification function is not required to work in real-time mode at all. In other
words, that competent can be run in background process which trains new classification
model when the number of new streamed threshold condition is satisfied. The compo-
nent of real-time spam tweet detection must treat every incoming tweet within a time
less than 16.7 ms in order to prevent an overflow problem in buffering tweets and the
synchronization problem. Hence, in our system, the adopted real-time tweet features,
which are described in Table 3.4, require 3 ms for extraction and 2 ms in the prediction
operation using the learned classification model, requiring 5 ms to process any incom-
ing tweet. These values have been computed using computer with i5 processor, memory
of 4 GB, and storage of 1TB.
4.5 Conclusion
We have discussed in this chapter the problem of real-time spam content detection ap-
plied on Twitter OSM site. In particular, we have proposed a framework that leverages
the unsupervised learning methods for collectively analyzing streamed tweets to pro-
vide annotated data-sets in an automated way for retraining tweet-based spam detec-
tion classification model using supervised learning methods. The framework has been
designed using a strong hypothesis that correlations exist between spam tweets that
were streamed into a particular information entity (e.g., Trending topic). More precisely,
spam tweets have a strong correlation when they are published and posted by same
social spammer using many spam accounts. Thus, our framework processes the tweets
streamed into an information entity through clustering them first at account age level.
An unsupervised community detection is performed on each cluster through using
simple meta-data to produce different communities having similar internal structure
at meta-data levels. In order to evaluate the degree of each community to be a spam
one, we propose five community-based features where four of which analysis the con-
tent and behavior of community’s users, while the last feature measures the similarity
between the content of posted tweets and external information retrieved from other so-
cial network such as Facebook. We aggregate these features in a simple classification
for determining the state of community’s tweets, providing annotated a data-set for
learning light and real-time classification model. In building real-time spam tweet de-
tection model, we exploit the concept of sequential data learning so that it assumes that
5 http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/
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a dependency exists between current tweet and previous one. Thus, we present a com-
plete design of first order HMM where its parameters are learned using the periodic
annotated data-sets.
In validating our framework, including community-based features, and designed HMM,
we have performed a series of experiments on a large data-set containing millions of
tweets streamed into 50 trending topics (50 information entities). The experimental re-
sults reported at three parts show the need for periodic training to classification spam
model to adapt the dynamic changes in social spammer’s behaviors since the classical
two approaches have failed in detecting spam tweets, ensuring our main hypothesis
the dynamicity of spammer’s in their behaviors and content. The high performance of
HMM, as sequential data learning method, in detecting spam tweets shows the impor-
tance of transition and prior parameters.

5
SOC IAL SPAM DETECT ION IN B IG DATA COLLECT IONS
It’s more fun to arrive a conclusion than to justify it.
— Malcolm Forbes
5.1 Introduction
In real-time spam filtering, we assume that the streaming is performed for a trending
information entity (e.g., trending topic) to which social spammers might conduct their
spam campaigns that have high correlation at the content and meta-data levels. Thus,
our introduced approach in previous chapter for real-time filtering is valid when the
streaming method is directed to a particular trending information entity (e.g., hashtag,
URL, keyword). Also, it is assumed that all tweet meta-data exists so that the method
can be applied on the introduced stages. Moreover, performing community detection on
large sets of users (e.g., hundred of thousands) is time consuming so that several days
are required to process large data-collection. Beyond these assumptions, in some cases
and contexts, collecting and streaming of tweets (or accounts) could be in random way
and therefore the probability to find an obvious correlation among them is low, requir-
ing to apply the account-based spam filtering methods in a reasonable and intelligent
way. Also, the tweet or account information entity might have few number of meta-data
limited to screen-name, username, ID, and account age. Thus, the account-level and
campaign-level detection methods are the most suggested solutions for such a prob-
lem. These conventional methods mainly combine the feature extraction concept with
the supervised machine learning algorithms to build predictive models based on an
annotated data-set. However, applying these methods on large-scale Twitter data con-
sisting of millions of users (or accounts) is time consuming, which may require months
to process such a "crawled" large-scale data. The main source of the time consumption,
especially in account and campaign based detection, is the need for retrieving or col-
lecting additional information from Twitter’s servers to make the features extractable.
Despite of the problem is not in retrieving the information itself, Twitter has its own
REST APIs1 so that the number of calls by those APIs is limited and restricted to a
defined number and a time window. Therefore, the exploitation of Twitter’s REST APIs
is the main responsible about this bottleneck problem, where no alternative solution
exists to collect (or retrieve) complete information about users. For instance, collecting
additional information for one million accounts with their meta-data, followers, and
followees, may take more than 6 months. Hence, inspecting sequentially or randomly
each individual account existing in a "collected" large-scale Twitter accounts or tweets
to predict the class label of the account is impractical solution at all, boosting the need
for a systematic method that reduces the sequential search space from being millions
to thousands. Beyond the need for a heuristic method that can minimize the search
space, the existing attempts based on spam account detection have critical limitations
1 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public
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Figure 5.1: Overview of our proposed solution for handling IQ problems in big data collections.
and major drawbacks. One of these limitations is the ease of manipulation in the ex-
isting features by social spammers. As a motivating example, the number of followers
(i.e., the accounts that follow a user) is one of many features used mainly in detecting
social spammers; however, this feature can be easily manipulated by social spammers
through creating a huge number of accounts and letting each account to follow each
other. Another feature is counting the words in a user’s tweets, where such a feature is
used in discriminating among spam accounts and non-spam accounts. Unfortunately,
most of the user and content features introduced in the literature are similar in perfor-
mance to the given two examples. Thus, this raises the need to search for new robust
features that can detect spam accounts (or spam users) effectively and efficiently, with
minimizing the need for Twitter’s information as much as possible.
We summarize the social spam IQ problem in big data collections in the need for ap-
plying a preprocessing step that can reduce the search space of the data that needs
quality filtering. For better understanding, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, we are given a
big data collection of tweets, accounts, or both, the task is to produce a candidate list
of suspected accounts that have high probability of being spam accounts. The method
that will be applied as a pre-processing step must only leverage the existing meta-data
of accounts or tweets in the given collection, without requesting external information
from Twitter’s servers. With these intuitions and assumptions, we would like to discuss
the following research questions in this chapter:
1. To what extent the information retrieval (IR) concept as a preprocessing step is
applicable in social spam filtering problem ?
2. To what extent is possible to make the detection process of spam accounts more
systematic?
3. How much is important the study of OSM user’s behavior in having high quality
UGC (e.g., accounts, tweets) ?
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As a part of our contributions, in this chapter, we discuss the possibility of using infor-
mation retrieval concept to retrieve spam accounts existing in large-scale Twitter data,
forming a main preprocessing step for reducing the search space of accounts filtering.
We leverage the benefit of performing collective analysis using the unsupervised classi-
fication method introduced in Section 4.2 so that spam queries are extracted from the
existing meta-data (e.g., username, and screen name) that describe Twitter account ob-
ject. Specifically, our method processes partially and quickly a subset of Twitter tweets
or accounts meta-data existing in a desired large-scale Twitter data that requires clean-
ing. The another contribution in this chapter is related to studying the user’s behavior
that helps in detecting spam accounts. For doing so, we introduce a design of a new set
of features suitable for processing large-scale collections of Twitter users. Our features
focus on modeling social spammers’ behaviors by deeply analyzing their posting be-
havior such as writing style similarity among user’s tweets. In designing our features,
we assume that social spammers have different behavior from normal (legitimate) users
in posting tweets. In other words, social spammers have systematic posting patterns,
while normal users have a kind of randomness in posting content on Twitter.
Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in
generating spam queries on a collected and an annotated data-set containing more than
five millions tweets. The experimental results show that the spam queries generated
from the screen name and username attributes have superior performance in terms
of three different information retrieval metrics (Precision@L, Recall@L, Normalized Dis-
counted Cumulative Gain@L ), compared to five different baselines. Beyond spam query
generation, we validate the robustness of our account-based features through a series
of experiments conducted on a large-scale data-set consisting of more than 400,000 an-
notated Twitter accounts, using different supervised machine learning algorithms. The
experimental results demonstrate that our new features are able to correctly classify the
majority of social spammers (spam accounts) with more than 80% of accuracy, precision,
recall, and f-measure, when using Random Forest learning algorithm, outperforming
77 account-based features designed in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the design of our
proposed spam query generation model. Section 5.3 describes the design of our account-
based features. Section 5.4 presents the data-sets that have been exploited in performing
the experiments. The performance results of the spam query generation model and
account-based features are illustrated in section 5.5. At last, section 5.6 concludes the
work presented in the chapter.
5.2 Spam Queries Generation Method and Spam Accounts Re-
trieval Model
The Twitter spam detection methods presented in the literature have been designed to
provide the class label, as an output information, of a desired selected entity (account,
tweets, campaign). Given the fact that spam content might be partially common in par-
ticular information such as username attribute, having a spam searchable information
could contribute in making the detection process of spam accounts more systematic and
faster. More precisely, based on the information retrieval (IR) concepts, the searchable in-
formation corresponds to queries, while the Twitter data are the documents over which
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Figure 5.2: An example of three different spam accounts having same naming pattern and style
adopted in establishing the accounts by social spammers.
the retrieval process is taken place. Consequently, generating spam queries in somehow
with using them at the retrieval process contribute in retrieving accounts having high
probability for being spam. As a possible example of spam queries, Figure 5.2 shows
three correlated spam tweets corresponding to three different spam accounts having
almost same screen name attribute value "voteddlovatu". With applying simple infor-
mation retrieval method on a desired Twitter data with using such a string pattern as
a spam query, all accounts that have the string pattern will be retrieved with top ranks.
After that the conventional detection methods can be applied on a defined set of the
retrieved accounts to produce an accurate class label for each account in the selected set.
As our solution architecture illustrated in Figure 5.3, we start first by clustering a ran-
dom selected part of the input data collection based on a common posting service such
as (Hashtag, URL, or mention). Then, we extract the spammy patterns (queries) from
each cluster resulted from the previous step. Afterward, the generated spam queries
are adopted in an IR model for retrieving all suspected accounts in a ranked list. At
last, a top number of ranked accounts is taken for advanced account-based detection as
a further verification to take more precise decision about each account.
One important note is that social spammers spend a great effort to avoid random and
rubbish names in filling-up the public attributes such as screen name and username
because social spammers automate the creation process of Twitter accounts in which
the IDs must be unique. To ensure the uniqueness property for some attributes, social
spammers fill up those attributes using a unique pattern combined with a systematic
simple counting (e.g., "15", "1", and "5") as illustrated in the given example in Figure
5.2. Moreover, social spammers must select attractive names in order to lure legitimate
users as much as possible and thus using random and rubbish names is not the solution
at all.
Meta-data Modeling. We model a large-scale of Twitter data that requires a treatment,
as a finite set of tweets, defined as Twitter_Data = {U1,U2, ...}, where the Twitter data
element U• is further defined by 3-tuple U• = hUA, SN,UNi which has same definition
in 4.2.1 sub-section, forming the minimal set of meta-data that exists in any Twitter
information entity. Given the fact that our method works on a sub-set of Twitter data
for generating spam queries and thus we define the Working_Data ⇢ Twitter_Data as
a finite set of Twitter data.
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Figure 5.3: Architecture of our integrated proposed solution for handling big data collection of
tweets (or accounts).
Problem Formalization. Given a set of large-scale Twitter data, Twitter_Data, the main
problem is to infer and discover a set of spam queries, SQs, through partially processing
the given set of Twitter data, Working_Data, without requiring any prior knowledge in
advance such as the relation between users (e.g., followers and followees of users). In
a formal way, we aim at designing a function y such that it processes and handles the
given set of Twitter data, Working_Data, to generate a set of spam queries, defined as
y : Working_Data ! {SQ1, SQ2, ...} where SQ• is a set of ordered characters forming a
spam query.
5.2.1 Spam Queries Generation: The Model Design
We take the great benefit of our method introduced in 4.2.3 sub-section for generating
the spam queries using the available Twitter meta-data since it the process of generat-
ing spam queries must be unsupervised as much as possible to be robust towards the
dynamic changes in social spammers’ behaviors and strategies. Thus, we process the
Working_Data set for having the communities that are classified as spam ones. Then,
we generate spam queries from username and screen name users’ attributes, using the
communities that have been classified as a spam community. However, the adoptable
community-based features are username pattern similarity (UNPS) and screen-name
pattern similarity (SNPS) since the existing meta-data makes them extractable; while
the rest ones that are related to tweets text cannot be used because the corresponding
meta-data is assumed not available. The new design of the community classification
function is reduced to include only the two extractable features, defined as follows:
Cj.Label =
8<:spam Cj.UNPS  D||Cj.SNPS  Dnon  spam otherwise
where D is a classification threshold value fixed (i.e. 0.1), Cj represents the j community
that is inferred by our method in 4.2.3. As illustrated through an example in Figure
5.4, after determining the class label of each community being inferred, the last step is
to extract spam queries using the communities that have been classified as a spam. In
this work, we generate spam queries from screen name and username attributes where
we mainly rely on these attributes in performing community detection stage. As each
spam community may provide more than one string pattern in both attributes, we are
interested in the longest and frequent pattern. Intuitively, the probability to find the
longest pattern in attributes of legitimate users’ accounts is quite low. To combine the
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Figure 5.4: An example of generating spam queries from spam predicted communities and lever-
aging them in an IR model for retrieving a ranked list of suspected spam accounts.
both properties in generating spam queries, we turn out the problem to a maximization
optimization through searching for the string pattern that has the highest value of the
multiplication of the pattern likelihood probability with the logarithm of its length,
separately defined as follows for username and screen name string patterns:
SQUN =
[
j2{1,...,|Ages|⇥K}
Cj.Label=spam
{w⇤} = max
w2PTUN
PTUND (w) ⇤ log |w| (5.1)
SQSN =
[
j2{1,...,|Ages|⇥K}
Cj.Label=spam
{w⇤} = max
w2PTSN
PTSND (w) ⇤ log |w| (5.2)
where K is the number of clustering communities, |Ages| represents the length of
unique account’s ages, PTUN and PTSN are the string patterns of username and screen
name attributes of Cj community’s users, respectively. PTUND , PT
SN
D are the probability
distribution of the string patterns of username and screen name attributes of Cj com-
munity’s users, respectively. w⇤ is the optimal string pattern that will be selected as a
spam query corresponding to the considered community.
5.2.2 Spam Accounts Retrieval Model
For a given spam query related to one of the two spam queries set extracted, the next
step is to retrieve spam accounts (users) existing in the given collections. We adopt
the probability ranking principle to rank accounts for being relevant for a given spam
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query [119]. Formally, given a user u and a spam query q, we rank the users (or ac-
counts) according the probability of the user being relevant. Mathematically, the scoring
probability function is given by
P(R = 1|U = u,Q = q) = P(U = u|R = 1) ⇤ P(Q = q|U = u,R = 1) (5.3)
where R 2 {spam, non   spam}is an indicator random variable that takes value 1 if
the user u is relevant w.r.t. query q and 0 if the user u is irrelevant w.r.t. query q,
U 2 Twitter_Data is a random variable that takes value of a user existing in the given
collection of Twitter data (Twitter_Data), Q 2 SQSN [ SQUN is also a random variable
that takes value of a spam query extracted from either username or screen name at-
tribute. The probability component P(U = u|R = 1) represents the degree of the user
(account) u being a spam, while the P(Q = q|U = u,R = 1) is the probability of the
spam query used in creating the account of the current user u. We estimate the prior
probability of the user being spam based on the user’s account age where the old age
user’s account has low probability for being a spam account. We adopt Gaussian zero
mean probability distribution to compute the probability of the user being spam, for-
mally given as:
P(U = u|R = 1) = 1p
2s2p
e (u.UA)
2
.
2s2 (5.4)
where the variance s2 is experientially determined according to some statistics, and
u.UA is the age of the user’s account in days time unit. For computing the probability
of the account of the given user being created by the given spammy query, q, we leverage
the similarity degree between the given query and the value of the selected attribute
(username and scree name), using same similarity concept introduced in equations 4.2,
and 4.3.
5.3 Account-Based Features Design
In this section, we introduce notations, definitions, and formalization of our target prob-
lem. Then, we present the design of our features by which we distinguish among spam
accounts and non-spam accounts.
5.3.1 Notations and Problem Formalization
Let UCollection = {u1, u2, ...} be a finite set of Twitter users representing a target data
collection (or a ranked list of users) which requires processing to filter out the spam
accounts (users) that belong to social spammers. In order to minimize the size of infor-
mation needed from Twitter’s servers, for each user u• 2 UCollection, we collect the top
100 tweets using a single REST API call. This number of tweets is the maximum number
that Twitter can provide in a one single call. It is possible to retrieve more user’s tweets,
if any; however, this increases the number of API calls, doubling the required time to
process the entire users in the given collection. This number of tweets (100 tweets) per
user is relatively enough to take a precises decision about user type. Hence, we model
each user u• 2 UCollection by a 2-tuple, u• = hTweets, Agei. Each element in the tuple
and some additional functions are defined as follows:
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Tweets. We model the tweets of user u• 2 UCollection as a finite set, Tweets = {t1, t2, ...},
where t• represents a tweet object consisting of simple meta-data. We model these
meta-data by a 5-tuple t• = hTime,Hashtags,URLs,Mentions,Wordsi, where Time is
the posting date of the tweet, t•, represented in seconds time unit computed since
1970/1/1, Hashtags is a finite set containing all hashtags posted in the tweet, URLs
also represents a finite set of all URLs posted in the tweet, Mentions is a set of users
who are mentioned in the tweet extracted through searching for words starting by @
symbol, and Words is a finite set consisting of words posted in the tweet such that
Words \ Hashtags \Mentions \URLs = ∆.
Age. The creation date of each account is registered on Twitter’s servers, when users
setup their accounts. We compute the age of a user’s account in days time unit through
calculating the difference between the current time date (Timenow) and the creation date
of the account (Timecreation), defined formally as Age = Timenow   Timecreation.
Kullback–Leibler Divergence (KLD) (M1,M2,V). Given two different language mod-
els, M1,M2 and a set of terms V (e.g., words of a tweet), we compute the similarity of
the two language models using a customized version of KLD [86], defined as:
KLD(M1,M2,V) =
log |V| Âw2V P(w|M1) ⇤min(| log P(w|M1)P(w|M2) |, log |V|)
log |V| (5.5)
where P(w|M•) is the probability of the term w of being generated by the given lan-
guage model M•. We perform this customization since the range of the classical KLD
method is unbounded and thus the • value appears when two language models are
dissimilar. Hence, our customization reverses the semantic of KLD values (i.e., 0 )
dissimilar and 1) similar), with bounding its value between 0 and 1.
Problem Formalization. With the presented notations and definitions, our main prob-
lem is to detect and filter out Twitter social spammers existing in a given collection.
Formally, given a collection of Twitter accounts (or users), UCollection, the problem is
turned to build a binary classification model with minimizing the number of requests
to Twitter’s servers, y : u• ! {Social Spammer, Legitimate User}, u• 2 UCollection.
5.3.2 Features Design
In designing our features, we have deeply analyzed a large set of spam accounts sus-
pended by Twitter. Unlike the state-of-the-art features, our features focus on modeling
user’s behaviors since, according to the social spammers’ trends, legitimate users have
completely different behaviors like the randomness in their tweets content and structure.
Also, the design of any feature must be not easy to be manipulated by social spammers.
For instance, the number of tweet’s words feature can be easily manipulated by social
spammers through using low number of words in their tweets. Thus, we introduce a set
of behavioral features that can efficiently and effectively distinguish among spam and
non-spam accounts (or users), with relying only on the top 100 tweets.
Writing Style Similarity (WSS). Computing the textual similarity of user’s tweets is a
widely used feature; however, some social spammers are tricky enough to avoid tweets
duplication. Given the fact that social spammers automate their posting in a systematic
way, the probability of finding a correlation in the writing style among social spammers’
accounts tweets is relatively high. For instance, the spam tweets in Figure 5.5 have
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DolceAmore Engagement #KCA Opening the picture of brightness 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
DolceAmore Engagement #KCA How life can really be unfair 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
DolceAmore Engagement #KCA So quietly without a sound, 
https://t.co/5VyG5QMJ50
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Figure 5.5: An example f a spam account posted three tweets aving a correlation at the writing
style level.
a common style structure in writing tweets (word, word, hashtag, word, word,word,
word, word, and then URL). In this instance, the social spammer of these tweets has
been tricky in writing tweets so that no tweets duplicated in the content.
We model this feature through transforming tweet’s content to a higher level of abstrac-
tion. Then, we measure the writing style similarity among tweets using Jaccard similar-
ity index. In a formal way, a transformation function, Type(ST, T) 2 {W,H,U,M}, is
defined, which takes a string ST and a tweet T as parameters, and returns the type of
the input string (Word, Hashtag, Url, and Mention), formalized as:
Type(ST, T) =
8>>><>>>:
H ST 2 T.Hashtags (5.6)
M ST 2 T.Mentions
U ST 2 T.URLs
W ST 2 T.Words
Hence, for a tweet, T•, posted by a user u 2 UCollection, the writing style (WS) of the
tweet is given as:
WS(T•) = {(i, Type(S, T•))|S 2 T•.Hashtags [ T•.Mentions [ T•.URLs [ T•.Words}
(5.7)
where i is the position of the string S that requires transformation.
As a concert example using first tweet of Figure 5.5, the writing style set will be
WS = {(1,W), (2,W), (3,H), (4,W), (5,W), (6,W), (7,W), (8,W), (9,U))}. With these
definitions, for a user, u 2 UCollection, we compute the writing style similarity among
user’s tweets, uTweets, as follows:
WSS(u) =
ÂT12u.Tweets ÂT22u.Tweets
|WS(T1)\WS(T2)|
|WS(T1)[WS(T2)|
(|u.Tweets|)(|u.Tweets|  1) (5.8)
With this definition of WSS, the upper and lower bounds are between 1 and 0, respec-
tively. The increasing in its value means that the user, u, has high probability of being
a spam account. For instance, the writing style similarity of the user’s tweets in Figure
5.5 is close to 1.
Posting Behavior. Social spammers are too dependent on the current events that are
circulated in Twitter [148]. For instance, trending topics of Twitter are changing over
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Figure 5.6: An illustrative example showing: (i) two correlated posting time probability distri-
butions of two instances (#H1 and #H2); and (ii) the cross-correlation among the
two probability distributions with the area (black shaded). The x-axis represents the
shifted time-stamp of the tweets, computed by subtracting the time-stamp of each
tweet from the most recent post tweet by the user. The 0 value on x-axis corresponds
to the recency in time.
time and thus social spammers may intensively post tweets in a trending topic and
then when that topic becomes not trending, they change to other trending one. Hence,
given the fact that social spammers leverage the Twitter REST APIs in automating the
posting of spam content, a correlation might exist between the posting time probability
distribution of hashatgs, mentions, URLs, or textual words. For example, Figure 5.6
shows two posting time probability distributions of tweets containing two instances
(#H1 and #H2) of the hashtag service. It is obvious that the social spammer has focused
on the #H2 when posting tweets and then after a while has changed the attention
towards #H1. Although the two probability distributions are not identical in the posting
time, they are correlated in the probability value and the time period between each
two consecutive tweets. The probability of having such a correlation in a legitimate
user’s tweets is quite low since legitimate users are random in their posts and in using
Twitter’s services.
We model this posting behavior through computing the cross-correlation between differ-
ent instances of a tweeting service: hashtags, URLs, and mentions services. In a formal
way, let Is be a set of all unique instances available in user’s, u 2 UCollection, tweets and
posted with a tweeting service s 2 {Mention,Hashtag,URL}. Also, let Pi be the posting
time probability distribution of the instance, i 2 Is. Since the posting time distributions
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time can be viewed as time shifted signals, we adopt the correlation [113] method to
measure the posting behavior similarity among user’s tweets of the user u, defined as:
ISu(Is) =
Â
i12Is
Area(Pi1 ? Pi2)
|Is| ⇤ Area(Pimax ? Pimax)
i2 = argmax
i32Is\i3 6=i1
Area(Pi1 ? Pi3)
imax = argmax
i2Is
Area(Pi ? Pi)
(5.9)
where Area(•) is a function that computes the area of the new distribution resulted
by applying correlation (i.e., 0 area means dissimilar distributions), P• ? P⇤ is a cross-
correlation between two different distributions, and P• ? P• is a correlation between
same distribution known as an auto-correlation. The intuition behind i2 is to get the
instance that has the maximum correlation with the instance i1.
The summation of the maximum areas is normalized by the area of the instance
that has the maximum self-similarity multiplied by the number of instances. Thus,
the IS value is between 0 and 1, where 0 means that there are no instances having
same posting behavior, while 1 means that all instances have similar posting behav-
ior. As social spammers might use all possible posting services, we extract three fea-
tures through applying equation 5 on hashtags, URLs, and mentions services. The
definition of the three instances sets are defined as Ihashtags =
S
t2u.Tweets t.Hashtags,
IMentions =
S
t2u.Tweets t.Mentions, and IURLs =
S
t2u.Tweets t.URLs.
Posting Diversity. Legitimate users and social spammers may use hashtags, URLs, and
mentions tweeting services in an intensive way. In such a common scenario, the clas-
sical statistical features existing in the literature such as number of URLs, number of
hashtags, number of mentions, and percentage of URLs [18] do not significantly con-
tribute in distinguishing among users’ types. Our feature goes beyond these statistical
ones through computing the posting diversity for each service separately such as the
diversity of hashtags used in user’s tweets. As an intuition, spammers intensively post
their tweets with focusing on a single instance of a tweeting service (e.g., hashtag),
while legitimate users have a kind of diversity in posting their tweets without focusing
on a particular instance or even a tweeting service. By using the same definitions used
in posting behavior feature part, the diversity of an instance set, Is, of a service s, is
computed as:
PD(u, Is) =
|Is|
|u.Tweets| (5.10)
The 0 value of PD means that the instances set is empty, while the 1 value means that
each instance in Is has been used only once in the user’s u tweets. We apply this feature
on four different tweeting services, including hashtags, mentions, URLs, and textual
words services. Hence, the definition of the four instance sets are defined as Ihashtags =S
t2u.Tweets t.Hashtags, IMentions =
S
t2u.Tweets t.Mentions, IURLs =
S
t2u.Tweets t.URLs, and
IWords =
S
t2u.Tweets t.Words.
Language Model-Based Tweets Similarity. Social spammers try to avoid detection
through non-duplicating exactly their tweets by generating random sentences from a
predefined dictionary of words. Thus, in this case, the exact similarity feature can easily
fail in capturing this spamming behavior.
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We model this spamming behavior through computing first the uni-gram word lan-
guage model of user’s, u, tweets. Then, we measure the similarity between the language
model of each tweet and all user’s tweets language model, using the customized ver-
sion of Kullback-Leibler Divergence defined above. Formally, for a user u 2 UCollection,
let MTweets be a uni-gram word language of the user’s u tweets, and let MT be a uni-
gram word language model of the tweet T 2 u.Tweets, the tweets similarity is computed
as:
LMTS(u) =
Â
T2u.Tweets
KLD(MT,MTweets, T.Words)
|u.Tweets|
(5.11)
The upper and lower bound of LMTS are between 1 and 0, respectively. The high value
gives an indication that the user’s u tweets are almost similar in the content and thus
the probability of being a spam account (social spammer) is high, while the low value
means that most user’s tweets talking about different topics.
5.4 Data-set Description and Ground Truth
5.4.1 Spam Query Generation Model Data-set
In evaluating our method and baseline methods, we have collected Twitter data for an-
other 100 hashtags different from the introduced one in section 4.3. The main difference
in the both data-sets is that the introduced one in section 4.3 is related to trending top-
ics in which the real-time filtering works perfectly because of possible high correlations
among tweets; while the data-set of 100 hashtags is not associated to trending Twitter
topics. Furthermore, the given meta-data of tweets are limited to simple information
related to users such as username, screen-name. In a similar way, to the dataset that is
introduced in section 4.3, we report the statistics of the 100 hashtags in Table 5.1 so that
we have found about 135,000 users (accounts) labeled as social spammer, and about
1,520,000 legitimate users.
Table 5.1: Distribution of different statistics for social spammers (spam accounts) and legitimate
users (non-spam accounts) existing in the collected 100 hashtags.
Social Spammers Legitimate Users
Statistic Name Value Rate (per 100 users) Value Ratio (per 100 users)
Number of users 134,896 (8.2%) — 1,520,081 (91.8%) —
Number of geo-enabled users 10,205 (1.9%) 8 (20%) 514,773 (98.1%) 33 (80.0%)
Number of verified users 0 (0.0%) 0 3,686 (100.0%) 1 (100.0%)
Number of users’ followers 103,705,788 (2.7%) 76878 (24.1%) 3,686,545,059 (97.3%) 242522 (75.9%)
Number of users’ followees 72,640,728 (3.8%) 53849 (30.1%) 1,829,383,146 (96.2%) 120347 (69.9%)
Number of tweets posted 134,897,419 (0.5%) 100001(5.9%) 24,305,283,191 (99.5%) 1598946 (94.1%)
Number of tweets streamed 608,078 (11.7%) 450 (60.0%) 4,576,143 (88.3%) 301(40.0%)
Number of retweeted tweets 283,663 (10.3%) 210 (56.5%) 2,463,144 (89.7%) 162 (43.5%)
Number of replied tweets 2,930 (4.6%) 2 (33.3%) 60,381 (95.4%) 4 (66.6%)
Number of URLs 181,764 (8.1%) 135 (50.0%) 2,050,215 (91.9%) 135 (50.0%)
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Table 5.2: Detailed statistics of our data-set used in performing the experiments .
Social Spammers Legitimate Users
Statistic Name Value Ratio (per 100 users) Value Ratio (per 100 users)
Number of users 11,451 (2.8%) — 409,170 (97.2%) —
Number of geo-enabled users 2,542 (1.7%) 22 (38.6%) 147,200 (98.3%) 35 (61.4%)
Number of verified users 48 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 15,585 (99.7%) 4 (100%)
Number of users’ followers 126,078,117 (0.11%) 1,101,022 (26.1%) 12,779,787,065 (99.8%) 3,123,344 (73.9%)
Number of users’ followees 54,493,725 (3.6%) 475,886 (54.4%) 1,636,779,971 (96.4%) 400,024 (45.6%)
Number of tweets posted 146,626,275 (2.9%) 1,280,466 (51.1%) 5,024,219,375 (97.1%) 1,227,905 (48.9%)
Number of tweets retrieved 874,557 (2.6%) 7,637 (49.5%) 32,007,284 (97.4%) 7,822 (50.5%)
Number of retweeted tweets 331,995 (2.8%) 2,899 (50.7%) 11,464,552 (97.2%) 2,810 (49.2%)
Number of replied tweets 104,848 (2.4%) 915 (45.9%) 4,425,005 (97.6%) 1,081 (54.1%)
Number of URLs 185,925 (1.9%) 1,623 (39.9%) 10,011,831 (98.1%) 2,446 (60.1%)
Number of Hashtags 468,593 (3.3%) 4,092 (55.1%) 13,677,994 (96.7%) 3,342 (44.9)
5.4.2 Account-based Data-set
Our data-set described in [148] consists of no more than 8,000 accounts manually anno-
tated between spam and non-spam accounts. However, we have enlarged that data-set
to draw more precise and accurate results.
We exploit our research team crawler to collect accounts and tweets, launched since 1st
June 2016. The streaming method is used to get an access to 1% of global tweets, as an
unbiased crawling way. For each tweet being streamed, we extract the user ID of the
tweet and then we retrieve the top 100 users’ tweets using Twitter REST APIs. We store
uesrs’ tweets in JSON format where the meta-data that Twitter provides in any tweet is
shown and annotated in Figure 3.6.
We perform our experiments on a data-set consisting of around 420,000 Twitter ac-
counts, after merging our previous data-set used in [148]. These accounts are a result
of 60 days of crawling from 1/June/2016 to 31/July/2016. To evaluate the effectiveness
of our features and the state-of-the-art ones, we created an annotated data-set through
labeling each account (user) as a spam or non-spam. However, with the huge amount of
accounts, using manual annotation approach to have labeled data-sets is an impractical
solution. Hence, we leverage a widely followed annotation process in the social spam
detection researches, named as "Twitter Suspended Spammers (TSS)" [69, 70], summa-
rized in Figure 5.7. The process checks whether each user was suspended by Twitter.
In case of suspension, both the user and his tweets are labeled as a spam; otherwise
we assign non-spam to both of them. In total, as reported in Table 5.2, we have about
11,500 spam accounts suspended by Twitter, forming around 3.0% of all accounts in our
data-set. It is important to mention that not all non-spam accounts are truly non-spam,
since Twitter might not have suspended some of them yet. However, on the other side,
all accounts suspended by Twitter in our data-set are truly belonging to social spam-
mers. Thus, the ratio of social spammers in our data-set is more than the percentage
reported in Table 5.2. Although our data-set is not balanced; the normalized (per 100
users or accounts) statistics in Table 5.2 show the effectiveness of social spammers in
polluting Twitter content. For example, Twitter social spammer averagely posts about
12K of tweets, which is almost equal to legitimate users’ tweets. Also, the given statistic
about the average number of hashtags posted by 100 users shows how much the hash-
tag service is used by social spammers in spreading their spam content. One important
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Figure 5.7: Adopted annotation process in building our data-set.
thing is the number of followers and followees. Indeed, according to the recent statis-
tics2 released in the 4th quarter of 2016, the number of Twitter active users is about 320
million, while the numbers reported about followers and followees are exponentially
higher than that number. Indeed, we compute these two numbers by summing the fol-
lowers and followees counters available in user’s object as meta-data, without deleting
the duplicated accounts. These unimaginable numbers of follower and followees show
the impracticality of graph-based features to process our data-set because of the need
to retrieve almost all users (320 million) from Twitter’s severs.
5.5 Experimental Results
5.5.1 Spam Query Generation Model
5.5.1.1 Experimental Setup
Information Retrieval Metrics. Different metrics are used in information retrieval area
to evaluate the degree of relevance of documents w.r.t. an input search query. In our
work, we exploit three widely used metrics [96]: (i) Precision at L (P@L); (ii) Recall
at L (R@L); (iii) and Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain at L (NDCG@L). We
measure the three performance metrics at two ranks L 2 {100, 500}.
Baseline Methods. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first in treating the
spam problem from information retrieval perspective. Therefore, we propose five possi-
ble baseline methods by which we can evaluate and compare our method with. Hence,
as no spam retrieval methods introduced in the state-of-the-art, the five simple retrieval
baseline methods rank Twitter accounts according to a particular criteria, summarized
in:
• Random (RN). RN method ranks the accounts in a random way without biasing
toward any account in the set.
• Recent Age Account (RAA). This method sorts accounts in an ascending order
according to the accounts’ creation date (age).
• Old Age Account (OAA). Conversely to RAA method, OAA sorts accounts in a
descending order according to the accounts’ creation date (age).
2 https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/
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Table 5.3: Performance results of the five baseline methods evaluated using Precision@L,
Recall@L, and NDCG@L metrics and different values of L 2 {100, 500}.
Baseline Retrieval Method P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500
Random (RN) 7.9% 7.7% 0.5% 1.9% 7.7% 7.7%
Recent Age Account (RAA) 19.9% 20.9% 1.3% 5.8% 19.5% 20.7%
Old Age Account (OAA) 0.6% 1.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0%
Recent Posted Tweet (RPT) 6.6% 6.9% 0.4% 1.7% 6.3% 6.8%
Old Posted Tweet (OPT) 7.8% 7.0% 0.5% 1.9% 8.0% 7.1%
• Recent Posted Tweet (RPT). This method ranks accounts according to the publi-
cation date of the considered tweets. Thus, it sorts first the tweets in an ascending
order according to the tweets’ date and then selects the corresponding accounts
in the same order.
• Old Posted Tweet (OPT). This method is similar in concept to the RPT method;
however, it sorts the tweets first in a descending order and then picks the corre-
sponding accounts in the same order.
Parameter Setting. For community detection stage, we set h = 0.001, M = 10, 000, and
e = 0.0001 as values for the learning rate, number of iterations, and the threshold of
absolute change in the hidden matrixH, respectively. For the number of communities K,
we experiment our method at three different values, K 2 {2, 5, 10}, to study its impact.
For the size of information matrices X•, we consider all distinct users (accounts) of each
hashtag without excluding any user available in the testing collection. As an iterative
algorithm is used for solving the optimization problem, we initialize each entry of the
hidden matrix H by a small positive real value drawn from an uniform distribution
on the interval [0,1]. For the threshold (D), we study the effect of this threshold in
predicting effective spam queries using different values, D 2 [0.1, 1]. We set the variance,
s2 ,of Gaussian probability distribution to 1 day according to the results introduced in
[148].
Experiment Procedure. For each hashtag, we perform the following steps: (i) we ex-
tract the users who posted the tweets related to the considered hashtag; (ii) account-age
clustering stage is performed on the extracted users set (iii) the community detection
method is then performed on each age cluster of users; (iv) afterward, each community
is labeled as a spam or non-spam based on the designed objective function for a certain
classification threshold (D); (v) for each community labeled as a spam, the spam queries
are generated for username attribute or for screen name attribute ; (vi) for each spam
query, we retrieve the accounts that contain the selected query based on the considered
attribute (user name or screen name), using all accounts in the data collection; (vii) the
retrieval model introduced in equation 5.13 is used to retrieval and rank accounts; (viii)
the performance of the considered spam query used in retrieving spam accounts is eval-
uated using the three metrics described; (ix) the previous two steps is repeated for each
spam query generated; (x) in the last step, the performance of all spam queries gener-
ated corresponding to the selected attribute (screen name or user name) is averaged for
producing the final performance value.
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Table 5.4: Performance results of the screen name and user name attribute-based spam queries
for retrieving spam accounts, experimented at various classification threshold (D)
and at different values of K 2 {2, 5, 10} as a number of communities, in terms of
Precision@L, Recall@L, and NDCG@L at L 2 {100, 500}, when excluding the prior
probability component in the designed retrieval model.
Screen-name pattern User-name pattern
K Th P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500 P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500
0.1 55.4% 33.4% 7.8% 19.8% 58.9% 46.4% 48.9% 43.1% 7.1% 23.8% 47.1% 43.8%
0.2 54.2% 26.3% 7.7% 15.0% 55.9% 37.0% 49.4% 35.3% 7.2% 18.7% 48.4% 37.3%
0.3 48.7% 19.2% 6.7% 10.9% 55.1% 30.6% 49.4% 33.1% 7.4% 17.5% 48.6% 35.4%
0.4 45.1% 18.3% 6.0% 9.8% 49.8% 23.5% 46.1% 31.6% 6.9% 16.4% 46.2% 33.9%
0.5 44.8% 17.2% 5.9% 9.0% 46.9% 22.5% 44.9% 30.1% 6.8% 15.3% 45.0% 32.4%
0.6 44.4% 15.4% 5.9% 8.9% 46.4% 21.5% 46.7% 29.5% 7.0% 15.1% 46.6% 31.9%
0.7 42.0% 13.7% 5.5% 8.0% 46.5% 20.0% 43.0% 28.4% 6.5% 14.3% 43.3% 30.6%
0.8 38.8% 12.5% 5.3% 7.5% 44.6% 18.3% 41.6% 27.5% 6.3% 13.7% 42.1% 29.6%
0.9 36.0% 10.3% 5.3% 7.0% 41.6% 16.9% 36.9% 25.9% 5.1% 11.8% 37.7% 27.7%
2
1.0 36.5% 9.8% 5.4% 6.7% 39.3% 14.6% 37.8% 25.9% 5.2% 11.8% 38.6% 27.9%
0.1 59.4% 32.9% 8.2% 18.1% 59.8% 36.9% 48.8% 41.6% 7.1% 22.3% 47.4% 42.6%
0.2 55.9% 26.1% 7.6% 14.9% 56.9% 30.7% 50.7% 36.9% 7.5% 19.8% 49.5% 38.9%
0.3 50.9% 19.7% 7.2% 11.6% 52.1% 24.3% 49.8% 34.0% 7.3% 17.8% 48.6% 36.1%
0.4 39.2% 14.9% 5.3% 8.1% 41.9% 19.0% 44.2% 29.4% 6.3% 14.4% 44.6% 31.7%
0.5 39.1% 13.6% 5.2% 7.1% 42.2% 18.0% 41.7% 28.1% 5.9% 13.4% 41.8% 30.1%
0.6 40.4% 12.3% 5.4% 6.9% 44.0% 17.1% 41.2% 26.7% 6.2% 13.0% 42.5% 29.2%
0.7 42.6% 13.2% 5.4% 7.0% 45.8% 18.1% 42.3% 28.5% 6.2% 14.1% 42.3% 30.5%
0.8 41.2% 12.2% 5.4% 7.5% 44.1% 16.9% 38.4% 26.6% 5.6% 12.6% 38.8% 28.5%
0.9 37.9% 10.8% 5.2% 7.0% 40.7% 15.2% 37.7% 26.2% 5.1% 11.8% 38.5% 28.1%
5
1.0 37.0% 10.5% 5.0% 7.2% 40.4% 15.0% 38.9% 25.6% 5.5% 11.6% 39.7% 27.7%
0.1 60.2% 30.7% 8.3% 15.7% 60.8% 35.0% 50.8% 43.3% 7.5% 23.0% 44.3% 28.9%
0.2 54.0% 23.3% 7.5% 12.3% 56.0% 28.1% 49.3% 35.5% 7.3% 18.6% 37.7% 24.5%
0.3 47.0% 18.5% 6.3% 9.5% 48.9% 22.9% 48.4% 32.7% 7.1% 16.8% 35.0% 22.9%
0.4 43.4% 16.4% 5.7% 7.5% 45.7% 20.7% 44.1% 28.9% 6.3% 13.7% 31.1% 20.5%
0.5 38.9% 13.6% 5.0% 6.7% 41.9% 17.9% 39.4% 27.3% 5.7% 12.1% 29.4% 19.7%
0.6 34.5% 11.8% 4.4% 5.5% 37.9% 15.9% 38.0% 25.3% 5.7% 11.6% 27.5% 18.7%
0.7 35.4% 10.0% 4.8% 5.6% 39.5% 14.6% 38.3% 24.6% 5.6% 11.2% 26.7% 18.3%
0.8 37.2% 10.8% 5.0% 6.1% 41.3% 15.5% 37.4% 24.8% 5.4% 11.4% 27.1% 18.4%
0.9 35.9% 10.7% 4.4% 6.9% 40.1% 15.2% 36.9% 25.7% 4.9% 11.5% 27.9% 18.8%
10
1.0 35.6% 10.0% 4.5% 7.1% 40.0% 14.6% 38.1% 26.1% 5.1% 11.9% 28.4% 19.0%
5.5.1.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we introduce the results of the five baseline methods and our method.
Mainly, we divide the results into two parts where the first one shows the performance
of the five baseline methods and the second part discusses the results of our method.
We evaluate the performance of the five baseline retrieval methods (RN, RAA, OAA,
RPT, and OPT) by applying each method on each hashtag in our data-set. Averaged
over all hashtags, we observe in Table 5.3 that the recent age account retrieval (RAA)
method has a superior performance in terms of precision, recall, and NDCG, compared
to the rest four baseline methods. For RAA method, the 19.9% value of P@100 can be
interpreted in two ways: (i) the number of spam accounts retrieved (ranked based on
accounts’ age) in the top 100 accounts is 20; (ii) or the probability to retrieve a spam
account in the top 100 is about 19.9%. The recall@100 values of all baseline methods
are not at the same level as precision@100 values. Indeed, the low values of recall are
because of the huge number of spam accounts existing in our collection. This interpreta-
tion can be ensured by the significant increasing in the recall@500 values of all baselines
where more spam accounts can be found at rank 500. However, the recall values of all
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Table 5.5: Performance results of the screen name and user name attribute-based spam queries
for retrieving spam accounts, experimented at various classification threshold (D)
and at different values of K 2 {2, 5, 10} as a number of communities, in terms of
Precision@{100, 500}, Recall@{100, 500, 2000}, and NDCG@{100, 500}, when includ-
ing the prior probability component in the designed retrieval model.
Screen-name pattern User-name pattern
K D P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 R@2000 NDCG@100 NDCG@500 P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 R@2000 NDCG@100 NDCG@500
0.1 56.0% 34.7% 7.8% 20.2% 78.3% 56.7% 38.2% 48.6% 42.3% 7.1% 23.2% 80.6% 47.1% 43.2%
0.2 52.5% 26.0% 7.1% 14.4% 77.3% 53.3% 30.1% 49.6% 38.7% 7.3% 20.8% 78.3% 48.3% 40.2%
0.3 49.5% 20.9% 6.7% 12.0% 75.3% 51.2% 25.4% 48.9% 34.7% 7.3% 18.1% 76.3% 48.1% 36.7%
0.4 45.7% 19.2% 6.0% 9.8% 72.5 46.9% 23.2% 47.3% 32.6% 7.0% 16.6% 74.5% 47.3% 34.9%
0.5 46.1% 17.2% 6.0% 8.5% 70.4% 47.8% 21.7% 47.4% 30.9% 7.0% 15.1% 71.4% 46.7% 33.1%
0.6 43.5% 14.1% 5.4% 6.9% 69.3% 46.4% 18.9% 43.8% 29.2% 6.4% 14.0% 70.5% 44.3% 31.4%
0.7 42.2% 12.6% 5.3% 6.5% 67.4% 45.2% 17.5% 42.0% 27.6% 6.4% 13.7% 68.3% 42.9% 29.9%
0.8 38.5% 11.2% 4.9% 6.1% 65.2% 41.6% 15.7% 41.3% 27.2% 6.1% 13.1% 67.3% 41.6% 29.2%
0.9 37.2% 10.4% 4.8% 6.0% 63.4% 40.6% 14.9% 36.8% 26.1% 5.1% 11.8% 66.2% 37.8% 28.0%
2
1.0 37.3% 10.4% 4.9% 6.2% 62.5% 40.5% 14.9% 36.6% 25.9% 4.9% 11.5% 65.3% 37.4% 27.7%
0.1 59.8% 32.1% 8.3% 17.2% 77.3% 60.0% 36.1% 49.7% 41.9% 7.2% 22.9% 79.4% 47.7% 42.8%
0.2 53.3% 23.7% 7.4% 13.0% 76.5% 53.9% 28.0% 50.8% 37.6% 7.6% 19.6% 78.3% 49.6% 39.4%
0.3 49.7% 21.0% 6.7% 10.8% 75.4% 51.0% 25.3% 48.5% 34.8% 7.2% 18.1% 77.3% 47.6% 36.8%
0.4 42.9% 16.5% 5.5% 8.0% 74.5% 45.5% 20.8% 45.3% 30.6% 6.7% 15.0% 76.4% 45.6% 32.9%
0.5 42.5% 13.2% 5.3% 6.6% 73.7% 44.0% 17.6% 42.1% 29.0% 6.2% 13.5% 75.3% 42.3% 31.0%
0.6 39.7% 12.3% 5.1% 6.6% 72.5% 41.7% 16.7% 43.8% 28.0% 6.4% 13.2% 74.3% 43.7% 30.2%
0.7 41.4% 11.3% 5.4% 6.6% 70.3% 43.7% 16.0% 42.3% 26.9% 6.3% 12.9% 72.4% 42.5% 29.1%
0.8 39.1% 10.7% 5.0% 6.2% 68.4% 41.7% 15.2% 40.9% 26.6% 6.0% 12.4% 70.4% 41.3% 28.8%
0.9 39.6% 11.3% 5.1% 6.9% 66.5% 42.7% 16.0% 36.2% 25.9% 4.9% 11.5% 68.8% 37.3% 27.7%
5
1.0 36.8% 11.0% 4.4% 6.7% 64..4% 40.5% 15.6% 38.1% 25.7% 5.0% 11.4% 67.3% 39.0% 27.8%
0.1 58.5% 30.2% 7.9% 15.6% 76.3% 59.6% 34.5% 49.1% 41.8% 7.1% 22.3% 78.3% 47.7% 42.9%
0.2 54.2% 22.5% 7.3% 12.0% 75.4% 55.7% 27.4% 50.1% 38.1% 7.4% 20.0% 77.3% 48.9% 39.7%
0.3 48.9% 18.9% 6.4% 9.7% 73.5% 51.1% 23.7% 48.3% 33.5% 7.1% 16.9% 75.3% 47.7% 35.7%
0.4 43.6% 14.7% 5.8% 7.4% 72.2% 46.2% 19.4% 46.5% 31.1% 6.8% 15.1% 74.4% 46.3% 33.3%
0.5 39.2% 12.4% 5.1% 6.3% 71.5% 42.2% 16.9% 43.5% 29.8% 6.2% 13.9% 73.2% 44.0% 32.0%
0.6 36.7% 10.3% 4.8% 5.8% 70.3% 39.6% 14.7% 43.5% 27.6% 6.2% 13.1% 71.9% 44.0% 30.0%
0.7 39.6% 12.2% 5.0% 6.1% 67.4% 42.9% 16.8% 42.2% 26.7% 6.1% 12.5% 68.3% 42.2% 28.9%
0.8 38.5% 10.5% 5.1% 6.2% 65.4% 41.1% 14.9% 40.9% 27.3% 5.8% 12.7% 67.4% 41.4% 29.4%
0.9 38.5% 10.7% 5.2% 6.5% 64.6% 40.9% 15.1% 38.9% 27.4% 5.4% 12.3% 65.3% 39.9% 29.4%
10
1.0 35.6% 9.6% 4.4% 5.5% 62.5% 38.3% 13.8% 39.8% 26.7% 5.2% 11.9% 63.1% 40.7% 28.9%
baseline methods are not satisfactory and adoptable for retrieving all spam accounts in
the collection. More precisely, the best recall@500 is obtained by RAA method which
has retrieved no more than 2,200 spam accounts available in our data-set. The behav-
ior of baseline methods in regards of NDCG metric is almost similar to the precision
metric. The strength of the NDCG metric is in giving weight for each account retrieved
based on its position in the list (i.e., top position =) highest weight). The 19.5% of
NDCG@100 of RAA baseline method gives an indication that the spam accounts re-
trieved are not in the top 80 accounts. Overall, the performance results obtained by the
five baseline methods draw the following conclusions: (i) the results of RAA method
ensure the validity of a strong hypothesis that spam accounts are recent in age; (ii) the
recall values of the five methods are not satisfactory to adopt them in retrieving spam
accounts at all.
In producing the experimental results of our method, the procedure described in 5.5.1.1
subsection is performed on each hashtag in the data-set used, with averaging the re-
sults over the number of hashtags. We perform two main experiments to provide more
insights into the impact of screen name and user name attributes in retrieving spam ac-
counts. In Table 5.4, we report the evaluation results of the both attributes, experimented
at different classification thresholds D and at finite set of number of communities K,
when excluding the prior probability (i.e., acting as uniform distribution) component
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of the retrieval ranking model introduced in equation 5.13. The other Table 5.5 shows
the results of our method when considering the prior component probability of the
retrieval ranking model. As an external comparison with the baseline methods, our
approach has superior performance in retrieving spam accounts either when consid-
ering screen name or user name attributes, or when excluding or including the prior
probability component. As an internal comparison, there is a complete consistency, in
Tables 5.4 and 5.5, showing that 0.1 is almost the optimal classification threshold in
terms of the performance metrics. We don’t report the results of the threshold when
be less than 0.1 since no spam community have been identified. The optimal threshold
value, 0.1, ensures our hypothesis that the distribution of patterns in a spam commu-
nity follows non-uniform distribution. Also, we find that increasing the classification
threshold implies to classify communities as spam where they are truly not spam ones.
Consequently, this misclassification at community level produces spam queries which
are non-spam at all. Indeed, this explains the degradation in the performance results
when increasing the classification threshold. The effect of number of communities K is
obvious in improving precision@100, recall@100, and NDCG@100 metrics. We associate
this increasing with the number of spam bots that had attacked the considered 100
hashtags. More precisely, when a hashtag is attacked by 10 different spam bots, the low
values of K cannot provide all possible spam queries, and thus not all spam accounts
might be retrieved. On contrary, we observe that the increasing in the number of com-
munities decreases the precision@500, recall@500, and NDCG@500 metrics. We explain
this behavior because of the existence non-spam accounts having partial matching with
the spammy patterns of either screen name or user name attributes.
Obviously, according to the results, none of the both attributes has superior perfor-
mance compared to each other. For instance, the spammy patterns of screen name at-
tribute perform better than the spammy patterns of user name attribute in terms of
precision@100, recall@100, and NDCG@100. However, considering the prior probabil-
ity in the retrieval model increases the values of the retrieval metrics, explaining why
we have computed the recall@2000 in this part of results only. The selection among
screen name and user name attributes in performing the retrieval process is completely
dependent on the size of the list that contains the potential spam accounts (e.g 100,
500, 2000). Indeed, the high recall values @2000 are the most important ones since they
show the number of spam accounts that have been retrieved when using our simple
retrieval model. In other words, having about 80% recall@2000means that around 1,600
spam accounts existing in the top 2,000 ranked accounts per hashtag, and 108,000 for
all hashtags. In case of the false positive classification is not important, the first ranked
2,000 accounts can be directly classified as spam accounts, leading to have new data-set
consisting of around 1,400,000 accounts with about 30,000 spam accounts that are not
appeared in the ranked lists.
5.5.2 Account-based Features
5.5.2.1 Experimental Setup
Performance Metrics. As the ground truth class label about each user is available, we
exploit the accuracy, precision, recall, F-measure, average precision, average recall, and
average F-measure, computed according to the confusion matrix of Weka tool [60], as
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commonly used metrics in classification problems. As our problem is two-class (binary)
classification, we compute the precision, recall, and F-measure for the "spammer" class,
while the average metrics combine the both classes based on the ratio of each class (e.g.,
4.9% * "spammer precision" + 95.1% * legitimate user precision" ).
Baselines. We define two baselines to compare our method with them: (i) baseline
"A" which represents the results when classifying all users as legitimate users di-
rectly without doing any kind of classification; (ii) and baselines "B" and "C" re-
flect the results when using the account user and content features that have been
introduced in the literature, respectively. We adopt 77 of state-of-the-art features
listed in Table A.1, distributed among user, content, timing, and geographic fea-
tures [100, 162, 7, 58, 140, 129, 164, 161, 161, 141, 6, 99, 88], listed as: Number of
tweets,Verified user,Verified user, Existence of Spam words in the screen-name at-
tribute,Number of lists, Default account image,Geo-enabled, Screen-Name length,
Profile description length, URL in profile description, Number of spam words in the
account description, Time weighted profile description similarity, Number of men-
tions, Number of unique mentions, Number of mentions per tweet, Number of nu-
meric characters per tweet, Unsolicited mentions ratio, Number of replied to, Number
of user’s replies, Ratio of replied tweets, Number of tweets received from followees,
URL ratio, Tweets Similarity, Time weighted Tweets similarity, Number of words per
tweet, Duplicated Tweets, Number of Hashtags, Max Hashtag frequency, Mentions
ratio, Unique mentions ratio, Unique URLs ratio, Interaction rate, Cosine similar-
ity, Hashtaged tweets ratio, Avg Hashtags per tweet, Retweeted tweets ratio, Average
tweet length, Number of URLs, Number of unique URLs, URL repetition frequency,
Average number of spam words, Average number of hashtags per word, Average
number of URLs per word, Hijacking Topics, Intersection with trending topics, Du-
plicated do- main names ratio, IP-to-Domain ratio, URL and Tweet Similarity, One-
gram characters, Number of favorites, Number of retweets, Ratio of retweeted tweets,
User sentiment index, Mean tweets similarity, Number of Hashtaged tweets, Hash-
tags density, Hashtags density, Links density, User’s personality, Part-of-speech tag-
ging, Hashtag diversity, URL diversity, Mentions diversity, Average number of char-
acters, Country changes per month, Speed limit per month, Mean speed, Max speed,
Unique countries per month, Tweets time distribution, Hashtags posting behaviour
similarity, URLs posting behaviour similarity, and Mentions posting behaviour simi-
larity. We avoid the comparison with the graph features because of the huge number of
information needed from Twitter’s servers to extract them, requiring months to collect
these information.
Balanced Data-sets. It is obvious that our data-set is imbalanced in the class label dis-
tribution where the ratio of social spammers class is less than 3%. In fact, conventional
supervised machine learning algorithms are often biased towards the majority class
[138]. The biasing problem happens because the loss functions of these algorithms at-
tempt to optimize quantities such as error rate without taking the distribution of classes
into consideration. In our problem, the worst case happens when the minority class
(social spammers) examples are treated as outliers with respect to the majority class
(legitimate users). Thus, these learning algorithms simply generate trivial classifiers
that classify every example as the majority class. The recommended solution for such a
problem is performing either oversampling or undersampling as a preprocessing step
[138]. However, applying oversampling method is not suitable in our case since to make
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the data-set balanced, we have to increase the number of social spammer examples to
around 400,000 and thus the over-fitting problem might easily occur. Hence, we adopt
the undersampling approach to have a balance data-set. In order to utilize all labeled
examples, we have created 35 ⇡ 409,17011,451 sub-datasets where each one has 22, 902 exam-
ples distributed equally between the social spammer and legitimate user classes. In all
of these sub-datasets, we have used the same social spammer examples without dupli-
cating legitimate user examples across the sub-datasets.
Learning Algorithms. In experimenting the performance of our features and the state-
of-the-art ones, we use f ive supervised machine learning algorithms widely adopted
in building binary classification models for Twitter social spam detection. These algo-
rithms are: Naive Bayes, Random Forest with #Trees 2 {100, 500, 1000}, J48 with Confi-
dence Factor CF 2 {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}, K-nearest neighbor with K 2 {2, 5, 10}, and support
vector machine (SVM) with radial basis function kernel (RBF) and g 2 {0.5, 1.0}. We
select these parameters since they have direct impact on producing high performance
classification models, with taking the over-fitting problem into the consideration. We
use Weka tool [60] as an implementation for these algorithms.
Experiments Procedure. For each type of features (User, Content, and our Behavioral)
and for a particular learning algorithm (Naive Bayes, Random Forest, J48, K-NN, or
SVM ), we perform the following steps: (i) we extract the selected type of features from
each sub-dataset, producing 35 (number of sub-datasets) feature spaces; (ii) we apply
10-fold cross validation on each feature space using the learning algorithm chosen, re-
sulting 35 confusion matrices; (iii) finally, we compute the final performance metrics for
the chosen features type using the summation of the 35 confusion matrices, avoiding
the computation of the variance across the 35 sub-datasets.
5.5.2.2 Experimental Results
Baseline Results. The results of the three baselines are reported in Table 5.6. The base-
line "A" has accuracy of 50% because all social spammer examples have been classified
as legitimate users in sub-dataset of the 35 sub-datasets. Thus, in such a case, the pre-
cision, recall, and F-measure of social spammer class are "0.0%" since no account is
classified as a social spammer at all. This baseline is easy to be bypassed in all met-
rics when using supervised learning methods. For instance, the baseline "B" of the 12
user features (Number of tweets,Verified user,Verified user, Existence of Spam words
in the screen-name attribute,Number of lists, Default account image,Geo-enabled,
Screen-Name length, Profile description length, URL in profile description, Number
of spam words in the account description, Time weighted profile description similar-
ity, and Number of mentions) has performance of 69,4% of accuracy as a best result
when applying Random Forest learning method with #Trees = 1000, compared to the
other learning methods. We expect this behavior from Random Forest since it creates
various classification models through constructing a multitude of decision trees (e.g,
1,000). However, in terms of precision metric, SVM has better performance than other
learning methods. According to the low recalls and high precisions of social spammer
class, the SVM method has effectively modeled very small sets of social spammer class
examples, the rest of examples has been modeled as legitimate users. Moreover, the
average precision of SVM is lower than the precision of social spammer class by about
24%. We interpret this behavior because our method followed in annotating our data-
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Table 5.6: Performance results of the three baselines, our behavioral features, and the combina-
tion of user+content+behavioral features when applying the five mentioned machine
learning algorithms in terms of different performance metrics.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Avg. Precision Avg. Recall Avg. F-measure
Baseline (A): All Users Labeled as Legitimate Users
— 50,0% 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Baseline (B): User Features
Naive Bayes 57,7 % 63,8 % 35,6 % 45,7 % 59,6 % 57,7 % 58,6 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 65,4 % 65,2 % 60,4 % 62,7 % 65,8 % 65,4 % 65,6 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 67,1 % 66,5 % 63,5 % 65,0 % 67,3 % 67,1 % 67,2 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 69,4 % 68,4 % 65,4 % 66,9 % 68,1 % 69,4 % 68,7 %
K-NN(K=2) 60,4 % 72,7 % 45,5 % 56,0 % 66,5 % 60,4 % 63,3 %
K-NN(K=5) 62,8 % 67,1 % 64,4 % 65,7 % 66,4 % 62,8 % 64,5 %
K-NN(K=10) 66,5 % 71,6 % 58,8 % 64,6 % 68,3 % 66,5 % 67,4 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 62,1 % 72,1 % 63,5 % 67,5 % 69,8 % 62,1 % 65,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 61,2 % 70,5 % 62,4 % 66,2 % 68,4 % 61,2 % 64,6 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 60,5 % 70,3 % 62,2 % 66,0 % 68,2 % 60,5 % 64,1 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 51,0 % 98,8 % 2,0 % 3,9 % 74,6 % 51,0 % 60,6 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 52,1 % 97,8 % 4,0 % 7,7 % 74,6 % 52,1 % 61,4 %
Baseline (C): Content Features
Naive Bayes 55,6 % 65,2 % 24,0 % 35,1 % 59,3 % 55,6 % 57,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 66,2 % 67,3 % 58,1 % 62,4 % 66,6 % 66,2 % 66,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 67,4 % 68,5 % 59,3 % 63,6 % 67,4 % 67,4 % 67,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 68,3 % 69,3 % 60,5 % 64,6 % 69,2 % 68,3 % 68,7 %
K-NN(K=2) 61,2 % 69,0 % 40,5 % 51,0 % 63,5 % 61,2 % 62,3 %
K-NN(K=5) 61,4 % 62,3 % 57,8 % 60,0 % 61,5 % 61,4 % 61,4 %
K-NN(K=10) 62,3 % 66,9 % 48,9 % 56,5 % 63,3 % 62,3 % 62,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 60,7 % 61,4 % 57,4 % 59,3 % 60,7 % 60,7 % 60,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 59,7 % 60,1 % 57,6 % 58,8 % 59,7 % 59,7 % 59,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 59,6 % 60,0 % 57,5 % 58,7 % 59,6 % 59,6 % 59,6 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 51,8 % 89,9 % 4,1 % 7,8 % 70,4 % 51,8 % 59,7 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 53,2 % 90,4 % 5,3 % 10,0 % 72,6 % 53,2 % 61,4 %
Behavioral (Our) Features
Naive Bayes 62 % 66,2 % 9,3 % 16,3 % 57,6 % 52,0 % 54,7 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 68,3 % 72,5 % 56,6 % 63,6 % 61,4 % 61,3 % 61,3 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 72,5 % 76,4 % 64,5 % 69,9 % 64,6 % 72,5 % 68,3 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 78,5 % 78,6 % 67,8 % 72,8 % 67,4 % 78,5 % 72,5 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 68,8 % 70,9 % 69,5 % 70,2 % 59,1 % 58,8 % 58,9 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 69,7 % 70,8 % 68,8 % 69,8 % 59,0 % 58,7 % 58,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 74,7 % 70,8 % 68,8 % 69,8 % 59,0 % 58,7 % 58,8 %
K-NN(K=2) 67,2 % 72,9 % 55,4 % 63,0 % 58,9 % 57,2 % 58,0 %
K-NN(K=5) 69,7 % 68 % 65,8 % 66,9 % 57,7 % 57,7 % 57,7 %
K-NN(K=10) 71,7 % 71,5 % 66,4 % 68,9 % 59,2 % 58,7 % 58,9 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 65,4 % 72,3 % 67,4 % 69,8 % 60,0 % 59,4 % 59,7 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 67,4 % 73,1 % 65,5 % 69,1 % 60,2 % 59,4 % 59,8 %
Baseline (B)+Baseline (C)+Behavioral (Our) Features
Naive Bayes 56,5 % 68,4 % 24,3 % 35,9 % 61,2 % 56,5 % 58,8 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 70,3 % 73,7 % 63,2 % 68,0 % 70,8 % 70,3 % 70,5 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 72,5 % 75,6 % 65,8 % 70,4 % 73,5 % 72,5 % 73,0 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 76,5 % 76,3 % 67,5 % 71,6 % 74,5 % 76,5 % 75,5 %
K-NN(K=2) 61,8 % 70,7 % 40,3 % 51,3 % 64,5 % 61,8 % 63,1 %
K-NN(K=5) 63,5 % 64,9 % 58,9 % 61,8 % 63,6 % 63,5 % 63,5 %
K-NN(K=10) 64,3 % 69,6 % 50,8 % 58,7 % 65,4 % 64,3 % 64,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 63,9 % 64,2 % 62,9 % 63,5 % 63,9 % 63,9 % 63,9 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,4 % 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,3 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 50,3 % 99,3 % 0,6 % 1,2 % 74,7 % 50,3 % 60,1 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 52,4 % 97,5 % 1,4 % 2,8 % 76,4 % 52,4 % 62,2 %
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set is not too precise from legitimate users class view (i.e., not all legitimate users are
truly legitimate users). The Naive Bayes learning method does not have an acceptable
performance, especially in recalling social spammers (35.6%). On the other side, the av-
erage recall value of Naive Bayes, 57.7% , shows that the method can recall about 80%
of legitimate users.
The results of the third baseline ,"C", when using 55 content features exploited in the
literature are worse than the user features in terms of all metrics. Although of the great
number of content features, their performance shows that the content features designed
in the literature cannot effectively model the behavior of social spammers. Also, in our
case, the combination of weak features has not produced a strong classification model.
This behavior occurs probably because of possible correlation among features. Similarly
to the results of baseline "B", the Random Forest with #Trees = 1000 is almost the best
one in all metrics.
Behavioral Features Results. Our behavioral features proposed in this chapter, which
are 10 features (one by Writing Style Similarity, one by Language Model-Based
Tweets Similarity, four by Posting Behavior, and four by Posting Diversity), perform
better than the three baselines ("A","B","C") in most performance metrics. As expected,
Random Forest has a classification accuracy more than 78%. As SVM has the highest
social spammer class precision and almost the lowest recall, using the F-measure metric
is the right way to compare with other baselines since this metric combines the preci-
sion and recall metrics. Thus, compared to the other baselines, the F-measure of our
behavioral features is higher than other two kinds of features by 5% ⇠ 7%. Differently
from baselines’ results, the performance of SVM when using our features is completely
different at the recall level. The use of RBF (Gaussian) kernel with g of 0.5 gives an
indication that the distribution of our features for social spammer class might be corre-
lated with the Gaussian distribution and thus such a knowledge might help in building
unsupervised advanced models like Gaussian mixture model. Finally, the results of our
features ensure our hypothesis about the need to focus on designing features that model
the behavior of social spammers.
All Features Results. To provide more insights into the performance of our features,
we report the results when using our features with the user and content features. Un-
fortunately, we observe a slight degradation in the accuracy, recall and F-measure of
social spammer class, while we expect the opposite behavior exactly. In the machine
learning world, this phenomenon appears when the classification model over-fits the
input data. In other words, the increasing of the features dimension has separated well
the examples of both classes. However, separating well examples of different classes
is not always something perfect since the learning algorithms build a model for some
examples while those examples are truly noise.
False Positive v.s. High Quality. As our main problem has a direct relation with the
information quality field, it is necessary to discuss the results from quality point of
view. As known in the spam email filtering, the efforts are directed towards the false
positive problem that occurs when a truly "non-spam" email is classified as "spam".
However, in the context of social spam, the false positive problem is less important
because of the availability of large-scale data collections, meaning that classifying "non-
spam" account as a "spam" one is not a serious and relevant problem to worry about.
Thus, the attention is turned in social networks context to increase the quality of data
where a wide range of Twitter based applications (e.g., tweets summarization) has a
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high priority to work on noise-free collections. For choosing the appropriate model that
can effectively filter out spam accounts, the recall of social spammer class is the right
metric that must be considered at models selection step. Thus, the J48 with confidence
factor of 0.1 produces the best model which gives the highest recall when leveraging our
10 behavioral features. F-measure of social spammer class comes after the recall metric
since it considers both recall and precision in the computation. In the case of F-measure
metric, the classification model that is produced by the Random Forest learning method
with #Trees = 1000 when adopting our 10 behavioral features.
As the computational time aspect is significant when targeting large-scale collections,
the extraction of our features is completely suitable to process large-scale collections
with providing high quality collections. For instance, the time required to process our
Twitter data-set is no more than few hours, distributed between crawling data from
Twitter (Top 100 tweets) and features extraction, and predicting the class label of each
account using an already learned classification model. Although of our features are
suitable for handling large-scale collections, they are not suitable for real-time detec-
tion because of the need for information from Twitter’s servers to process each Twitter
account (user).
5.6 Conclusion
We have discussed in this chapter the issue of IQ when targeting big data collections of
OSM information. We have proposed a spam query generation and retrieval model that
aims to reduce and narrow the search space of suspected accounts that require further
and advanced filtering. In generating the spam queries, we have leveraged the available
meta-data in social information posts (e.g tweets) for discovering spammy patterns
adopted in establishing various spam accounts. We have discussed ability of screen-
name and username meta-data attributes in generating spam queries relevant to them.
Experiments have shown the ability of these two simple meta-data in providing effective
information for recalling spam accounts and thus tweets, speeding-up the processing
of big data collection through handling part of the collection in an advanced way. With
the ranked lists of accounts that are produced by the retrieval, we have introduced a
new small set of effective behavioral features that require few information for extraction.
The experiments, in terms of different metrics, have demonstrated the performance of
our behavioral features, compared to 77 of state-of-the-art feature forming the strong
baseline.

6
CONCLUS ION
A conclusion is simply the place where you got tired of thinking.
— Edsger Dijkstra
6.1 Contributions
The work presented in this thesis is brought into the context of IQ in OSM, representing
a hot and challenging research field with the great growth of information on social me-
dia sites as well as the large number of researches and applications that are interested
in leveraging social information. In particular, we address, on the first hand, the prob-
lem of applying IQ process in real-time data streaming, and on the second hand, the
problem of analyzing the quality of crawled (or collected) big data social information.
For this purpose, we provide an overview of IQ approaches in the domain of OSM sites
in which users generate and circulate different forms of UGC. Also, we present in de-
tails f ive of well known IQ problems that appear on OSM sites, studied and analyzed
with respect to 16 IQ dimensions, where social spam problem is the most bad phenom-
ena appearing on social media sites according to the reported statistics. The previous
approaches introduced for tackling social spam in both real-time and big data have
applied machine learning methods with a great attention dedicated for Twitter social
service. The review of the state-of-the-art social spam detection in Twitter has revealed
different research questions that deal with (i) the real-time social spam detection, (ii) the
information validation with other OSM sites for social spam detection, (iii) the robust-
ness and applicability of sequential data learning methods in social spam detection, (iv)
and the applicability of information retrieval concepts in handling social spam problem
in big data collection. These questions have been addressed by two social spam mod-
els proposed in this thesis where one model is dedicated for real-time spam detection
in Twitter stream, while the other is designed for speeding-up the processing of big
crawled Twitter data. Our contributions are summarized in the following:
• The collective-based analysis concept provides a great ability to robustly identify
spam contents, despite the high dynamicity of social spammers’ behaviors. Based
on this idea, we propose a real-time spam detection framework consisting of two
main components: (i) collective-based unsupervised predictive model; (ii) opera-
tional real-time spam tweet filtering. The main functionalities of the first compo-
nent are in : (1) storing the streamed tweets based on defined information entities
in a data storage, (2) performing different levels of unsupervised clustering as a
part of collective-based analysis, (3) extracting a number of cluster-based features
that have a high discriminative classification power, (4) leveraging the annotations
of clusters for providing annotated data-sets of tweets, (5) and exploiting the anno-
tated tweets for periodically retraining real-time spam tweet detection model. The
effectiveness of the designed cluster-based features is in the exploitation of the
existing meta-data information of streamed tweets, without a need for retrieving
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further information for Twitter servers. One of the cluster-based features performs
a kind of information validation with other social network, opening a new pioneer
approach in addressing the IQ problems in OSM. Based on the hypothesis of cor-
relation among tweets when streaming them in a sequential way, Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) is formulated and designed for building a classification model for
real-time spam detection, as a method widely adopted in sequential data learning
algorithms. The second component uses the updated and latest version of the re-
trained classification model by the first component for filtering the input stream
of tweets. Experiments on our crawled and annotated Twitter data-set consisting
of millions of tweets show that our framework has the ability to provide classi-
fication models outperforming traditional real-time spam detection approaches.
Furthermore, they highlight the strong failure of adopting once-trained classifi-
cation models, ensuring the hypothesis about the high dynamicity and evolution
of social spammers. Moreover, results show the usefulness of leveraging external
information of other social networks such as Facebook in detecting spam tweets
and identifying spam clusters.
• Identifying spam patterns adopted in publishing spam content can be viewed as
a heuristic information for providing a candidate set of suspected spam entities
(e.g., account, and tweet). According to this hypothesis, we propose an approach
for speeding-up the IQ analysis when targeting big data collection of a social in-
formation entity (e.g., account, tweet). The approach leverages the information
retrieval concept so that a set of spam queries are being generated in an unsuper-
vised way for using them in the retrieval process by which a ranked list of candi-
date suspected accounts is retrieved. As the OSM data is often structured through
defining a set of meta-data, username and screen-name meta-data of Twitter ac-
counts are involved in the retrieval process so that the spam queries are generated
for these two common attributes. In generating the spam queries, an unsupervised
community detection method is exploited for discovering correlated communities
containing spam accounts that have a common naming patterns in filling the two
account-based attributes. The candidate set that results by the retrieval part re-
quires further investigation to provide an accurate decision about each account
being retrieved. For this purpose, we introduce a design of ten account-based fea-
tures that focus on analyzing the behavior of users in posting content on their
accounts where the intuition behind the design of these features is inspired by
Twitter’s rules in fighting spam problem as well as thousands of different true ex-
amples of spam accounts, with taking into the account the problem of scalability.
Experimental evaluation conduction over a large data-set of Twitter accounts and
tweets show that the information retrieval concept is applicable for reducing the
search space from millions to thousands of accounts that require advanced quality
checking, outperforming f ive baseline methods. Also, the performance results of
the account-based features outperform the performance of 77 features introduced
in the state-of-the-art, which allow to conclude that the nature and design of the
features are the key point in detecting spam accounts.
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6.2 Discussion
With the introduced approaches in this thesis, the IQ problems, in particular social
spam, are endless as the game of cat and mice. We believe that the solution of IQ
problems must be provided by the administrators of OSM sites through spending more
efforts and potentials in reducing the problems. More precisely, we believe that the elim-
ination of IQ problems starts by developing the security of the social websites, through
preventing and limiting the features that might be misused by ill-intentioned users. For
instance, Twitter allows a single user to create and activate thousands of accounts in
a day without imposing any constraints or conditions on such behavior, opening the
way for ill-intentioned users to misuse Twitter’s services. On the other hand, Facebook
prevents such bad behaviors by requesting true email and phone number verification
process.
With the lack of standard data-sets for social spam detection tasks, the real perfor-
mances of whole proposed methods in the state-of-the-art remain debatable. The avail-
ability of standard data-sets makes the comparison with other approaches more com-
prehensive and consistent. Although of the big data of social information that we have
worked on, the main drawback is that the adopted data-sets in performing the experi-
ments are not noise-free ones because of the nature of the method leveraged in having
the ground-truth of both accounts and tweets.
Our proposed solutions, in this thesis, have been experimented and evaluated on Twit-
ter data-sets only. One might this as a drawback; however, we adopt it because of its
wide use in large number of researches and applications. Also, Twitter is a very suitable
environment for examining solutions that require real-time posting mechanism. More-
over, Twitter provides great data accessibility and crawling functionalities in terms of
REST APIs where no other popular social service provides. With the structural diver-
gence of OSM sites, our solutions might be applied on other social information differing
from Twitter through understanding first the elements, entities, and structure of the tar-
get social network, and then performing mapping at meta-data levels. For instance, the
retweet action in Twitter corresponds to the share action on Facebook.
6.3 Perspectives
With respect to the challenges of having high quality UGC in OSM introduced in chap-
ter 1, we have addressed in this thesis the challenges of data volume, service limitations
and constraints, and in somehow the subjectivity and objectivity issues. In future work
and from a global perspective of view, we plan to investigate: (a) the structural diver-
gence and heterogeneity of OSM sites, (b) and UGC format diversity. In particular, our
social spam filtering methods proposed in this thesis will be extend in more abstractive
way to cover other social networks. Although of having a generic method is too chal-
lenging; however, the high possibility of finding entities having same semantic at the
functional level increases the chance to have such a method. Interestingly, motivated
by our method that performs collaboration with Facebook, having generic social spam
detection model has a great benefit in increasing the detection rate of low quality con-
tent due to the cross-information validation among social media sites. Regarding the
problem of UGC format diversity, we plan to design a multi-modal model that allows
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to fuses information coming from different materials such as videos, and images for
detecting social spam where such a model increases the detection robustness of social
spammers and their content.
As the IQ problems in OSM are not limited to social spam, we plan to provide another
generic model that can cover all IQ problems together. Indeed, the characteristics of
each IQ problem with respect to the IQ dimensions illustrated in chapter 2 might be
leveraged in designing the target model. With such a model, we would like to establish
Web platform that aims to check the quality of a given piece of information by user from
different aspects, including the probability of being social spam, and rumor information.
We think that establishing such a portal is important for normal users who don’t have
great experience in technology. Also, we intend to study the correlation of features with
respect to the IQ dimensions where such a study could facilitate the design of classi-
fication model besides to the machine learning algorithms. For instance, the existence
of spam words feature can be categorized into intrinsic IQ category and based on the
definition of this category, it is enough to classify a content as spam directly if it sat-
isfies the condition without looking to other features. More precisely, for this type of
knowledge, machine learning methods might fail in discovering them, leading to have
a degradation in their detection performance.
Additional improvements and evaluations might be performed on our approaches intro-
duced in this thesis. In particular, with the great success, at recall performance metric,
of our framework designed for real-time spam tweet filtering, we plan to improve its
performance through introducing a dynamic feature vector by using Word2Vec method
in an unsupervised way so that the most frequent words, URLs, and mentions adopted
by social spammers are considered as a light feature vector combined with classical
light features. We expect a great improvement at the precision metric of the learning
methods with maintaining same high recall values. In performing community detection,
we do not impose weights on the information matrices and thus their roles in inferring
the communities are same. Hence, we would like to develop the community detection
process through adding free parameter on each term existing in equation 4.6 so that the
optimization process will include these three free parameters. Also, at the clustering
level, we intend to improve the community method through applying it in an recur-
sive way so that when one or more communities are being classified spam with high
confidence the corresponding accounts of the spam communities are removed from the
clustering process with repeating it again. This way of clustering will provide more ac-
curate training data for adapting real-time spam detection models. For the community
classification function, we design it in a simple way so that the whole community-based
features are associated to same threshold D as a global variable; however, we would like
extend the complexity of this function through associating an independent classification
threshold per community feature, increasing the community classification performance.
At the spam query generation, we plan to study the impact of other meta-data in re-
trieving spam accounts.
Appendices
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A
TWITTER -BASED SPAM DETECT ION FEATURES
Table A.1 lists and describes the most common features adopted in building classifica-
tion models for Twitter spam detection problem.
Table A.1: List of all state of the art features adopted in Twitter-based spam detection problem
where each feature is analyzed whether it is suitable for Real-time Detection, and the
number of API Calls for crawling the required information to extract its value.
Index Feature Name Description R C
User Features
1 Number of
tweets
The number of tweets that have been posted by the
Twitter user [18, 54, 104, 71, 156, 109, 101].
3 0
2 Verified user A Boolean indicator showing whether the user is ver-
ified by Twitter [104, 6].
3 0
3 Account age The number of milliseconds spent since the creation
date of the account [18, 25, 104, 6, 109, 101].
3 0
4 Existence of
Spam words in
the screen-name
attribute
A boolean indicator checking whether the screen-
name attribute contains a spam word [129].
3 0
5 Number of lists The number of groups that have listed the considered
user[104, 6, 101].
3 0
6 Default account
image
A boolean indicator checking whether the image of
the user’s profile is the default one [6, 101].
3 0
7 Geo-enabled A boolean indictor showing whether the geographi-
cal location of the user’s account is activated or not
[6].
3 0
8 Screen-Name
length
The length of screen-name attribute of the user [109,
101].
3 0
9 Profile descrip-
tion length
The number of words of the profile description [109]. 3 0
10 URL in profile de-
scription
A boolean indictor stating whether the description of
the user profile has a URL [109].
3 0
11 Number of spam
words in the ac-
count description
The number of spam words existing in the descrip-
tion attribute of the user’s account [101].
3 0
12 Time weighted
profile descrip-
tion similarity
The weighted similarity between the user’s profile
description and other users’ profiles using the ac-
count age difference in weighting [148].
7 1
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Table A.1 continued from previous page
Index Feature Name Description R C
Content Features
13 Number of men-
tions
The number of users that have been mentioned
inside the tweets of the considered Twitter user
[18, 140, 141, 99, 3, 104, 58, 59, 6, 140].
7 1
14 Number of
unique mentions
The size of the unique set of users that have been
mentioned in the user’s tweets [7].
7 1
15 Number of men-
tions per tweet
The total number of mentions in the user’s tweets to
the number of the tweets [101].
7 1
16 Number of nu-
meric characters
per tweet
The ratio of the total number of numeric characters
existing in the user’s tweets to the number of the
user’s tweets [101].
7 1
17 Unsolicited men-
tions ratio
The ratio of the number of users that have been
mentioned in the user’s tweets and not belong to
the user’s followers to the total number of mentions
[7, 58].
7 1
18 Number of
replied to
The number of tweets that Twitter users have replied
to the considered Twitter user [18, 99, 100].
7 1
19 Number of user’s
replies
The number of tweets that contain a reply to other
Twitter users [18, 141, 100, 59, 140].
7 1
20 Ratio of replied
tweets
The ratio of the number of replied tweets to the num-
ber of the user’s tweets [101].
7 >1
21 Number of
tweets received
from followees
The number of tweets that the considered Twitter
user has been mentioned in them from the user’s fol-
lowees [18].
7 >1
22 URL ratio The count of the tweets that contain URLs with re-
spect to the number of the user’s tweets [129, 140,
141, 88, 89, 54, 100, 58, 156, 101].
7 1
23 Tweets Similarity The textual similarity degree among the user’s
tweets [129].
7 1
24 Time weighted
Tweets similarity
The similarity between the user’s tweets with wight-
ing it using the difference time between tweets [148].
7 1
25 Number of
words per tweet
The ratio of the number of words existing in the
user’s tweets to the number of tweets [101].
7 1
26 Duplicated
Tweets
The ratio of tweets that have been duplicated by the
user [140, 141, 140].
7 1
27 Number of Hash-
tags
The number of hashtags that are available in the
user’s tweets[141, 99, 3, 104, 59].
7 1
28 Max Hashtag fre-
quency
The maximum probability value of the probability
distribution of the hashtags mentioned in the user’s
tweets [3].
7 1
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29 Mentions ratio The ratio of the number of mentions in the user’s
tweets [88, 156].
7 1
30 Unique mentions
ratio
The ratio of the number of unique mentions in the
user’s tweets [88].
7 1
31 Unique URLs ra-
tio
The ratio of the number of unique URLs in the user’s
tweets [88, 53, 7, 156, 109].
7 1
32 Interaction rate The ratio of the number of tweets that have been
replied to the user’s followees and followers [89].
7 >1
33 Cosine similarity Average content similarity over all user’s tweets us-
ing the standard cosine similarity over the bag-of-
words vector representation [88, 156].
7 1
34 Hashtaged
tweets ratio
The ratio of the number of the user’s tweets contain-
ing at least one hashtag to the total number of the
user’s tweets [54, 58].
7 1
35 Avg Hashtags
per tweet
The average of the number hashtags existing in each
user’s tweets [54, 109, 101].
7 1
36 Retweeted tweets
ratio
The ratio of the number of retweeted tweets to the
total number of the user’s tweets [54].
7 1
37 Average tweet
length
The average number of characters of the user’s
tweets [99, 25].
7 1
38 Number of URLs The number of URLs existing in the user’s tweets
[99, 53, 3, 104, 59, 140].
7 1
39 Number of
unique URLs
The length of the unique set URLs posted in the
user’s tweets [3].
7 1
40 URL repetition
frequency
The average repetition frequency of a URL posted in
the user’s tweets [3].
7 1
41 Average number
of spam words
The average number of spam words existing in the
user’s tweets [99, 100, 109, 101].
7 1
42 Average number
of hashtags per
word
The average of the number of hashtags per word in
the user’s tweets [101].
7 1
43 Average number
of URLs per
word
The average of the number of URLs per word in the
user’s tweets [101].
7 1
44 Hijacking Topics The cosine similarity between the user’s tweets and
the tweets of topics mentioned in the user’s tweets
[7].
7 >1
45 Intersection with
trending topics
The ratio of the number of trending topics mentioned
in the user’s tweets to the total number of all topics
in the user’s tweets [7].
7 >1
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46 Duplicated do-
main names
ratio
The ratio of the number of unique domains existing
in the user’s tweets to the number of tweets that con-
tain at least one URL [7].
7 1
47 IP-to-Domain ra-
tio
The ratio of the unique IP addresses resolved from
the existing domains in the user’s tweets to the num-
ber of unique domains [7].
7 >1
48 URL and Tweet
Similarity
The cosine similarity between the content of an one
user’s tweet containing URL and the landing URL
page content [7].
7 >1
49 One-gram charac-
ters
The occurrence count of each alphabetical character
in the user’s tweets [104].
7 1
50 Number of
favorites
The total number of tweets that the user has marked
them [104, 71, 6, 101].
7 0
51 Number of
retweets
The sum of the retweeting action that the user’s
tweets have gained by other Twitter users [104, 156,
109].
7 0
52 Ratio of
retweeted tweets
The ratio of the number of tweets that have been
tweeted by at least one user to the total number of
all user’s tweets [58].
3 0
53 User sentiment
index
The ratio of the number of tweets that have either
positive or negative emotion to the total number of
the user’s tweets [58, 109].
7 1
54 Mean tweets sim-
ilarity
The average pairwise tweets similarity based on the
term frequency inverse document frequency [6]
7 1
55 Number of Hash-
taged tweets
The number of tweets that contain at least on hashtag
in the user’s tweets [6].
7 1
56 Hashtags density The number of hashtags in the user’s tweets nor-
malised by the number of the user’s tweets [6].
7 1
57 Tweets with links The number of tweets that contain at least one URL
link [6]
7 1
58 Links density The number of URLs in the user’s tweets normalised
by the number of the user’s tweets [6].
7 1
59 User’s personal-
ity
A statistical text-based analysis for finding
psychologically-meaningful features by using
Inquiry and Word Count dictionary [109].
7 1
60 Part-of-speech
tagging
A set of syntactic information extracted from each
tweet of the user’s tweets by using Twitter-specific
tagger [109].
7 1
61 Hashtag diver-
sity
The diversity of the hashtags posted in the user’s
tweets [148].
7 1
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62 URL diversity The diversity of the URLs posted in the user’s tweets
[148].
7 1
63 Mentions diver-
sity
The diversity of the mentions posted in the user’s
tweets [148].
7 1
64 Average number
of characters
The total number of characters in the user’s tweets
divided by the number of user’s tweets [101].
7 1
Graph Features
65 Number of fol-
lowees of the
user’s followers
The total number of the followees of the user’s fol-
lowers [18].
7 >1
66 Mean and Vari-
ance of followers’
ages
The mean and the variance of the user’s followers
ages [148]
7 >1
67 Mean and Vari-
ance of followee’s
ages
The mean and the variance of the user’s followees
ages [148]
7 >1
68 Mean and Vari-
ance of friends’
ages
The mean and the variance of the user’s friends ages
[148]
7 >1
69 Time weighted
followers
The weighted sum of the number user’s followers
based on the account age of followers [148].
7 >1
70 Time weighted
followees
The weighted sum of the number user’s followees
based on the account age of followers [148].
7 >1
71 Time weighted
friends
The weighted sum of the number user’s friends
based on the account age of friends [148].
7 >1
72 Number of fol-
lowers
The number of users that follow the user [18, 140, 54,
25, 59, 6, 109, 140, 101].
3 0
73 Number of fol-
lowees
The number of users that the considered Twitter user
follows [18, 140, 54, 25, 59, 6, 109, 101].
3 0
74 Fraction of
followers to
followees
The ratio of the user’s followers with respect to the
user’s followees [18, 25, 104, 156, 6, 109, 140, 101].
3 0
75 Following to Fol-
lowers Ratio
The ratio of the user’s followees to the user’s follow-
ers [129, 6].
3 >1
76 Number of
Friends
The number of users that the user follows them and
they follow the user in the same time (i.e. intersection
of followers and followees). [140, 25, 7, 104, 71, 109,
140]
7 >1
77 Reputation The ratio of number of followers with respect to the
sum of followers and followees sets [141, 99, 25, 109].
3 0
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78 Local Clustering
Coefficient
The proportion of following relations between the
user’s followers and followees divided by the num-
ber of all possible following relations among them
[161].
7 >1
79 Betweenness
Centrality
The centrality measure of the user with a graph of
Twitter users [161].
7 >1
80 Bi-directional
Links Ratio
The ratio of number of the common users of the
user’s followers and followees divided by the num-
ber of unique users of the user’s followers and foll-
woees [161, 58].
7 >1
81 Average Neigh-
bors’ Followers
The average number of followers of the user’s fol-
lowees [161].
7 >1
82 Average Neigh-
bors’ Tweets
The average number of tweets of the user’s followees
[161].
7 >1
83 Followings to
Median Neigh-
bors’ Followers
The ratio of number of the user’s followees with re-
spect to the median number of the followers of the
user’s followees [161].
7 >1
84 Distance The length of the shortest path between the user and
other Twitter user [127, 166].
7 >1
85 Connectivity The strength of a connection between the user and
other Twitter user [127, 166].
7 >1
86 PageRank The importance of the user with respect to other
Twitter users [166].
7 >1
87 In-degree of men-
tions graph
The number of users mentioning the user of interest
(e.g. hashtag, url) [6].
7 >1
88 Weighted in-
degree of men-
tions graph
The number of times that the user of interest (e.g.
hashtag, url) was mentioned by other users [6].
7 >1
89 Density of
weighted in-
degree of men-
tions graph
The number of times that the user of interest (e.g.
hashtag, url) was mentioned normalised by the num-
ber of users mentioned the user [6].
7 >1
90 Out-degree of
mentions graph
The number of users mentioned by the user of inter-
est (e.g. hashtag, url) [6].
7 >1
91 Weighted out-
degree of men-
tions graph
The number of time the user of interest mentioned
other users [6].
7 >1
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92 Density of
weighted out-
degree of men-
tions graph
The number of time the user of interest mentioned
other users normalised by the number of accounts
that mentioned the user [6].
7 >1
93 Bi-degree of men-
tions graph
The number of reciprocal mention relationships [6]. 7 >1
94 Weighted bi-
degree of men-
tions graph
The weighted reciprocal relationship or conversa-
tions length [6].
7 >1
95 closeness central-
ity of mentions
graph
The closeness centrality of the user with respect to
the 1.5 ego network [6].
7 >1
96 betweenness
centrality of
mentions graph
The betweenness centrality of the user with respect
to the 1.5 mention ego network [6].
7 >1
97 Density of rel-
ative edges of
mentions graph
The total degree of the user normalized by the total
number of edges in the 1.5 ego network [6].
7 >1
98 Open strongly
connected com-
ponents of
mentions graph
The number of strongly connected components in
the neighborhood of the user [6].
7 >1
99 Open weakly
connected com-
ponents of
mentions graph
The number of weakly connected components in the
neighborhood of the user [6].
7 >1
100 Ego strongly
connected com-
ponents of
mentions graph
The number of strongly connected components in
the 1.5 ego network of the user [6].
7 >1
101 Ego weakly
connected com-
ponents of
mentions graph
The number of weakly connected components in the
1.5 ego network of the user [6].
7 >1
Timing Features
102 Min, Max, Avg,
Median of num-
ber of tweets
posted per day
The minimum, maximum, average, and median of
the number of tweets that are posted daily by the
user [18, 25, 109].
7 1
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103 Min, Max, Avg,
Median of num-
ber of tweets
posted per week
The minimum, maximum, average, and median of
the number of tweets that are posted per week by
the user [18, 109].
7 1
104 Min, Max, Avg,
Median of the
time tweets
The minimum, maximum, average, and median of
the time difference between two consecutive tweets
[18, 3, 100, 58, 101].
7 1
105 Following Rate The rate of the user in following Twitter users [161,
109].
7 >1
106 Tweets time dis-
tribution
The distribution of the posting time of the user’s
tweets over 24-hour period [99].
7 1
107 Variance in tweet
intervals
The variance in the posting time interval between
each two consecutive tweets [7].
7 1
108 Active days The number of days between the oldest tweet and
newest tweet in the user’s tweets [156].
7 >1
109 Hashtags post-
ing behaviour
similarity
The correlation among the posting time distributions
of whole hashtags posted in the user’s tweets [148].
7 1
110 URLs posting
behaviour simi-
larity
The correlation among the posting time distributions
of whole URLs posted in the user’s tweets [148].
7 1
111 Mentions post-
ing behaviour
similarity
The correlation among the posting time distributions
of whole mentions existing in the user’s tweets [148].
7 1
Automation Fea-
tures
112 API Ratio The ratio of the number of the user’s tweets posted
by an API tool to the total number of the user’s
tweets [161, 58, 58].
7 1
113 API URL Ratio The ratio of the number of the user’s tweets contain-
ing a URL posted by an API tool to the total number
of the user’s tweets posted by API [161].
7 1
114 API Tweet Simi-
larity
The content similarity of the tweets posted only by
an API tool [161].
7 1
Geographic fea-
tures
115 Country changes
per month
The number of times per month that a user
moves across country boundaries between consecu-
tive tweet [58].
7 1
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116 Speed limit per
month
The monthly average number of times that the user
has a traveling speed exceeding a defined speed
threshold [58].
7 >1
117 Mean speed The average tweeting speed [58]. 7 1
118 Max speed The maximum tweeting speed that the user followed
in his tweets [58].
7 1
119 Unique countries
per month
The average monthly number of countries that the
user has been [58].
7 >1

B
COLLECT IVE -BASED FRAMEWORK DETA ILED RESULTS
In the following, we report detailed results related to the performance of classical, asym-
metrical, and our collective-based method, studied at different configurations and su-
pervised machine learning algorithms.
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(a) Spam class recall performance results of the classical method, reported at
different training set sizes, and various learning algorithms.
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(b) Spam class recall performance results of the asymmetric method, reported
at different training set sizes, two tweet frequencies, and various learning
algorithms.
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(c) Spam class recall performance results of our collective-based method, re-
ported at two tweet frequencies, three classification thresholds, two numbers
of communities, and various learning algorithms.
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(a) Spam class precision performance results of the classical method, reported at dif-
ferent training set sizes, and various learning algorithms.
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 500 Tweets Frequency, 500 Training Tweets
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 500 Tweets Frequency, 1000 Training Tweets
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 500 Tweets Frequency, 5000 Training Tweets
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 1000 Tweets Frequency, 500 Training Tweets
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 1000 Tweets Frequency, 1000 Training Tweets
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of Streamed Tweets
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Spam Precsion, 1000 Tweets Frequency, 5000 Training Tweets
(b) Spam class precision performance results of the asymmetric method, reported at
different training set sizes, two tweet frequencies, and various learning algorithms.
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(c) Spam class precision performance results of our collective-based method, reported
at two tweet frequencies, three classification thresholds, two numbers of communi-
ties, and various learning algorithms.
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(a) Spam class F-measure performance results of the classical method, reported at dif-
ferent training set sizes, and various learning algorithms.
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(b) Spam class F-measure performance results of the asymmetric method, reported at
different training set sizes, two tweet frequencies, and various learning algorithms.
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(c) Spam class F-measure performance results of our collective-based method, reported
at two tweet frequencies, three classification thresholds, two numbers of communi-
ties, and various learning algorithms.
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